Can Moscow and Seoul Help Vietnam Achieve its Nuclear Energy Ambitions?

Vietnam has ambitious plans to build a series of nuclear power plants to power its fast-developing economy, with several countries lined up to facilitate the transition. Still, however, the country’s nuclear power ambitions face immense challenges.

At the recently concluded Party Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), General-Secretary To Lam made a bold pledge to grow the economy by at least 10 per cent per annum until 2030.

To achieve that lofty goal, Vietnam will have to at least double its current power generation capacity. But to achieve its net zero emissions goal by 2050, much of that power will have to come from renewables, including nuclear.

Two countries appear well placed to help: Russia and South Korea. But the road ahead might hit some obstacles.

Vietnam’s nuclear power aspirations date back to the introduction of economic reforms in the mid-1980s. It was not until 2009, however, that Hanoi announced plans to build 14 nuclear power plants (NPPs) across the country by 2030.

The first two would be located in the south-central province of Ninh Thuan (now called Khanh Hoa province). The Ninh Thuan project would comprise two NPPs, each consisting of four nuclear reactors. The combined generating capacity of the two plants would exceed 4,000 megawatts (MW).

In 2010, Russia’s state-owned energy company Rosatom was awarded the contract to build Ninh Thuan 1, while a Japanese consortium was chosen for Ninh Thuan 2. Moscow and Tokyo agreed to help finance the project by providing credit lines.

In 2016, however, the project was suddenly halted due to a combination of spiralling costs, post-Fukushima safety concerns and factional infighting within the CPV.

On being elected to CPV general-secretary in 2024, however, the economic growth-oriented To Lam ordered the Ninh Thuan project resurrected. Talks were initiated with Canada, France, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the US. Last year, the country’s future energy plans were updated to include nuclear power and a law was passed to provide a regulatory framework. To Lam wants the NPP up and running by the end of 2031.

In January 2026, however, Japan dropped a bombshell when it announced it was pulling out of the Ninh Thuan project because it considered the timeline to be unrealistic. Undeterred, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh urged government officials to work “night and day” to meet the deadline.

While Japan is out, Russia is still very much in the game. In January 2025, Vietnam signed a cooperation agreement with Rosatom. Following Japan’s withdrawal, Hanoi called for urgent talks with Russia to accelerate Ninh Thuan 1.

If Russia is re-awarded the contract, it would be a huge commercial win for Russia in Southeast Asia and would help Moscow’s nuclear power sales pitch in other regional countries such as Indonesia.

That Russia is the front runner for Ninh Thuan 1 makes sense. In 2010, it was chosen for three reasons. First, Vietnam and Russia have a long history of energy cooperation, including in nuclear energy. Second, Russia has built NPPs worldwide and dominates the market for enriched uranium used to fuel nuclear reactors. Third, it is willing to provide generous loans (in 2011, it agreed to finance 85 per cent of the costs of Ninh Thuan 1).

If Russia is re-awarded the contract, it would be a huge commercial win for Russia in Southeast Asia and would help Moscow’s nuclear power sales pitch in other regional countries such as Indonesia.

To avoid putting all its nuclear eggs in one basket, however, Vietnam is unlikely to award both contracts to Russia. So who will build Ninh Thuan 2?

America is a possibility. The two countries signed a nuclear power cooperation agreement in 2014. Last year, America’s biggest nuclear power company, Westinghouse, signed an agreement with PetroVietnam (the state-owned company in charge of Ninh Thuan 2) to further that cooperation.

But the Trump administration’s imposition of 20 per cent tariffs on Vietnamese exports has soured relations. Besides, the US is mainly interested in partnering with Vietnam to build small modular reactors, which are not yet commercially available.

Enter South Korea. Seoul is already one of Vietnam’s most important trade and investment partners. South Korea also has an advanced nuclear industry. South Korea recently completed the Barakah NPP in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a four-reactor 5,600 MW NPP. In a sign that South Korea might take on Ninh Thuan 2, in August 2025, Hanoi and Seoul agreed to broaden bilateral cooperation, specifically including the construction of NPPs.

But even if contracts with Russia and South Korea are inked this year, the Ninh Thuan project faces formidable challenges.

To Lam’s deadline of 2030-2031 is tight, to say the least. After years of negotiations, it took nine years for Russia and South Korea to complete the construction of NPPs in Bangladesh and the UAE. Western-imposed sanctions in the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine have disrupted Rosatom’s operations. This has resulted in construction delays.

Moreover, before Vietnam’s nuclear reactors can come online, approximately 4,000 nuclear technicians will need to be trained, a regulatory framework finalised and approval obtained from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Vietnam will also have to root out corruption in its energy sector to ensure nuclear safety standards are upheld.

Then there is the question of money. Even if Russia and South Korea were to provide generous credit lines, Hanoi would still have to find billions of dollars to fund construction costs at a time when it is also planning to build new expressways, metro lines, airports and a north-south high-speed railway. It will be challenging for Vietnam to fund all these major infrastructure projects at the same time.

At the Party Congress recently concluded, To Lam successfully consolidated political power. But whether he can marshal the financing, expertise and partnerships needed to deliver his nuclear power goals is by no means guaranteed.

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