Türkiye and ASEAN: Turning a Side Story into a Strategy

Türkiye-ASEAN relations are often overlooked in discussions of regional diplomacy, but the challenge is not one of neglect. On the contrary, it must be understood in terms of a gap between institutional and economic aspects. Over the past decade, Türkiye and ASEAN have expanded their political dialogue, established formal cooperation mechanisms and expressed mutual interest in deeper partnership.

Türkiye acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 2010. Additionally, Türkiye became an ASEAN Sectoral Dialogue Partner in 2017 and engages in such institutional initiatives as the ASEAN-Türkiye Trilateral Meeting and ASEAN-Türkiye Joint Sectoral Cooperation Committee. The Practical Cooperation Areas for 2024-2028 include trade and investment, energy security, supply chains, transport, digital transformation and agricultural and sustainable development. In addition, Türkiye applied for ASEAN Dialogue Partner status in 2024, and ASEAN leaders noted broad in-principle support for the application, subject to the review of the moratorium on new Dialogue Partners.

The presence of the embassies of Türkiye in all ASEAN member states but Timor-Leste, free trade agreements (FTAs) with Singapore and Malaysia and shared institutional platforms with some ASEAN members, including the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, are important factors, but they should be viewed as an institutional basis for cooperation, rather than confirmation of successful economic relations. The challenge, therefore, lies not in the absence of diplomatic engagement, but in translating strong institutional ties into a more strategic, sustained and results-oriented economic partnership.

The data points towards progress, but also to substantial untapped potential. In 2023, two-way ASEAN-Türkiye trade reached US$13.02 billion, rising to US$13.84 billion in 2024. Turkish FDI inflows to ASEAN reached US$410.44 million in 2024 compared to US$106.53 million the previous year. These figures show that the ASEAN-Türkiye economic relationship exists and has positive potential. Yet its scale remains modest when set against ASEAN’s overall external trade volume.

It is important to remember that ASEAN is an internally diverse region. Singapore and Malaysia may be viewed as entry points based on FTAs, whereas Indonesia and Malaysia exemplify different dynamics of cooperation. For instance, Indonesian orders of 48 KAAN fighter aircraft, as well as Malaysian purchases of Turkish military equipment and UAVs, indicate that defence-industrial cooperation is also an important part of Türkiye-ASEAN relations. Thus, there should not be assumptions about a single ASEAN approach to Türkiye, but there should be a variety of strategies tailored to individual countries, based on their respective interests.

It is possible to claim that there are grounds for a strategic economic agenda. Both sides face challenges related to supply chains. Indeed, the US-China competition and tensions have affected ASEAN manufacturers via export controls, sanctions risks, maritime issues and the rearrangement of global value chains. At the same time, Türkiye remains vulnerable due to its exposure to European demand, exchange rates, access to external financing and regional politics.

Resilience can be defined as reducing reliance on particular markets, transport and geopolitical blocs. In this context, supply-chain cooperation is a practical area for action. Türkiye could serve as a complementary near-shoring and logistics platform for ASEAN firms seeking their reach across Europe-facing, MENA-facing, Black Sea-facing and Central Asia-facing trade routes. This role could include assembly, repair and maintenance, warehousing and cold-chain distribution, especially where proximity, after-sales services, regulatory adaptation and logistics resilience matter. Sectors such as machinery, automotive components, electronics sub-systems, processed foods, logistics services and defence-industrial components appear the most suitable here.

At the same time, Turkish firms do not need to focus on just exports. There are several ways for them to become integrated into the ASEAN economy. For example, they may engage in joint ventures or production facilities, participate in logistics activities and operate industrial parks. Firms could also invest in logistics facilities such as warehousing, cold-chain services and e-commerce fulfilment infrastructure.

Another aspect of cooperation may be the use of digital tools. As the Türkiye-Singapore and Türkiye-Malaysia FTAs show, cooperation in trade should not be reduced to removing tariffs alone. For example, the Türkiye-Singapore FTA includes electronic commerce, while the updated version of the Türkiye-Malaysia FTA, which entered into force in 2024, adds other fields to the discussion, such as services, investment, e-commerce and small and medium-size enterprise (SME) cooperation. While these FTAs do not apply across ASEAN as a whole, they provide useful examples of how future cooperation could move beyond tariffs. A broader digital cooperation agenda should focus on trade facilitation, non-tariff barriers, electronic documents and e-invoicing, digitalisation of small businesses, cybersecurity, payment systems, insurance, logistics and verification systems.

Another area for cooperation is energy and the green industry. Energy consumption in the ASEAN region rose by more than 35 per cent during the last decade, and electricity demand increased by more than 60 per cent. Türkiye has developed its renewable sources infrastructure considerably, reaching a share of renewables equal to more than 58 per cent of installed capacity, with the goal to achieve 120 Gigawatt (GW) of wind and solar capacity by 2035. Türkiye can provide its expertise on renewable project implementation; engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) services; energy network modernisation; and renewables-based energy. ASEAN in turn could offer rapidly growing energy demand, renewable project pipelines, green industrial parks, component supply chains and financing opportunities. This makes cooperation possible not only in energy trade, but also in project development, grid modernisation, storage, efficiency and industrial decarbonisation.

Finally, the halal value chain offers a more specific and realistic field of cooperation. In this respect, any assumption that it will involve rerouting Southeast Asian exports to the Middle East via Türkiye seems inappropriate, as Southeast Asian countries already have access to the Middle East market. Yet cooperation with Türkiye would have advantages for the ASEAN side. Türkiye and ASEAN have the necessary elements for cooperation: while Malaysia and Indonesia have certification capacities, Türkiye has the ability to produce, process and distribute food products. Halal value chain cooperation would include cooperation in the co-production of halal products, certification, traceability, laboratory analysis, cold-chain and branding of certain products.

Rather than creating parallel mechanisms, this agenda should be pursued through existing channels such as the ASEAN-Türkiye Joint Sectoral Cooperation Committee, ASEAN-Business Advisory Council (BAC) links, embassies, commercial counsellors, chambers of commerce, export unions and sectoral associations. Through these channels, Türkiye could prepare country- and sector-specific roadmaps, while ASEAN members could view Türkiye as a national market and a complementary platform for selected production, logistics, investment and value-chain activities. Both parties can start from simple and clearly defined sectors. Meanwhile, financial instruments would be needed for joint ventures, logistics infrastructure and green industrial investment.

On this basis, many of the ingredients for deeper cooperation are already present. Türkiye’s advantage lies in its production capacity, logistical position and experience in operating under difficult regional conditions in and around Europe. ASEAN provides production networks, rising demand and geopolitical weight in the Indo-Pacific. Such a partnership will increase each side’s independence within an increasingly fragmented international system.

The question remains whether both sides are willing to view their relationship from this long-term perspective or as just another diplomatic issue on paper.

Editor’s Note:
ASEANFocus+ articles are timely critical insight pieces published by the ASEAN Studies Centre.