In Search of Effective and Peaceful ASEAN Dispute Settlement Mechanisms

The effectiveness of ASEAN’s dispute settlement mechanisms has come under scrutiny amid growing security challenges that threaten regional peace and stability. This article examines the genesis of and primary ASEAN mechanisms for the pacific settlement of inter-state disputes and discusses their utility.

The pursuit of peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms was an element of ASEAN’s establishment in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. At that time, the five founding members had emerged as nation-states following the colonial era. They were adjusting to the post-World War II global order, navigating the complex environment of Cold War politics, and manoeuvring intra-regional disputes and tensions. ASEAN’s formation followed several failed attempts to create a workable regional framework involving two or more Southeast Asian states, including the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954, the Southeast Asia Friendship and Economic Treaty (SEAFET) in 1959, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961, and MAPHILINDO in 1963.

In its early stages, ASEAN’s survival hinged on its member states (AMS) recognising the need for an acceptable regional code of conduct that would manage and foster intra- and extra-regional relations and promote cooperation on mutual interests and concerns. Peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms were central to such a code.

Achieving this required time to nurture trust and confidence among the AMS. Since the beginning, consultation and consensus have been part of ASEAN’s modus operandi to ensure the comfort level of all of its members was met. Following the Communist victories in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in 1975, there was heightened urgency for ASEAN to have a legally binding regional treaty to govern inter-state relations, as well as those between AMS and non-ASEAN states. In February 1976, at its first summit, ASEAN adopted the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). Originally intended as an attempt to foster constructive relations among the AMS, and also between them and non-ASEAN states, the TAC stood the test of time from the height of the Cold War to the post-Cold War environment.

The TAC continues to be a fundamental regional instrument for ASEAN’s intra- and extra-regional relations. As of July 2025, 57 High Contracting Parties (HCPs) have acceded to the TAC. At the 1976 summit, ASEAN also adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali Concord I) that called for the study of the “desirability of a new constitutional framework for ASEAN”. This was the basis for the ASEAN Charter, which came into force in 2008.

TAC and ASEAN Charter

Due to their legally binding nature, the TAC and ASEAN Charter serve as ASEAN’s primary reference documents defining regional dispute settlement mechanisms.

While incorporating key principles of the United Nations Charter such as sovereign equality and non-interference, and calling on all signatories to refrain from the threat or use of force, the TAC and its amendments and rules of procedure were designed to accommodate the differing comfort levels of AMS and other HCPs, and to provide ways to peacefully settle regional disputes.

The TAC has two broad themes, including dispute prevention through efforts such as friendly negotiations among disputed parties (Article 13), and settlement through regional processes like forming a High Council (Articles 14-15). For instance, the High Council shall take cognisance of disputes or situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony; can recommend to disputing parties the use of appropriate means such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation; and can recommend “appropriate measures” to prevent a deterioration of the dispute or situation. However, the High Council cannot take shape or meet unless all disputing parties agree, while HCPs not party to the dispute can offer all possible assistance to settle the said dispute (Article 16).

The rules of procedure were adopted in 2001. First, the High Council shall comprise one representative at the ministerial level from each AMS, and one from each of the HCPs which are states outside Southeast Asia and directly involved in the dispute (Rule 3). Next, observers may represent HCPs who are not directly involved in the dispute at a High Council meeting, subject to the High Council’s decision (Rule 14). All decisions shall be taken by consensus (Rule 19). However, due to complexities in reaching consensus, the TAC’s High Council has never been officially activated.

The ASEAN Charter, while integrating the TAC’s essence, has its own provisions on dispute settlement mechanisms. The four broad approaches include dispute prevention through dialogue, consultation and negotiation (Article 22). Second, AMS which are disputing parties may request the ASEAN Chair or Secretary-General to provide good offices, conciliation or mediation (Article 23), Third, disputes which do not concern the interpretation or application of any ASEAN instrument shall be resolved peacefully in accordance with the TAC and its rules of procedure (Article 24). Last, when a dispute remains unresolved, it shall be referred to the ASEAN Summit for decision (Article 26).

Both the TAC (Article 17) and ASEAN Charter (Article 28) do not exclusively restrict the HCPs and AMS from pursuing the pacific settlement of disputes as enshrined in Article 33(1) of the UN Charter. All major key ASEAN documents cite the TAC and ASEAN Charter, thus embedding all relevant principles and mechanisms as a part of regional socialisation process among AMS, and between AMS and ASEAN’s external partners. Whenever disputes or situations affecting regional peace and stability occur, these two instruments have been used to legitimise and support the relevant regional mechanisms for peaceful dispute settlements, subject to AMS’ consensus.

Utility of ASEAN’s Dispute Settlement Mechanisms

The fundamental utility of ASEAN’s dispute settlement mechanisms lies in their flexibility, allowing ASEAN and the AMS to pursue all peaceful options to settle disputes as they individually and collectively see fit. The involvement — where appropriate and acceptable to ASEAN — of ASEAN’s external partners is also evident in this process.

For example, following the recent outbreak of armed clashes between AMSs Cambodia and Thailand at their borders, Malaysia as ASEAN Chair and mediator played an important role alongside positive efforts by key external partners. Cambodia and Thailand agreed to a ceasefire agreement at a meeting in Putrajaya on 28 July 2025, co-organised by Malaysia and the US, with the participation of China. Mechanisms to observe the ceasefire’s implementation are in place and there has been ongoing discussion on the formation of an ASEAN Observer Team (AOT) led by Malaysia to verify and ensure the ceasefire agreement holds. Pending this, Interim Observer Teams (IOT) comprising AMS Defence Attachés respectively accredited to Cambodia and Thailand were established; within each disputing party, the IOT is operationalised separately and independently.

The above process, actively spearheaded by Malaysia as Chair, has been crucial in helping to stop the fighting and to save lives on both sides of the Thai-Cambodia border. It is a positive first step towards peaceful resolutions through diplomacy and dialogue.

Nevertheless, the effectiveness of ASEAN’s dispute settlement mechanisms, like that of other international and regional intergovernmental organisations, faces difficult challenges, particularly in implementation and compliance. ASEAN’s past record of managing disputes shows room for improvement, especially in forging consensus among its ten, soon to be 11, diverse members. ASEAN’s ability to solve this critical question will determine how relevant the bloc is to individual member states and HCPs.

The creation and effectiveness of ASEAN’s mechanisms for pacific dispute settlement should be viewed as a work in progress that requires continued regional and intra-ASEAN socialisation to solicit genuine political commitment and trust, and to uphold the common interests of its members. Fundamentally, the effectiveness and peacefulness of ASEAN’s dispute settlement mechanisms depends on the comfort level of each member vis-à-vis one another and vis-à-vis ASEAN as a regional institution.

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Editor’s Note:
ASEANFocus+ articles are timely critical insight pieces published by the ASEAN Studies Centre.