Mary Jane Veloso and Transnational Crime: Lessons for ASEAN

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s absolute pardon of Mary Jane Veloso on 24 September 2026 has finally ended her 16-year detention, but the path to her release underscores why responses to transnational crime must balance national action with regional cooperation. The Philippines’ 2026 ASEAN chairmanship makes this recent development in Veloso’s case particularly timely, as Manila is well placed to advance regional cooperation on tackling trafficking and protecting its victims.

In 2010, Veloso was arrested in Indonesia after 2.6 kg of heroin were found in her luggage. She was consequently tried and sentenced to death for drug trafficking. Throughout her incarceration, Veloso maintained that she was a victim and that she had been deceived by recruiters who promised employment abroad, making her an unwitting drug courier. She narrowly avoided execution in 2015 when then-Indonesian President Joko Widodo granted a last-minute reprieve after Veloso’s suspected recruiters were arrested in the Philippines.

Veloso’s ordeal highlights wider problems across the region. As Southeast Asia’s local crime syndicates have restructured and consolidated their presence across national borders, the number of persons trafficked for forced criminality has become a pressing issue for ASEAN. Trafficking for forced criminality involves compelling victims to commit offences for their exploiters’ benefit. While Veloso’s account of unknowingly carrying drugs differs from such coercion, both raise the risk of exploitation being overlooked when victims are only treated as offenders. This “victim-offender overlap” (when an exploited person is also treated as an offender), together with national politics in both Indonesia and the Philippines, shaped how Veloso’s case unfolded.

The Philippine position and actions on her case spanned three presidential administrations. Former President Benigno Aquino III repeatedly sought clemency, and his administration’s efforts were pivotal in the 2015 postponement of the execution, especially as prosecutors needed Veloso’s statement to strengthen the qualified trafficking case filed against her recruiters. Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022) took a less interventionist position than Aquino: although he denied endorsing Veloso’s execution, he reportedly told Widodo in 2016 to “follow your own laws”. During Marcos Jr.’s and Prabowo Subianto’s presidencies, bilateral negotiations culminated in the 2024 agreement allowing Veloso’s transfer to the Philippines. Marcos Jr. then granted Veloso an absolute pardon on 24 September 2026.

While the Philippines eventually treated Veloso as a victim of trafficking and considered her a key witness in the case against her recruiters, Indonesia regarded her as an offender under its punitive drug laws. When her execution was scheduled in 2015, Joko Widodo’s government was pursuing a hard-line approach to narcotics offences. Veloso’s case, and the contrasting treatment by Indonesian and Philippine authorities illustrates the victim-offender overlap. It also highlights the relevance of ASEAN’s Guideline on the Implementation of the Non-Punishment Principle for Protection of Victims of Trafficking in Persons (ASEAN NPP Guideline), under which trafficking victims should not be penalised for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of their trafficking.

This victim-offender overlap has become increasingly prevalent in transnational crime networks in the region. In the worsening problem posed by online scam hubs, people from various countries are recruited with false promises of legitimate jobs, moved across borders and coerced into committing online fraud. Unlike Veloso, who maintained that she did not know she was carrying drugs, scam centre workers may know they are committing fraud but face threats or violence if they refuse. As a result, they may appear as suspected scammers rather than as victims of trafficking.

ASEAN is addressing this risk of misidentification by developing regional tools for victim protection. The 2026 ASEAN Indicators on Trafficking for Forced Criminality provide law enforcement agencies with tools to identify potential victims of trafficking for forced criminality and support the application of the non-punishment principle where unlawful acts result from exploitation. Together with the ASEAN Multi-Sectoral Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Work Plan 2023–2028, these regional cooperation efforts recognise that the bureaucratic categories national governments use to confront transnational criminal networks seldom fit. The Philippines’ Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act already provides that trafficked persons shall not be penalised for crimes directly related to their trafficking, and complementing it with ASEAN tools can further strengthen the identification and protection of potential victims, as well as cooperation across jurisdictions.

The more consequential lesson from Veloso’s case is that national protection, bilateral cooperation and regional mechanisms must work together.

The Philippines has a long institutional record in ASEAN cooperation on transnational crime. Manila hosted the first ASEAN Conference on Transnational Crime in 1997, which produced the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime and marked the start of dedicated ministerial cooperation in this field. More recently, the Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC)-Philippines became ASEAN’s voluntary lead shepherd on trafficking in persons. This led to the development of the original Bohol Trafficking in Persons Work Plan and helped shape its successor, the 2023–2028 ASEAN Multi-Sectoral TIP. In August 2026, the ASEAN SOMTC-Philippines and ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) Indonesia jointly convened a workshop to validate ASEAN’s new forced criminality indicators and training materials.

Veloso’s pardon comes against the backdrop of the Philippines’ history of involvement in shaping transnational crime policies in ASEAN. The timing is especially apt given Manila’s stated priorities for its 2026 ASEAN chairmanship, which include “Peace and Security Anchors” and “People Empowerment”. The pairing captures the dilemma exposed by Veloso’s case: her arrest and detention reflected the view that combating drug trafficking and organised crime is a security concern, yet identifying migrants exploited by criminal networks is simultaneously a matter of protection and justice.

Policy Implications

Since recruitment, exploitation and prosecution may occur in different ASEAN states, no single jurisdiction can balance law enforcement and victim protection on its own. ASEAN’s 2025 NPP Guideline and 2026 ASEAN Indicators on Trafficking for Forced Criminality are intended precisely to reduce the risk that trafficking victims are treated only as offenders before possible trafficking is identified. ASEAN states therefore have a stake in this issue since victim identification and labour protection operate through national institutions alongside regional cooperation.

As ASEAN chair, the Philippines can use its convening role to strengthen regional cooperation on transnational crime. The Philippines recently hosted the 20th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) in Manila on 19–21 October, ahead of the 49th ASEAN Summit in November. The chairmanship cannot dictate national criminal law, but it can promote policy initiatives, coordination and cooperation across ASEAN mechanisms. Through the upcoming summit, Manila can promote joint training on victim identification, cross-border referrals and follow-up on national implementation of ASEAN’s NPP Guideline and forced criminality frameworks and tools.

The more consequential lesson from Veloso’s case is that national protection, bilateral cooperation and regional mechanisms must work together. Veloso’s case may remain exceptional in its duration and visibility, but the victim-offender overlap it exposes is increasingly visible across Southeast Asia and requires sustained regional attention and cooperation.

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