Does the Arakan Army have the Capacity to Govern Rakhine?

As the Arakan Army (AA) gains more ground against the State Administration Council (SAC) regime forces in Rakhine State, analysts are asking questions about the AA’s administrative capacity. The AA has steadily gained momentum against SAC troops since November 2023, when it opened a new front as a part of Operation 1027, a coordinated attack against SAC forces that started in October 2023, primarily in northern Myanmar.

Since its formation in 2009 with the aim of greater autonomy for Rakhine State, the AA is now one of the country’s most powerful armed groups. It has established nine military zones across Rakhine State and deployed thousands of troops in allied areas. In early November 2023, the AA had attacked SAC troops in multiple locations in western Myanmar, breaking a year-long informal ceasefire. The fighting has continued intensively and spread from rural to urban areas from northern to southern Rakhine. As of mid-October 2024, the AA has seized more than an estimated two-thirds of Rakhine State, including the areas around the state capital, Sittwe, the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone, and the Myanmar military’s Western Command in Ann.

Since the 2021 coup, observers of the conflict in Myanmar have speculated that the Chin and Kayah (Karenni) States were most likely to be the first to break free of SAC control. However, the AA’s significant gains after renewed fighting in Rakhine State have now sparked new speculation that Rakhine might be the first state to be fully liberated.

Even so, questions remain about the extent of this liberation, especially as SAC forces are bombarding different parts of Rakhine with naval and airpower attacks, including on areas that the AA has wrested from the Myanmar military. Additionally, the possibility of armed clashes between the AA and Rohingya militants, such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), and the SAC junta’s Rohingya recruits in northern Rakhine State, poses concerns about continued instability in the region. 

Nonetheless, the AA’s recent gains have fired the locals’ imaginations on their greater autonomy.

The International Crisis Group assesses that the AA’s establishment of de facto control over a larger territory in Rakhine State even after expelling the SAC force will still mean that the AA faces challenges in addressing the fundamental socio-economic needs of Rakhine State. Bangladesh and India, which border Myanmar’s Rakhine and Chin States, are wary about engaging Myanmar’s armed groups, unlike China or Thailand. Bangladesh and India do not have direct economic/trade ties with Rakhine State. Furthermore, poor transportation connectivity makes Rakhine residents heavily dependent on access to SAC-controlled central Myanmar for their essential goods, electricity, communications, and banking services.

Nonetheless, the AA’s recent gains have fired the locals’ imaginations on their greater autonomy. Many in Rakhine State recall the past brutal suppression of Rakhine’s armed rebellion against the Myanmar military, such as Operation Leach in 1998 by Indian intelligence in collaboration with the Myanmar regime. The long-standing desire of the Rakhine people for more autonomy (home rule) adds to the significance of possible self-government in Rakhine. The AA’s current military success arguably represents the first significant achievement since 1785 when the Arakan Kingdom fell vassal to the Burmese Kingdom in Mandalay.

The AA may not have full capabilities to govern Rakhine, but it has shown it is capable of growth. Starting with just 26 people in 2009, the AA has grown to approximately 40,000 troops. The AA ran administrative and judiciary services in several parts of Rakhine State, even before the 2021 coup. It thus has first-hand experience in governance. The AA has also sought to shore up its administrative weaknesses by training personnel and establishing a public administration and policy school run mainly by foreign-educated Rakhine individuals. Courses include public policy, English, leadership, and politics.

The AA has also been gaining widespread support from the Rakhine people since it started fighting the Myanmar military in early 2015. Following the formation of its administration in late 2020, the AA has sought to establish legitimacy among diverse communities in Rakhine State, including the Rohingya. The AA has invited Rohingya representatives into its governance mechanism and took a leading role in the Cyclone Mocha recovery process. Such inclusive efforts should continue.

The AA’s current limited interactions with India and Bangladesh may potentially change should its administrative control over Rakhine expand. India’s Mizoram state representatives met AA leadership late last year. However, it is unlikely that either country can or will fully recognise the AA as a state actor. Looking ahead, refugee repatriation poses the key challenge in Bangladesh-AA interactions while the Kaladan multimodal transport corridor project will partly affect future relations between India and the AA.

The AA now stands at a crossroads where its military achievements could spell either potential progress towards more autonomy in Rakhine or expose it to the multifaceted challenges of governance. How it addresses these challenges will have consequences for Rakhine State’s future trajectory and the broader landscape of armed struggle in Myanmar.

2024/344