Chokepoint in the Gulf: What the US-Israeli War on Iran Means For Southeast Asia’s Food Security

The US-Israel attacks on Iran since late February and the wider fallout in West Asia have choked energy and fertiliser supply chains. The war has largely forced the closure of commodity manufacturing plants and halted shipping exports from the region, locking up about 20 to 30 per cent of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) and one-third of globally traded fertilisers. Qatar’s force majeure declaration on LNG (Qatar supplies around a fifth of global LNG) has further squeezed nitrogen fertiliser production elsewhere. Concurrently, airlines are rerouting flights to avoid the Gulf conflict zones, which has increased aviation fuel costs, raising the cost of air-flown goods.

Beyond the 60 million people in the Gulf, the shock is raising food insecurity worldwide: higher energy prices, which already account for about half of food costs, will push up production, storage and logistics bills. Furthermore, the rising prices of fertiliser today will see farmers cutting back on fertilisers, leading to lower yields and tightening markets. While urea fertiliser prices have not yet reached the heights of when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, they may do so in the coming months, having already risen by more than 50 per cent since the start of this year.

For Southeast Asia, these global shocks matter because the region is highly exposed as a net energy importer, with Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam among the most reliant on imported oil and gas. Regional countries are heavily dependent on imported fertilisers, especially phosphates and urea. Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines and Thailand are the most dependent on imported nitrogenous fertilisers in Southeast Asia (Table 1).

Table 1: Nitrogenous (N) and Phosphatic (P) Fertilisers in Southeast Asia – Production, Import and Export Quantities, and Quantities and Share of Imports for Agriculture, 2023

* Singapore imports 100 per cent of its fertilisers. However, it is also a fertiliser trading hub. It imports a significant volume but also exports a similar value, mainly after processing, blending or trans‑shipping to the region.

Southeast Asia is already seeing food prices rise, as higher energy costs show up in retail prices. Producers that rely on diesel and other fuels are facing shortages, which disrupt production and create supply gaps that push prices up further through demand‑driven inflation. The impact of more expensive fertiliser will come later: farmers typically take one to three months to adjust their planting and input decisions; another three to nine months may pass before those higher production costs fully show up on supermarket shelves.

When prices spike, governments are tempted to impose export bans or restrictions, as seen during the 2007-2008 food crisis and the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Studies by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) demonstrate that such measures offer only short-lived domestic relief, at the cost of heightened global volatility, diminished trade confidence and long-term disincentives to production.

…ASEAN governments should focus on building regional fertiliser and agricultural energy resilience.

ASEAN should resist repeating this mistake. Instead, ASEAN governments should focus on building regional resilience. First, ASEAN should address the energy and fertiliser crunch early by pooling purchases regionally, fast-tracking port regulatory arrangements to facilitate switching suppliers and product types and supporting farmers’ transition to digital tools to optimise nutrient use.

In the immediate term, fertiliser price spikes and shortages will likely have a limited impact on rice, as the growing season is ongoing and most fertilisers have already been applied. However, the effect will differ for other food crops (like vegetables), perennial crops (like oil palm) and beverage crops (like cocoa and coffee), as these need to be regularly fertilised – now under conditions of higher prices and limited supplies. Going into the next rice-growing season, any reduced use of nitrogenous fertiliser will be a major blow to rice exports from countries like Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia. Large rice-growing countries like Indonesia and Philippines will see reduced domestic production, necessitating more imports at higher prices due to the anticipated tighter export margins. With only about 10 per cent of global rice production traded internationally, any squeeze in that thin export margin will quickly drive up import prices. Generally, the more prolonged the chokepoint effect of the Strait of Hormuz closure, the greater the likelihood of food price inflation, which is already being felt, as shown in the latest FAO Food Price Index for March 2026.

In the long run, policymakers, businesses and civil society need to accelerate a shift to more regenerative, sustainable and circular agri-food systems that promote shorter supply chains. To replace imported fertilisers, countries must invest in systems to extract fertilisers from sewage and manure, promote regenerative agricultural techniques and introduce soil improvement bio-fertilisers. ASEAN had already made a proactive start when the ASEAN Ministers on Agriculture and Forestry (AMAF) approved the ASEAN Food, Agriculture & Forestry Sectoral Plan 2026-2030 in October 2025. This plan prioritises sustainable and regenerative measures, including the use of fertilisers and pesticides produced from regional biological waste and microbial organisms, to reduce reliance on long, fragile supply chains.

Even if the Iran war were to end tomorrow, the damage to LNG and fertiliser production facilities, particularly in Qatar, will already constrain supplies for up to the next five years. This event has shown our region’s serious vulnerability in the energy–food nexus. Further, a possible return of the El Nino weather phenomenon this year may compound the pressure on Southeast Asia’s harvests.

The region’s real test is not about surviving this shock, but whether governments use this crisis to hard‑wire their countries’ fertiliser resilience, diversify energy and input supplies and accelerate a shift toward more input‑efficient, climate‑resilient and regenerative food systems.

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