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Screenshot from Thai PBS World YouTube video, “Can UNCLOS settle Thai-Cambodia Maritime Claims?” (Captured 16 October 2026).

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Will the Cambodia-Thailand UNCLOS Compulsory Conciliation Prove Conciliatory?

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Cambodia has initiated compulsory conciliation with Thailand under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This article argues that there are already some positive signs that the conciliation might yield productive outcomes.

INTRODUCTION

On 2 June 2026, Cambodia initiated conciliation with Thailand under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to settle the dispute over the overlapping claims area (OCA) of approximately 26,000 km2 in the Gulf of Thailand. Cambodia’s notification of the ‘compulsory conciliation’ was made while the tension between the two countries remained unprecedentedly high. In the public address, Prime Minister Hun Manet affirmed that this ‘is not escalation. It is a facilitated negotiation between two nations overseen by international expert conciliators’. The immediate response by the Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow, however, criticised Cambodia’s move as a ‘rushed decision’ that ‘may have repercussions and cause efforts to rebuild trust and confidence towards restoring bilateral relations to falter or stall’. Thailand nevertheless decided to proceed with the conciliation. As a result, a conciliation commission, composed of five renowned international lawyers, was constituted on 14 September. The first meeting between the commission and representatives of the two countries was held in Singapore from 14-16 September, and the second one in The Hague from 14-18 October.

Many aspects of the UNCLOS conciliation between Cambodia and Thailand remain unclear for both lay audiences and legal experts. What is the nature of this compulsory conciliation? How will it unfold? Perhaps more importantly, what is the likely outcome? The relevant rules are prescribed in Article 298 of UNCLOS and Annex V thereto, but these provisions only provide for a broad framework of the proceedings. Moreover, there is only one precedent to look to—the compulsory conciliation between Timor-Leste and Australia, which culminated in the historic agreement between the two countries in 2018.

This article aims to bring some clarity to these issues. In particular, it argues that while the conciliation proceedings between Cambodia and Thailand are still at a very early stage, there are already some positive signs that the conciliation might yield productive outcomes. Despite nationalistic sentiment on both sides, there is room for some agreement at the end of the conciliation.

A BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE

At the heart of the maritime dispute between Cambodia and Thailand are overlapping claims in the Gulf of Thailand made at different points in time. This created an OCA requiring boundary delimitation. The key developments can be summarised as follows.

Table 1. Key developments in the maritime dispute between Cambodia and Thailand

Source: Author’s compilation from the UN Treaty Collection and Schofield and Tan-Mullins (2008)

It is noteworthy that both Cambodia and Thailand, like states in different regions, began to claim new maritime zones and entitlements as the law of the sea evolved over the last sixty years.

As a result of overlapping claims, Cambodia and Thailand agreed in 2001 to negotiate the settlement and management of their maritime dispute. This 2001 MOU officially recognises the OCA as reflected in the annexed sketch. The sketch divides the OCA into two blocs along the line of 11 degrees latitude north. The stated purpose of the MOU is for the two countries to simultaneously conduct accelerated negotiations to conclude an agreement for the joint development of hydrocarbon resources in one bloc and to agree on the delimitation of the territorial sea, continental shelf, and EEZ in another. Neither has been achieved, however. Indeed, both countries have organised only two rounds of formal, high-level negotiations in 25 years.

In September 2025, the Anutin Government of Thailand announced that it would hold a referendum on the termination of the 2001 MOU. Experts in the parliamentary committee cautioned that the termination might prompt Cambodia to ratify UNCLOS, so as to be able to resort to the compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms therein, which would reduce Thailand’s control over the settlement process. Prior to the termination, Cambodian media had already reported in January 2026 that the Cambodian Senate had approved the law ratifying UNCLOS. The Cambodian Government did finally ratify it on 6 February 2026.

On 5 May 2026, the Thai Council of Ministers adopted the resolution to terminate the 2001 MOU. The publicly available explanation was that Thailand wanted to make room for a new, more feasible agreement on the overlapping claims area under UNCLOS. Cambodia did not deny Thailand’s right to unilaterally terminate the MOU, although it expressed regret. Indeed, Cambodia used this fact to justify its decision to resort to compulsory conciliation under UNCLOS. On the same day that the Thai Cabinet’s decision was announced, the Cambodian PM declared the intention to use compulsory conciliation on his Facebook page. In the 2 June address, he expressly remarked that ‘the MOU 2001—the only agreed bilateral framework in relation to the overlapping maritime claims area over the past 25 years could no longer be relied upon’.

