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Operationalising the AEC Strategic Plan 2026-2030: From Aspirations to Real Action
Published
Denis Hew analyses the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Strategic Plan 2026-2030, focusing on its ambitious goals and how they can be expanded, while highlighting concerns over its actionability and the broader implications on ASEAN.
The launch of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Strategic Plan 2026–2030 at the 46th ASEAN Summit in May 2025 marked a significant milestone in ASEAN’s long-running journey to create a single market and integrated production base. The Plan serves as the economic pillar of the ASEAN Community Vision 2045, which aspires to create a resilient, innovative, dynamic, and people-centred region within the next two decades.
Replacing the AEC 2015–2025 Blueprint, the new Plan extends ASEAN’s integration agenda beyond trade and investment into areas such as sustainability, digital transformation, innovation, resilience, and inclusiveness. It sets out six strategic goals, operationalised through 44 objectives and 192 measures, grouped into six aspirational communities (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Overview of the ASEAN Economic Community Strategic Plan 2026-2030

Despite the Plan’s best intentions, there are some nagging concerns. On paper, the Strategic Plan is impressively comprehensive; however, many of its measures remain broad and aspirational rather than actionable. Another major concern is that the final assessment of the AEC Blueprint 2015-2025 has still not been released to the public. Hence, it is unclear how many initiatives were completed and to what extent the unfinished work has been carried forward to the new Strategic Plan. In this sense, the AEC Strategic Plan may have been released prematurely — putting the “cart before the horse”.
ASEAN’s track record on implementation also further tempers optimism. Despite legally binding agreements such as the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), and the ASEAN Trade in Services Agreement (ATISA), intra-regional trade has stagnated at just over 20 per cent for the past two decades. Intra-regional trade remains the most fundamental indicator to measure progress in economic integration.
Financing the Strategic Plan also presents a formidable hurdle. Resource mobilisation in today’s uncertain economic environment will be difficult, as member states and external partners may be reluctant to commit funds to ambitious new projects. Likewise, the goal of building an inclusive community may prove elusive, given the persistent development gap between CLM countries (Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar) and the rest of ASEAN. The Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) has had limited success in closing this divide, despite more than two decades of workplans.
External headwinds compound these challenges. High reciprocal tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration and intense US-China rivalry are fragmenting the global economy and disrupting supply chains. With the US pursuing bilateral and transactional trade deals, ASEAN’s efforts to accelerate regional integration and strengthen regional supply chains face mounting obstacles.
Even existing FTAs such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement, which came into force from January 2022, have been plagued by relatively low utilisation rates, owing to varying tariff lines, rules of origin, and less favourable concessions compared to existing ASEAN+1 Free Trade Agreements (FTA). Moreover, efforts to rachet up the RCEP to level up to other ASEAN+1 FTAs would require a mechanism for this to be established as well as difficult renegotiations.
There are three policy directions worth exploring to ensure the new Strategic Plan will be able to deliver on its objectives. First, strengthening multi-stakeholder coordination and resource mobilisation. The cross-cutting nature of economic integration in areas such as digitalisation and sustainability requires a platform that brings together different stakeholders such as ASEAN sectoral bodies, government agencies, research centres, and the private sector. Involving stakeholders early in project design and development — via public-private partnerships — will build stronger ownership and improve implementation outcomes. This is especially critical for mobilising private-sector resources to finance costly regional projects. Encouraging greater voluntary contributions from richer ASEAN member states and the private sector could be a more effective way to diversify resource mobilisation and reduce reliance on dialogue partners to finance region-wide projects.
Second, resolving weak implementation through rigorous monitoring and evaluation. ASEAN’s persistent challenge lies in translating regional binding economic commitments into national action. Although ASEAN does have a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework, more robust mechanisms should be adopted by both the ASEAN Secretariat and national agencies to ensure that regional initiatives are effectively implemented on the ground. Establishing a good, regular feedback process will help to fine-tune existing regional initiatives and ensure stronger compliance and implementation from member states.
Third, reframing the Narrowing the Development Gap (NDG) initiative. Capacity-building should go beyond the CLMV countries to address disparities across all member states, particularly in digital infrastructure and broadband access. This may require a rethinking of the existing IAI framework and phasing out ineffective workplans while designing more inclusive and innovative approaches to NDG programmes.
Additionally, the twin drivers of the green and digital economies could inject fresh momentum into the AEC process. Post-pandemic initiatives such as the ASEAN Framework for the Circular Economy (2021) and the ASEAN Strategy for Carbon Neutrality (2024) lay important groundwork for advancing ASEAN’s sustainability agenda. These frameworks open opportunities to build green supply chains and harness emerging environmentally friendly technologies. To further support trade liberalisation in this high-growth sector, ASEAN could adopt a flexible reference list for environmental goods and services, building on the 2012 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation’s (APEC) List of Environmental Goods and the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Environmental Goods Agreement.
In the digital sphere, the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA), expected to conclude negotiations this year, offers an opportunity to overcome persistent barriers to digital trade and e-commerce. If effectively implemented, it could accelerate ASEAN’s digital transformation, spur new businesses and start-ups, and advance the Strategic Plan’s vision of an enterprising and innovative community. A good example of practical digital financial integration is the ongoing Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Nexus pilot project. Involving the central banks of four ASEAN member states — Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines — it aims to build a region-wide fast payment network system. By promoting QR code interoperability, the initiative would make cross-border consumer spending easier and more seamless across the region.
Yet ASEAN must do more to unlock these economic opportunities. Reducing or eliminating non-tariff measures and barriers that restrict trade in environmental and digital services will be critical. Policymakers can do more by making better use of ATISA and national-level reforms to open up the services sector. For instance, ATISA adopts a negative list, in which all sectors are open for reduction or elimination of tariffs or foreign participation, except specified exceptions. This more liberalising approach offers an opening to expand commitments in emerging sectors such as waste management, renewable energy, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and digitally delivered services.
Looking ahead, the AEC Strategic Plan 2026–2030 is both ambitious and forward-looking. By broadening ASEAN’s integration agenda to encompass sustainability, digital transformation, and resilience, it rightly acknowledges the region’s pressing challenges and the megatrends reshaping the global economy. The five-year timeline for assessing progress makes sense in light of current economic uncertainties. Yet the absence of clarity on how much unfinished work has been carried over from the AEC Blueprint 2015–2025 risks undermining the credibility of the new plan. Without a proper stocktake of past achievements and, more importantly, failures, ASEAN may once again fall into the familiar pattern of setting lofty goals without delivering concrete results.
The next five years will be a decisive test of ASEAN’s credibility as a regional grouping that can deliver economic security and prosperity for its peoples. With the global economic order shifting rapidly and radically, ASEAN cannot afford business as usual. If the AEC Strategic Plan fails to translate into concrete actions, the region risks eroding its relevance and losing the confidence of its stakeholders and external partners. Hence, ASEAN’s future as a driver of economic integration will hinge on its ability to demonstrate concrete results, and not just aspirations.
Editor’s Note:
ASEANFocus+ articles are timely critical insight pieces published by the ASEAN Studies Centre.
Denis Hew is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.















