The Mango Flavour: India and ASEAN After a Decade of the Act East Policy

Ambassador Singh is a former Indian diplomat with 37 years of service, during which he held several positions, including those of Ambassador of India to Germany, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, ASEAN, Ethiopia, and the African Union. He has authored several other books, including The Abalone Factor: An Overview of India-Japan Business Relations, The Injera and the Paratha: Enhancing the Ethio-India Relationship, and Masala Bumbu: Enhancing the India-Indonesia Partnership. Beyond diplomacy, Ambassador Singh is active in the social impact investment space and civil society initiatives, contributing through the Aavishkar Foundation, the Advisory Council of Nobel Peace Laureate Kailash Satyarthi, and as an Advisor to the Abhinav Bindra Foundation Trust.

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AF: Congratulations on your book’s publication, Ambassador Singh. Last year marked a decade since the launch of India’s Act East Policy (AEP), the book’s central focus. In your view, has the AEP successfully deepened India’s engagement with Southeast Asia over the last decade and what are its most notable achievements?

Ambassador Singh: Thank you. I am deeply honoured that the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute has published my book, The Mango Flavour: India and ASEAN After a Decade of the Act East Policy. This period has indeed been an eventful one for India, for ASEAN, for the Indo-Pacific, and for our interaction in this dynamic space.

The AEP, announced in 2014, marked a decisive step by India to raise its profile in the region by engaging ASEAN more proactively across the three ASEAN communities established in 2015: the ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. In that sense, the AEP was a precursor to many important developments in the region, which included the formation of the ASEAN Communities. The transition in regional vocabulary from “Asia-Pacific” to “Indo-Pacific” was another.

What distinguished the AEP from India’s earlier “Look East Policy” was India’s readiness to go beyond the economic sphere to strengthen cooperation in the political-security and socio-cultural pillars. This broader engagement created greater diversity within the India–ASEAN partnership. Most importantly, the policy placed ASEAN at its core, with a clear, unequivocal recognition of ASEAN centrality and determination to work with it effectively. As the region evolved over the last decade, the AEP ensured that New Delhi was better prepared to engage with ASEAN and the wider Indo-Pacific strategically, thematically, and economically.

AF: India ranked sixth in terms of strategic relevance in The State of Southeast Asia Survey 2025 and the region’s trust in New Delhi has steadily increased. How can India enhance the visibility of its partnership with ASEAN and potentially improve its standing amongst Southeast Asian respondents?

Ambassador Singh: I read the State of Southeast Asia (SSEA) survey every year with great interest. However, in India, it is not a widely used instrument of analysis, partly because Indian engagement with ASEAN is still largely government-to-government, whether through the ASEAN Secretariat, member-state governments, or dialogue partners. People-to-people engagement, though often discussed, is less systematically factored into perception-building.

The survey is unique because it reflects public perceptions rather than official views. While governments in Southeast Asia generally express a high level of trust in India, public opinion sometimes shows lower confidence in what India can deliver. This disparity needs to be addressed. In the chapters on socio-cultural cooperation in my book, I argued that India and ASEAN must adopt more modern and effective methods of engagement that would resonate more strongly with the youth in both regions. These modes of engagement should cut across different issue areas and link cultural engagements with economic and functional cooperation.

Questions about the region’s trust in India have featured consistently in the SSEA. However, it remains an open question whether (ASEAN respondents’) higher levels of trust in India stem from a distrust of other countries or from an intrinsic confidence in India. My view is that the region’s growing trust in India indicates that it is not merely a reaction to short-term developments.

This trust is a foundation on which we must build. From sixth place, India could easily move into the top five of the SSEA’s public confidence rankings. To achieve this, we must better utilise instruments like the ASEAN–India Fund, especially the Green Fund and the Digital Fund. More people-to-people connections are needed — connections that emerge organically from within ASEAN societies rather than those imposed from outside. Our engagement cannot rely solely on civilisational links or the popularity of Bollywood. While such ties are valuable, they are not sufficient. As I note in my book, cultural references such as Kuch Kuch Hota Hai remain well known within ASEAN, but they belong to the previous century. In the 21st century, India and ASEAN must create new cultural touchstones and new “songs to sing together”.