Now that the conciliation has commenced, it is fair to say that neither Thailand nor Cambodia desires to continue negotiations under the 2001 MOU framework.

THE NATURE OF UNCLOS COMPLUSORY CONCILIATION

Under international law, conciliation remains little understood. The UN Office of Legal Affairs describes it as the combination of inquiry and mediation. Under UNCLOS specifically, conciliation is the means of dispute settlement under which an ad hoc neutral commission is established with the mandate to assist the disputants in reaching an amicable settlement. Under Article 6 of Annex V, the commission may hear the parties, examine their claims and objections, make proposals to the parties, and assist the parties in any other way. Article 5 makes it abundantly clear that ‘[t]he commission may draw the attention of the parties to any measures which might facilitate an amicable settlement of the dispute’. Unlike a court or an arbitral tribunal, the conciliation commission does not have the power to give a legally binding decision on the dispute. UNCLOS empowers it to issue non-legally binding recommendations to the parties that carry diplomatic and political weight. Judge Koroma, the former ICJ judge who also served as a conciliator in the Timor-Leste-Australia conciliation, captured the crux of the matter succinctly: ‘The main purpose of conciliation’, he noted, ‘is to facilitate parties’ amicable settlement of their dispute—not for the Commission to solve it for them’.

Clearly distinguishing conciliation from adjudication is instrumental in reaching positive outcomes. In the context of the Timor Sea conciliation, the counsel for both countries insightfully identified two important features of the conciliation process: that the process was forward-looking, and that it ‘focused on seeking an overall solution to the issues in dispute, rather than merely an adjudication of the parties’ respective legal claims’. The parties are free to shape the contour and trajectory of the conciliation process.

Unlike a court or an arbitral tribunal, the conciliation commission does not have the power to give a legally binding decision on the dispute. UNCLOS empowers it to issue non-legally binding recommendations to the parties that carry diplomatic and political weight.

Since the conciliation commission’s main task is facilitative, the parties will play the leading role in the process with the view to reaching settlement. Specifically, they are expected to present their views, respond to each other’s claims, answer the commission’s questions, clarify their respective interests (including non-legal interests), and negotiate. If a consensus emerges that the outcome will be a treaty, the parties might need to negotiate the text—as was the case in the Timor Sea conciliation.

UNCLOS provides for two types of conciliation. One is voluntary conciliation to be initiated jointly by the disputants. The other type is compulsory conciliation, which a disputing party may initiate unilaterally, as prescribed by Article 11 in Section 2 of Annex V.

The Cambodia-Thailand conciliation is compulsory. The rationale of this mechanism is tied to the drafting history of UNCLOS. When UNCLOS was negotiated, it was widely agreed that this new treaty should contain compulsory mechanisms to resolve disputes over interpretation and application, ensuring consistency and harmonisation among all parties. Ocean governance would be ineffective if the parties could interpret the same UNCLOS provision differently to suit their preferences. Many states, however, were not ready to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of international courts and arbitral tribunals with regard to maritime delimitation disputes. They would prefer bilateral negotiation to third-party adjudication. As a compromise, compulsory conciliation was introduced in Article 298. It is designed to be used when the disputing party exercises its right not to accept the jurisdiction of international courts or tribunals in a maritime delimitation dispute. Thailand has made clear that it does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of international courts or tribunals in disputes relating to sea boundary delimitations or involving historic bays or titles. As a consequence, under Article 298(1)(a)(i), Thailand must ‘accept submission of the matter to conciliation’. Indeed Article 12 of Annex V clarifies that the party’s refusal to proceed with conciliation does not constitute a bar to the proceedings. Simply put, UNCLOS requires the parties to accept either adjudication or compulsory conciliation to settle maritime delimitation disputes.

PROCEDURAL FLEXIBILITY IN COMPULSORY CONCILIATION

UNCLOS empowers the conciliation commission to determine its own rules of procedure. In practice, the commission is expected to thoroughly consult with both sides to adopt the mutually acceptable rules of procedure and organisation of the proceedings to build trust and confidence in the proceedings. The conciliation procedure can be informal. Indeed, the whole proceedings can be kept confidential if the parties so prefer.

The conciliation between Cambodia and Thailand will thus unfold as agreed by the commission and the parties. The detailed schedule has not been made public. What can be expected is a series of intensive and structured negotiations and meetings with the conciliation commission or its representative in the coming months. According to Cambodia, six more meetings with the Commission have been scheduled.

