Implications of India’s 2024 Election Outcomes for ASEAN

In early June, the Indian public delivered a stunning electoral surprise to Narendra Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). They did not give him a blank cheque to run India for the next five years. Instead, they clipped his power by dividing the mandate, which behooves the BJP to ally with regional parties to form the next government. What does a third Modi term mean for India, India’s foreign policy, and Southeast Asia?

Politically, though the BJP is the largest party in the Lok Sabha, Modi will depend on coalition partners of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) to govern. Led by the Indian National Congress, the opposition INDIA alliance has enough seats to invigorate parliament and somewhat resist Modi’s Hindu nationalist agenda. The BJP’s election manifesto, “Modi’s Guarantee”, affirmed his pledge to make India a developed country: Viksit Bharat by 2047, through further economic reforms and plans to institute a uniform civil code that would replace existing religious laws. The Indian public did not embrace this agenda, urging Modi to moderate his parochial impulses and address longstanding economic concerns, especially inflation and joblessness. Voters appeared to rebuke the Prime Minister and BJP for ostensibly being distracted from the economic focus. Nearly 20 BJP ministers lost their seats. The results and rebuke are all the more remarkable given the ruling party’s advantages over the opposition in terms of resources, messaging, and strategy. Yet, it was not a total rebuke. Savvy Indian voters still have faith in Modi but signalled that the time had come to limit the BJP’s power and share it with other parties to address India’s challenges. A renewed focus on domestic issues could follow as the new government figures out a dynamic between the BJP and its allies in a fraught geopolitical climate.

What will this mean for foreign policy? India’s foreign policy will stay the course. The broader strategic context will remain: China represents the overriding strategic challenge. Delhi will seek to develop and modernise its military and economic capabilities to manage and deter China. While an immediate rapprochement between Delhi and Beijing is hard to imagine, it is in their mutual interest to set up guardrails to prevent the border standoff from escalating into an unanticipated crisis. The now emboldened opposition could press the BJP-led government on China, given the tense border situation, making negotiations with China more challenging.

Diplomatically, attempting to balance China will mean India doubling down on relationships with the West, especially the US and its allies and partners, including the EU, Japan, and Australia. The last decade witnessed several historical breakthroughs in US-India ties, particularly on security cooperation, with China giving Delhi and Washington enough reasons to elevate their strategic partnership. India and the US now discuss areas of bilateral concern like maritime security, climate change, infrastructure and energy at other ‘minilateral’ mechanisms like the Quad, I2U2 (India, Israel, United Arab Emirates, United States), and G20. This seemingly indispensable partnership for Delhi will likely be sustained and deepen. Both countries, however, will have to manage prevailing irritants, including the state of democracy in their countries, Delhi’s role in the alleged plot to kill a US Sikh separatist, India’s close ties with Russia and Iran, and perennial trade frictions on issues like digital trade and clean energy. Some issues, especially involving Delhi’s alleged targeting of specific diaspora forces who undermine India’s sovereignty could resurface. Anti-India elements across Western countries could further challenge this coalition government on issues like the rule of law, human rights, and the protection of minorities at home and abroad. Delhi will have to deftly manage this dynamic.

Near home, India will continue to extend and deepen partnerships with countries like Japan, Vietnam, Philippines, and Indonesia, which share its concerns vis-à-vis China’s influence in Asia. Intra-Asian balancing is prominent in India’s foreign policy to resist Chinese activities in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Additionally, India’s solid economic trajectory will continue to drive strategic compacts with partners like the EU and several Gulf countries, especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Delhi will articulate and defend the economic priorities of developing countries through multilateral frameworks like the G7, G20, World Bank, and other entities. When possible, India will challenge China’s growing role and influence across these institutions that have clout in the Global South.

This foreign policy approach means India’s Indo-Pacific focus could sharpen, especially given Southeast Asia’s palpable concerns on China’s maritime activities, Delhi’s troubled relations with Beijing, questions over the US’ sustained regional engagement, and opportunities to provide regional public goods. India endorses the notion of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, affirming the role and importance of international law and freedom of navigation across critical sea lanes connecting the Indian and Pacific oceans. Delhi has called for the peaceful resolution of maritime territorial and boundary disputes across the littoral, supported naval training missions, provided naval arms to select South China Sea (SCS) claimant states like the Philippines and Vietnam, and worked to enhance maritime domain awareness cooperation. China is a motivator behind India’s actions but so is the need to ensure the broader region remains peaceful and stable to bolster trade, investment, and connectivity. Regional stability will become more critical as India’s trade with other parts of Asia grows.

Besides bilateral partnerships, India will look to deepen its focus on cooperating through issue-based partnerships or minilaterals like the Quad and the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative, when possible. India remains integral to the Quad’s functioning as its focus and mandate shift to non-traditional issues, particularly issues like maritime domain awareness.

How will this tack affect India-ASEAN ties? Though Delhi endorses ASEAN centrality, it has found a way to establish like-minded partnerships given structural pressures and convergent interests. Delhi prefers to deal directly with select Southeast Asian countries on security and economic issues, enhancing regional deterrence through diplomacy. Recent engagements with Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines testify to India’s desire to reorient its strategic role in Southeast Asia. Since 2017, as Sino-India tensions rose, Delhi has invested in establishing and sustaining comprehensive security and diplomatic relationships, covering the gamut from military and naval exercises to discussions on aviation, energy, agriculture, infrastructure, defence trade, and counter-terrorism. These moves, however, have seldom been backed by strong trade and investment links, which generally lag with these countries and ASEAN writ large.

One issue that has long inhibited close India-ASEAN cooperation is the absence of a meaningful and robust economic partnership, with India resisting overtures to further open its economy, best exemplified by its exit from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Improving India’s economic position in Southeast Asia will hinge on further economic reforms in Delhi that boost India’s goods exports to ASEAN to complement its advantage in services. With ongoing defence sector reforms, India could also focus more on defence production and exports, which could provide another pathway to increase its clout in Southeast Asia and offer some ASEAN states an alternative to China and Russia to improve their defence preparedness. Defence trade could further enhance trust, augment India’s standing and drive deeper cooperation on security issues.

Modi’s re-election will ensure India remains an important and proactive strategic actor in the Indo-Pacific, including ASEAN. Sino-India tensions will be sustained and drive India’s interest to support specific ASEAN states dealing with similar pressures and working alongside extra-regional partners to improve regional security and prosperity. Expanding India’s strategic role and relevance in Southeast Asia will depend on trade and investment, ironically the very issues that hurt Modi in the recent elections.

Editor’s Note:
ASEANFocus+ articles are timely critical insight pieces published by the ASEAN Studies Centre.