AF: India’s strategic partnerships increasingly involve trilateral and multilateral cooperation initiatives, such as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC). How does ASEAN fit into these frameworks and what can be done to make trilateral cooperation more impactful?

Ambassador Singh: I have long argued that trilateral cooperation should augment India’s South–South cooperation initiatives. The Group of Seven (G7) countries frequently look to partner with India for projects in Africa because India’s development cooperation model, which is people-focused, cost-effective, and respectful of local priorities, has earned strong credibility there. My earlier book, The Harambee Factor: India–Africa Economic and Development Partnership, documented India’s success in this area.

Several G7 countries have since pursued trilateral projects with India in Africa. For instance, the Asia–Africa Growth Corridor, conceptualised by Indian and Japanese think-tanks, has attempted to energise governments and businesses in both countries. While India’s trilateral cooperation with European countries has been more formalised, the India-Japan-Africa partnership has largely evolved through private sector initiatives, without extensive government-to-government coordination, particularly in the form of Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA).

At the Ninth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD 9) in Yokohama, Japan launched the concept of ‘Japan–India–Indian Ocean–Africa’ regional cooperation, which builds on the above trilateral idea. Japan is encouraging its private sector to take the lead, aligning with India’s expanding economic engagement with Africa, allowing both partners to leverage growing complementarities and shared assets to develop a sustainable model of collaboration.

However, these efforts must move from conceptual discussions to practical business partnerships. My 2019 report suggested that such cooperation could extend to ASEAN development partners like Germany, Norway, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In my book, I examine the challenges to trilateral development engagements, including differences in ODA procurement procedures and private sector expectations, while highlighting the potential of the private sector to make them work. One critical success area for India is the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) through impact investment. For example, a noteworthy development at TICAD 9 was the first US$40 million contribution from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) into India’s Aavishkaar Fund, to support small and medium-sized enterprises as part of global supply chains across Asia and Africa. These positive developments validate India’s preference for trilateral cooperation and demonstrate its viability. The challenge now is for the private sector in Africa, India, and Japan to bring these initiatives to fruition.

AF: India is ASEAN’s sixth largest trading partner and eighth largest source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). How can Indian businesses be better incentivised to engage with Southeast Asia, particularly in emerging sectors like green technology and digital trade?

Ambassador Singh: Besides being an important economic partner for ASEAN in trade and FDI, India is a significant partner in the services industry, particularly in Singapore. This aspect is often overlooked; I have tried to highlight it in my book. At the same time, I show that for India, ASEAN is among its ‘US$100 billion-plus’ trading and FDI partners. While ASEAN is not India’s largest economic partner, it remains an important one.

My book underlines the unevenness among ASEAN member states in engaging India. Interestingly, some of the largest trading partners are often the slowest in providing market access or easing non-tariff barriers, with Indonesia having the lowest access offer and Vietnam having hardened access. While the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) remains a work in progress, India-ASEAN trade already exceeds US$100 billion. A modern, reviewed agreement that addresses the trade concerns of both sides could pave the way for a much larger economic partnership. When globalisation is under strain and the world is facing new tariffs and trade wars, the case for India and ASEAN to work as partners in the Global South is stronger than ever. Importantly, this is not just something the two sides should declare to others but a conviction they must genuinely share.

The challenge, therefore, is not only how Indian businesses can be better incentivised to engage with ASEAN but also how ASEAN businesses ex-Singapore can intensify their engagements with India. My book outlines several promising areas of engagement, including green technology, digital trade, capacity building for green human resources, and sustainable impact investment. However, one persistent weakness is that outside Singapore, the business-to-business (B2B) connection between Indian and ASEAN entrepreneurs remains limited. Strengthening this dimension will be essential if the economic partnership is to realise its full potential.