Notwithstanding a large measure of procedural flexibility, Annex V to UNCLOS lays down the default timeframe to ensure that the parties and the commission are not trapped in a futile process. The commission has the duty to produce a report within 12 months from the date of its constitution. If the parties reach an agreement, the report may simply record it. If there is no such agreement, UNCLOS requires the commission to give its conclusions on questions of fact or law relevant to the dispute and recommendations appropriate for the parties’ settlement. The 12-month negotiation deadline may be extended jointly by the parties.

DIFFERENT SCENARIOS OF THE OUTCOME

In the opening statements in Singapore on 15 September, both Cambodia and Thailand clarified their objectives in the conciliation. Cambodia’s desired outcomes are threefold: (1) a treaty determining a single, all-purpose boundary; (2) an agreement of joint development and sharing of resources pending a final delimitation agreement; and (3) the conciliation commission’s recommendations for the two countries if either a delimitation treaty or a joint development arrangement cannot be concluded at the end of the conciliation. Thailand, for its part, emphatically insisted that the ‘scope of these proceedings concerns only maritime boundary delimitation’. Thus, the overlapping consensus between the two sides (so far) lies only in the delimitation of negotiations.

While the objectives may evolve as the negotiation progresses, different scenarios of the outcome can already be envisaged. In the best-case scenario, the governments of Cambodia and Thailand can agree on boundary delimitation in all maritime zones in the overlapping claims area in the Gulf of Thailand. This, as a matter of international law, will definitively settle the delimitation dispute between the two states. The 12-month deadline might be unrealistic in this regard, but the parties may jointly extend it. This scenario requires clear and unequivocal political will on both sides at the governmental level.

The worst-case scenario is the exact opposite: nothing is agreed on. The legal position between Cambodia and Thailand will largely remain status quo before the conciliation. The conciliation commission is likely to make recommendations setting out the framework for continued negotiation. It might also recommend the joint submission of this dispute to a court. Article 298(1)(a)(ii) of UNCLOS expressly requires Cambodia and Thailand to continue negotiating an agreement based on the commission’s report. The same provision also specifies that if the continued negotiation does not result in an agreement, the parties shall, by mutual consent, submit the question to international adjudication. This might heighten the tension between the two countries.

Between the two extremes lie different shades of agreement between Cambodia and Thailand. Depending on the political will of both sides, it is possible that the parties will agree on the delimitation of some segments, but not the entirety of the OCA.

At a minimum, both states have an incentive to agree on the framework for future negotiation. Given that Thailand has already rejected the 2001 MOU and that Cambodia desires a settlement, a clear and practical framework for negotiation serves the interests of both sides. If the parties wish to be perceived as playing the leading role in the process, they have an incentive to at least come to an agreement on a concrete framework for continued negotiations. The commission is likely to simply recommend the parties to constructively negotiate on the basis of such a framework. For Thailand specifically, its public justification will be consistent: the termination of MOU2001 will indeed lead to a new framework. It will also allow Thailand to claim control over the negotiation without much involvement from a third party. 

DRAMATIS PERSONAE IN THE CONCILIATION

Although the Cambodia-Thailand conciliation is still at a very early phase, it is possible to point to some positive signs. Both governments have publicly expressed their intention to engage in the process, including in the 15 September opening statements. Such a public posture should not be taken for granted. In May, some corners of the Thai public argued against Thailand’s participation. The tone of the Thai opening statement, directed largely to the public, was combative, but it reiterated Thailand’s readiness to engage in the process constructively. As recent as 19 September, the Thai Foreign Minister gave an interview in Thai, reassuring the audience that this conciliation ‘should provide a win-win solution that is acceptable to both sides and the public’.

Cambodian Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn (first row, second from left) and Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow (first row, second from right) attend the first UNCLOS conciliation meeting in Singapore from 14 to 16 September 2026. (Photo by Thailand MFA) 

Another important sign for the potentially positive outcome is the dramatis personae in the process. Ambassador Tommy Koh of Singapore rightly attributed the historic success of the Timor Sea conciliation to the wisdom of the conciliators and the flexibility of both governments. It is instructive, then, to have an overview of key persons involved in the Cambodia-Thailand conciliation.

Cambodia appointed two ministers to lead the delegation. Cambodia’s delegation is supported by a large team of foreign counsel. The team comprises two partners of the Australia-based law firm, barristers, and a prominent French international law scholar, among others. Together, the team members not only claim extensive expertise on maritime disputes and resources but also possess experience in maritime delimitation negotiation and litigation in other parts of the world.

The Thai delegation offers a good match. The Deputy Agent, in particular, is Ambassador Songchai Chaipatiyut who has extensive experience in delimitation and demarcation with neighbouring countries. The delegation is assisted by high-profile international lawyers mainly from the UK and France including Sir Michael Wood KC who represented Timor-Leste in the conciliation. His direct experience in UNCLOS compulsory conciliation will be valuable in this context.

