Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) leadership at the 72nd PAS annual congress on 5 September 2026 in Kelantan, Malaysia. (Photo from Abdul Hadi Awang / Facebook)

Can PAS “Sell” Its Technocratic Record?

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Parti Islam SeMalaysia is trying to show voters that it has a record of solid governance. Its record, however, has been patchy.

A string of electoral victories in recent years has inspired Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) to go for more urbanised and developed states in the run-up to the next general elections. PAS’ strategy is straightforward: in addition to leveraging its religious credentials, the party also seeks to underscore its ability to govern well. The problem here, however, is that PAS might not have a solid technocratic record to sell to voters.

PAS was established by the ulama (religious scholars) wing of United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). As part of the Islamic resurgent wave starting in the 1980s, the ulama leadership began to shape PAS into a movement that represented the “authentic Islam”, as opposed to more ‘westernised’ and ‘secular’ UMNO. PAS became synonymous with the image of a party that exclusively focuses on matters of faith and whose solutions to real-world problems can only be found in religious texts. Consequently, the general public perceives PAS’s ulama leadership to be ill-equipped to deal with the complex challenges of modern life.

Currently, PAS controls the state governments of four states: Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Terengganu. In the 2022 general election and various state elections in the following year, PAS made inroads into states previously controlled by UMNO, such as Perak, Pahang and Selangor. These states differ from the PAS strongholds of Kelantan and Terengganu because they are more urbanised, economically developed and demographically diverse. Campaigning on a platform of Islamic credibility to govern was not enough to attract Malay voters in these states. They may be religiously conservative but will not blindly vote based on faith alone. The results of Johor and Negeri Sembilan state elections this year show that the more urbanised West Coast and southern states pose a challenge for PAS. The only way for the party to expand its presence is by allying with Malay nationalist parties such as UMNO and the newly formed Parti Wawasan Negara (Wawasan).   

A Merdeka Center nationwide poll in April this year showed that 81 per cent of Muslim bumiputera list economic concerns as the country’s main challenge. About 53 per cent of Malays feel the country is going in the wrong direction. A majority of those making less than MYR4,000 per month (SGD1,261), many of whom are Malays, feel the same. PAS is targeting these voters, and it is clear that their top priority is the economy. PAS’s aim is to show them it has a sound and feasible economic agenda and more importantly, the technocratic chops to carry it out.

At its annual congress (muktamar) in early September, PAS sought to convince the Malaysian public of its ability to govern. Besides the expected Malay-Islamic unity agenda, PAS also put forth reformist-like motions, such as the creation of a Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) on the so-called corporate mafia; increasing protection of healthcare workers and ramping up rice production to augment food security. Whether PAS can convince voters of this reformist, welfare-focused vision remains a challenge in the months leading up to the general election.

As Malaysia heads into the 16th general election, PAS needs to make a case for its governing ability to hesitant Malay voters in urban and semi-urban areas.

PAS has some ground to cover from its posturing of the past decade. After purging the so-called “professional” faction in 2015, PAS has since adopted a more ethno-religious stance. It has fused Islamism and Malay nationalism and coalesced around its hardline president, Abdul Hadi Awang. The image turns off many Malays who are pious but do not buy into PAS’s divisive rhetoric. Hence the appeal of technocrats in PAS who are seen as the party’s moderate face.

Since 2018, PAS has been showcasing technocratic leaders such as Ahmad Samsuri Mokhtar, the Chief Minister of Terengganu and Syahir Sulaiman, the MP of Bachok in Kelantan. Ahmad Samsuri, who is better known as Dr. Sam, holds a PhD in Aerospace Engineering from the University of Leeds and is a protégé of Abdul Hadi Awang. Syahir Sulaiman has a private sector background, having worked with the Sime Darby Group before becoming a full-time politician in 2018.

PAS regularly uses the Samsuri administration in Terengganu as an example of the party’s governing achievements. But PAS might be overstating its case. As an oil-producing state, Terengganu is highly dependent on oil royalties from the federal government, which make up about 80–90 per cent of its budget. During his first term (2018–2023), such royalties played a big role in the Samsuri administration’s ability to fulfill its populist agenda. This was primarily due to the unimpeded flow of revenue from the then Perikatan Nasional (PN) federal government, of which PAS was part. The dynamic changed after 2022 when the current Madani federal government took over. These royalty payments are now subjected to onerous conditions set by Putrajaya. This affects the Samsuri administration’s visibility significantly, as the federal government can now claim credit for the payments.  Instead of filling up the state coffers that the Samsuri administration can then use to carry out its agenda, the federal government has opted to develop the state directly by funding myriad projects such as a new hospital in Dungun and a MYR60 million (SGD19 million) poverty eradication programme, among others.

But are the technocrats in PAS actually more religiously moderate compared to the hardline ulamas in the party? Given that PAS seeks to propel an ideologically-driven movement, party members must go through a regimented indoctrination process, such as regularly attending usrah (guided study sessions). In short, a PAS technocrat can be as dogmatic as a religious scholar; the only difference is that one wears a suit and a tie while the other wears a robe and a turban. Authority over matters of faith and ideological underpinnings still resides with the ulama council (Majlis Syura Ulamak). Economic policies formulated by the party’s technocrats have to get a religious imprimatur from the ulamas.

As Malaysia heads into the 16th general election, PAS needs to make a case for its governing ability to hesitant Malay voters in urban and semi-urban areas. This is especially so when development in the four states governed by PAS still lags behind PH-governed states like Selangor and Penang. Working with UMNO would help PAS leverage the former’s vast experience and proven track record in government. In the 2022 general election and various 2023 state elections, PAS combined forces with Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu). This allowed it to penetrate Malay-majority areas outside of its strongholds. As a result, PAS increased its parliamentary seats from 18 to 43 and made inroads in Perak, Selangor and Pahang. There is a similar dynamic now with UMNO since the falling out between PAS and Bersatu. One key difference is UMNO is now stronger than Bersatu and it would not want to play second fiddle to PAS in this partnership. The tussle for dominance between these two parties will be a key dynamic as the general election looms closer. If PAS decides not to ally itself with UMNO, it would face a tough challenge in persuading the skeptical Malay electorate to put their trust in its mixed technocratic record.

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Dr Azmil Tayeb is a Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute. He is an Associate Professor at the School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia.