Ban Keun and Beyond: Vietnam Engages Neighbours to Hedge China’s Encircling Power

The Ban Keun joint training centre and aviation academy in Laos, jointly announced by China and Laos on 29 September, has drawn wide media and analytical attention. Analysts agree this matters most for Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, Thailand. While Bangkok has said it has no immediate concerns and will monitor the facility, Hanoi had issued no official response by late October. Instead, Vietnam appears to have quietly and proactively deepened political and defence ties with Laos and Cambodia to secure its western flank.

Construction of the facility, ostensibly for training Lao pilots, began in late 2025. Neither government said anything publicly until China’s Ministry of National Defense announced the launch ceremony, attended by Lao Defence Minister General Khamlieng Outhakaysone. Laos has not responded to media requests, and the project’s duration, cost and personnel remain undisclosed.

Given the opacity of the project, some have hypothesized that Ban Keun is China’s first air base in Southeast Asia. For now, satellite imagery shows a roughly 2,000m runway, a modest apron and eight K-8 jet trainers — infrastructure suited to training rather than power projection, as security expert Olli Pekka Suorsa notes.

But that is a snapshot, not a trajectory. Construction remains under way and there is room to extend the runway by up to 1,000m — enough for larger aircraft, including bombers. Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base offers a precedent: after its China-funded upgrade, Chinese corvettes berthed there for months from December 2023, even as Phnom Penh insisted the deployment was not permanent.

For Vietnam, the risk lies less in war than in peacetime. Suorsa rightly notes that Chinese combat aircraft can already reach all of Vietnam from China’s own bases — but that matters mainly in wartime. In peacetime, military access and operating permissions weigh heavier. Ban Keun could eventually become a base for sustained Chinese aviation activity in Laos and, with Vientiane’s consent, for radar, unmanned systems or intelligence-gathering aircraft. Such capabilities could enhance Chinese awareness of military activities across parts of mainland Southeast Asia, including Vietnam’s western fringes and Thailand.

Ban Keun may serve multiple strategic purposes, but viewed from Hanoi, it nearly closes the circle of potential military pressure. Vietnam now faces China’s military presence to the north, disputed Paracel Islands to the east, and the Spratly Islands to the southeast — reinforced by Chinese coast guard, survey and maritime militia activities in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone along its central and southeast coast. To the southwest and west, China’s growing security presence at Ream and now Ban Keun brings this circle of pressure closer to completion.

Consistent with its doctrine of protecting the country “early and from afar,” in which potential security threats should be addressed at inception and beyond borders, Hanoi has maintained an exceptionally active schedule of high-level engagement with both capitals in 2026.

Through a Vietnamese lens, China appears to be playing weiqi – literally “the surrounding game”, known in English as Go, gradually encircling the opponent’s territory until it has no room to manoeuvre. Vietnam is China’s weaker and non-aligned neighbour, but also an ideological and trading partner. Whereas Beijing applies overt pressure on the Philippines, China is viewed as trying to constrain Vietnam through long-term encirclement combined with economic dominance.

Beijing plays this game patiently, over decades, such as in the South China Sea where artificial islands it said were mainly for civilian use were later fitted with hangars and missiles. Ban Keun could follow a similar path.

Vietnam could not have missed a year-long airfield project 50km from Vientiane or failed to monitor it. Though publicly silent, Hanoi is hardly unconcerned: a Vietnamese official told AP that a Chinese deployment there would “naturally place a certain degree of additional military pressure on Vietnam.”

Such reticence reflects Hanoi’s traditional approach to its two neighbours. On sensitive issues — Mekong hydropower dams, Cambodia’s withdrawal from the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area in 2024, or the Funan Techo canal — Vietnam has generally been gentle and conciliatory to preserve its special relations, giving its neighbours room to manage China and domestic politics.

Consistent with its doctrine of protecting the country “early and from afar”, in which potential security threats should be addressed at inception and beyond borders, Hanoi has maintained an exceptionally active schedule of high-level engagement with both capitals in 2026. In February, shortly after Vietnam’s 14th Party Congress, General Secretary To Lam made Laos and Cambodia his first foreign destinations of the new term. In Phnom Penh, the three held a summit of ruling-party chiefs, attended by their prime ministers and parliamentary leaders.

In early October, days after the Ban Keun announcement, Prime Minister Le Minh Hung made his first official visits to both countries since taking office. On 14 October, Defence Minister General Phan Van Giang hosted his Lao and Cambodian counterparts for the 10th trilateral defence ministers’ meeting and a joint civil defence exercise; To Lam also received both ministers. Notably, General Khamlieng travelled to Hanoi barely two weeks after the Ban Keun ceremony, and Vietnam will soon host two subregional summits with its mainland neighbours.

Looking Ahead

These moves suggest Hanoi believes closer ties with Laos and Cambodia will help it hedge against whatever Ban Keun and Ream may become. In Go, an encircled player can survive by holding vital positions that preserve freedom of movement. For Vietnam, sustaining close political and security ties with Vientiane and Phnom Penh could serve a similar purpose: keeping its western flank secured and preventing China’s growing influence from translating into strategic isolation.

As Ban Keun evolves, Hanoi should not only deepen its special ties with its western neighbours but also strengthen its web of economic and defence relations with other Southeast Asian countries, middle powers and regional groupings, short of alliance, to ensure that — even if it cannot win — it does not lose China’s long game of encirclement.

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