At a relatively early stage, Cambodia and Thailand had jointly chosen the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) as Registry in the proceedings. The PCA is a century-old institution with unrivalled experience in various forms of dispute settlement around the world. More importantly, it also served as Registry in the conciliation between Timor-Leste and Australia. As explained by the Timor Sea commission, the instrumental role of the PCA in the proceedings should not be overlooked.

The conciliation commission is truly exemplary. Cambodia appointed two eminent international lawyers—Ambassador Peter Taksoe-Jensen and Professor Jean-Marc Thouvenin. Ambassador Taksoe-Jensen is a Danish diplomat with the exceptional experience of being the Chair of the Timor Sea conciliation. Professor Thouvenin is a prominent French scholar, an experienced litigator, and world-leading authority on the law of the sea. Thailand, for its part, appointed two former Presidents of ITLOS: Judge Rüdiger Wolfrum and Judge Albert Hoffman. Judge Wolfrum is a pre-eminent German international law scholar who was a judge at ITLOS, and served as the first Vice President. He was also a conciliator in the Timor-Leste-Australia conciliation. Judge Hoffman was a South African judge at ITLOS from 2005 to 2023, and also served as President. With the experience of the two judges, the conciliation commission will benefit from the intimate knowledge of the caselaw in the history of ITLOS. Neither side objected to the appointment.

On 13 August 2026, the four conciliators, in consultation with the delegations of Cambodia and Thailand, appointed Australian former diplomat Katrina Cooper as Chair. The initial deadline for the appointment was extended by mutual agreement with Cambodia and Thailand, suggesting that the conciliators and the parties have genuinely endeavoured to find the name acceptable to both countries. Ambassador Cooper was not only a seasoned diplomat; she was also Co-Agent for Australia in the Timor Sea conciliation with direct experience in UNCLOS compulsory conciliation.

This stellar cast makes the conciliation promising. Both conciliators and counsel are well versed in procedural law, diplomacy, practice in dispute settlement, and the legal principles governing maritime delimitation. With their background, they are attuned to procedural flexibility, one of the key ingredients for successful outcomes, and to political sensitivity. At the same time, it illustrates that, so far, both Cambodia and Thailand have engaged constructively in the process, suggesting an intention to achieve positive outcomes.

At a minimum, both states have an incentive to agree on the framework for future negotiation. Given that Thailand has already rejected the 2001 MOU and that Cambodia desires a settlement, a clear and practical framework for negotiation serves the interests of both sides.

In addition to their mandate to facilitate an amicable settlement, the conciliators might desire a successful outcome from a ‘systemic’ perspective. In 2016, Judge Wolfrum wrote that whether the use of compulsory conciliation would increase might very much depend on the outcome of the then-ongoing conciliation between Timor-Leste and Australia. If successful, it might inspire other states to follow the example.

CONCLUSION

Even at this early stage, some key conditions for the positive outcomes of the conciliation between Cambodia and Thailand are already in place. Both sides have publicly expressed their intentions to engage constructively. The key persons involved in the process are exceedingly well-versed in law, diplomacy, procedure, practice, and political sensitivity. It also shows that the procedural steps have been taken by both countries with care. Since both sides share the incentive to at least agree on a framework for future negotiation, one might cautiously expect a positive conclusion to the conciliation.

Despite these positive signs, it is well to remember that the ball is also in the governments’ court—the governments of Cambodia and Thailand. Without the political will to seek a durable, mutually acceptable solution and make the necessary concessions, positive outcomes will be difficult to achieve. The reflections of the commission of the Timor Sea conciliation were crystal clear on this point: ‘it is in fact a significant benefit of conciliation that the proceedings were able to build on these aspirations for a positive outcome and preferable to a resolution of the dispute consisting merely of identifying a “winner”.’ Given the palpable nationalist sentiment, coupled with potential intervening political moves, the ultimate outcome remains an open question. One of the chief challenges for the prominent dramatis personae in the Cambodia-Thailand conciliation, then, is how to use the proceedings to generate more political will for durable solutions on both sides.


This is an adapted version of ISEAS Perspective 2026/74 published on 20 October 2026. The paper and its references can be accessed at this link.

Dr Phattharaphong Saengkrai is Lecturer and the Director of the LLM Programme at Faculty of Law, Thammasat University. He holds a PhD (summa cum laude) from Geneva Graduate Institute. Currently, he serves as an academic expert to the Committee of Foreign Affairs at the House Representatives of Thailand. He also advises states and non-state entities on matters of public international law.