Could Elections Provide a Way Out of Myanmar’s Political Crisis?

The military coup in 2021 has created unprecedented political turmoil and civil war in Myanmar. Some domestic and international actors view the State Administration Council (SAC) military regime’s promise of elections as a possible way out of the crisis and recommend proceeding with elections as soon as possible. Two surveys conducted by a local research team in December 2021- January 2022 and July-August 2024 suggest, however, that the Myanmar people are not as optimistic. (Editor’s note: For the researchers’ safety, details about the team will not be published.)

Both surveys included the same set of open-ended questions:

• Do you think the elections will take place? Why/Why not?
• Do you think elections could be a way out of the political crisis? Why/Why not?
• If the elections take place, will you vote? Why/Why not?

Thirty-eight per cent of the interviews in the first survey and 28 per cent of the interviews in the second survey were conducted face-to-face, with the other interviews conducted via audio-only calls using Viber or Signal messaging applications. The participants were between the ages of 22 and 65. Forty-eight per cent of respondents in the first survey and 33 per cent in the second survey were women. For both surveys, around 60 per cent of respondents lived in urban areas and 40 per cent in rural areas.

Respondents were purposely selected to include individuals known to be close to the military or the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), political party members believed to view elections as a way out of the ongoing political crisis, civil society activists, and regular citizens not actively involved in the resistance movement. Since many regular citizens were afraid to answer political questions, the research team used the snowball sampling method to identify additional respondents. (Editor’s note: This means asking each respondent if they knew anyone who could be a potential respondent, usually at the end of the survey.) Around 30 per cent of the participants in the second survey had participated in the first. Although responses to these surveys do not represent the entire population, the results nonetheless reveal how public sentiment has evolved.

In the earlier survey, eight per cent of the 350 respondents welcomed the SAC-proposed elections. These were people close to the military or the USDP. About nine per cent opposed the coup but said elections might pave the way for a return to democracy. However, 273 respondents (78 per cent) accused the military of toppling a popularly elected government to reassert military control and said that military-run elections would be designed to ensure a USDP victory. This widely-held view appears to have been reinforced by the unreasonably stringent requirements in the SAC’s Political Party Registration Law of January 2023; thousands of Myanmar citizens reacted to that law with social media posts and comments saying that meaningful elections would not occur under the SAC.

Of the 273 opposed to the election and who said that it would not provide a way out of the current crisis, 171 said that power should be handed back to the National League for Democracy (NLD), which won the 2020 election. 38 said they might change their view if the military released all political prisoners, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and allowed all political parties, including the NLD, to participate in the election. All 273 believed that anti-military resistance groups would try to disrupt the elections and predicted that polls in many townships, especially in ethnic minority areas, would be unsafe. However, 190 respondents thought voting was possible in 60 per cent of townships.

Thirty-one respondents (from seven different ethnic minority areas) said they would consider voting if credible ethnic minority parties participated while 18 said they would consider voting if ethnic revolutionary organisations (EROs) encouraged them to. Fifty-three said they would consider participating only in elections organised by a neutral transitional government. Without such measures, all 273 respondents would wish to boycott the elections. Still, 164 said they would vote under pressure (for example, if under threat of punitive action if they refused), but 135 of these added that they would spoil their ballots. 109 categorically said they would not participate.

In June 2024, when preparations began for the second survey, residents of Chin, Karenni, and Rakhine States, and Sagaing Region told the research team that interviews were unnecessary, as the strong pushback against the SAC in these areas meant polls were impossible there. Forty-eight of 500 people from other States and Regions surveyed in 2024 shared this view. All 43 participants close to the military or USDP said that they would support the elections, while 38 others said that they supported elections as the easiest and least violent way to end the crisis. These respondents explained that they feared the country would fail or fragment before the resistance could achieve victory on the battlefield. Some said that even if SAC chief Min Aung Hlaing became president following the elections, the existence of a parliament would curtail his power. (See Figures 1 and 2 below for the breakdown of responses.)

Conversely, 381 respondents believed elections would worsen the crisis as Min Aung Hlaing would try to become president and resistance groups would not accept the military taking any role in politics. These respondents doubted the military’s ability to hold elections effectively (as did 17 pro-election respondents). On the other hand, 67 respondents said they would vote if the election took place, and another 31 said they would vote if it was safe to do so. On election safety, 317 respondents predicted that candidates, especially USDP ones, would be at risk of assassination. A well-placed activist confirmed that anti-military armed groups, especially those not operating under the National Unity Government (NUG), might try to disrupt the elections by killing candidates.

These responses suggest that elections alone cannot resolve Myanmar’s political problems and might lead to more violence.

A member of a registered political party preferred the election pathway, stating that he and his fellow party members would participate even though he did not believe elections would be free and fair. He noted some political parties were unhappy when the SAC’s election commission suggested using a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system instead of proportional representation (PR), which the SAC has been promoting since 2021. Under FPTP, the candidate that wins the most votes in each constituency wins that seat, irrespective of how many votes were cast for other parties. Under PR, the number of seats assigned to each political party is decided based on the number of votes it received in all seats in the State/Region: PR would therefore favour parties that came in second for a large number of seats and those which do not contest all seats across Myanmar. In practice, this means the USDP and ethnic minority political parties.

The military has long promoted the PR system since it believed that FPTP favours the NLD. However, since the NLD will not be contesting the SAC’s planned election (due to its rejection of the election and the official dissolution of NLD for not registering under the Political Parties Registration Law), the USDP would be expected to win seats where it previously came second to the NLD. The political party member respondent noted that FPTP would favour the USDP, if most people refused to vote. As most voters would be USDP and military supporters, this would increase the likelihood of the USDP winning any seat outright under FPTP. Nonetheless, he saw the elections as necessary to resolve the crisis, bring about change, and begin genuine dialogue among stakeholders.

Figure 1. Respondents’ Views on Whether Elections Could be a Way Out of the Crisis

	2021-2022 Survey		2024 Survey
		%		%
Yes	59	17	81	16
No unless NLD allowed to compete	38	11	–	–
No	235	67	381	76
Don’t Know	18	5	38	8
Total	350	100	500	100

Figure 2. Responses to “If the elections take place, will you vote?”

	2021-2022 Survey		2024 Survey
		%		%
Yes	28	8	67	13.4
– if safe to do so	–	–	31	6.2
– if threatened	164	47	–	–
– if credible parties stand	31	9	–	–
– if EROs urge (me) to	18	5	–	–
No	109	31	381	76.2
Don’t Know	–	–	21	4.2
Total	350	100	500	100

These responses suggest that elections alone cannot resolve Myanmar’s political problems and might lead to more violence. Most respondents believed the crisis would deepen if elections went ahead, the USDP won, and senior military officers took up government roles. 113 respondents from the second survey were concerned about the potential for chaos should the SAC collapse. Their view may reflect an acceptable – though arduous – middle ground: if Myanmar’s military is serious about finding a way out, it should engage in serious dialogue with major stakeholders, including the NUG and EROs, before holding elections.

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