AF: You note in your book that the people-to-people connection between ASEAN and India is asymmetrical, as more Indian tourists visit Southeast Asian destinations but not vice versa. What is this imbalance and how can India better leverage its cultural strengths to foster deeper ties with ASEAN?

Ambassador Singh: The socio-cultural pillar of collaboration is a salient part of my book. Surveys of people in India and ASEAN reveal various ideas on how cultural partnerships can be expanded (by embracing modern literature, cinema, and lifestyle solutions such as yoga and wellness). While valuable, these are niche areas which must be complemented with stronger initiatives to redress the imbalance in flows of tourists and students. For instance, over four million Indians travelled to ASEAN countries in 2023, compared to less than one million visitors from ASEAN countries who travelled to India during the same period. This imbalance needs urgent attention from travel promoters.

Encouragingly, air connectivity is improving. With direct flights to Manila starting soon, nine ASEAN countries will be directly connected to India. Many ASEAN airlines, especially from Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, already fly to a growing number of tier-two Indian cities, such as Amritsar, Lucknow, Thiruvananthapuram, and Jaipur. This enhanced connectivity offers real opportunities to balance tourist flows.

Education is another sector where India’s collaboration with other developing countries is strong, but with ASEAN, it remains comparatively weak. In the 2025 SSEA survey, India ranks very low as a preferred destination for study. Still, there are promising developments: the prestigious Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Kharagpur is establishing a campus in Malaysia. Yet, India’s efforts to attract ASEAN students, such as offering numerous PhD and post-doctoral scholarships at IITs, have not met much success, as relatively few ASEAN candidates seek advanced scientific research opportunities in India. One way forward is to foster university-to-university partnerships through mechanisms like the ASEAN-India University Network. Joint projects could encourage short-term exchanges while laying the foundation for longer-term collaboration.

Beyond academia, other socio-cultural initiatives can draw from India’s civil society successes in areas directly relevant to ASEAN community-building. These include school meal programmes to improve children’s health, initiatives to protect and educate girls, and training in green skills to support economies transitioning toward sustainability. Together, such efforts can give real depth and relevance to the socio-cultural pillar of ASEAN-India relations.

AF: Beyond diplomacy, you have also been actively engaged with civil society and youth. What further steps are needed to foster greater connectivity between civil society and youth ecosystems between ASEAN and India?

Ambassador Singh: The civil society sector in India is vibrant and active across various areas. It plays a crucial role in augmenting government programmes aimed at providing sustainable development and better living standards. When civil society organisations (CSOs) and government initiatives complement each other, a stronger and more effective social matrix emerges.

Since most ASEAN countries, like India, are developing economies, they face similar challenges. These cannot always be addressed solely through collaboration with more developed partners. India has worked with G7 countries and in doing so has developed its own models for achieving the SDGs. Interestingly, several of these models have been adopted and scaled up by G7 partners for use in other developing regions, particularly in Africa.

Such engagement, however, has not yet taken place with ASEAN. The level of interaction between Indian and ASEAN CSOs remains quite limited, even though they often grapple with similar problems. The sharing of success stories, innovative practices, and adaptable solutions is something I strongly recommended in my book; such collaboration could greatly benefit both sides.

Part of the problem lies in perceptions of India as a development partner. Most of ASEAN’s development partners are developed countries and the expectation is that India should behave like them: primarily by providing funds and ready-made solutions. India, however, approaches ASEAN from a South-South cooperation perspective: as a peer partner, seeking to share experiences and co-create solutions rather than simply deliver aid. For this to succeed, the realisation of India’s role as a fellow partner in the Global South must gain traction not just at the governmental level but also at the popular and civil society level. Only then will CSO-to-CSO engagement between India and ASEAN flourish.

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Editor’s Note:
ASEANFocus+ articles are timely critical insight pieces published by the ASEAN Studies Centre.