Enlarging the “Gong” for a Bigger Boom: Vietnam and Strategic Autonomy

In the buildup to the recently concluded 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), Vietnam declared foreign affairs a “core and regular task”, with adaptive diplomacy elevated to a level akin to national defence and security. Vietnamese leaders are increasingly framing foreign affairs around the pursuit of strategic autonomy, a shift that speaks to the challenges posed by growing unpredictability and intensifying great-power competition.

For years, Vietnam has successfully pursued a foreign policy centred on international integration, multilateralism, and diversification, reinforcing its resilience against external pressures. Under Communist Party of Vietnam General Secretary To Lam, this omni-directional strategy has been energised. For example, Vietnam’s comprehensive strategic partnerships have doubled during his tenure. Yet improving strategic autonomy – fostering independence and resilience amid a fluid geopolitical environment — hinges not only on consolidating ties with traditional partners and expanding cooperation with new ones, but also on domestic capacity building.

Strategic autonomy is not about autarky, but the strategic deployment of resources to strengthen critical areas and mitigate vulnerabilities to supply-chain shocks. It is, as To Lam stressed at the Congress, “international integration without dependence, cooperation without compromise, and partnerships without losing sight of national interests.”

Vietnam has laid the groundwork to facilitate greater strategic autonomy in three key areas: energy security, domestic infrastructure financing, and cultivation of private domestic firms capable of competing globally. Greater autonomy across these areas would generate a mutually reinforcing cycle, enabling Vietnam to engage external partners with greater confidence and flexibility, without the alignment signalling it sometimes entails. Moreover, continued successes in these areas could underpin Vietnam’s drive for greater soft power, with smaller states across the Global South, such as Laos, Uzbekistan, and Mongolia, seeing a successful blueprint for development that preserves autonomous decision-making and utilises foreign assistance.

Still, however, challenges remain. Energy security, for example, is anchored in Vietnam’s Power Development Plan VIII (PDP8), which aims to double national power capacity to 150 GW by 2030 and expand it to around 900 GW by 2050. Complementing this, Politburo Resolution 70, issued last August, frames energy security as a pillar of national security. It calls on public and private actors to leverage domestic energy resources while making selective use of imports and exports.

In May, Malaysia, Vietnam and Singapore agreed to cooperate on renewable energy exports, with feasibility studies underway for transmitting power from Vietnam to Malaysia and Singapore via submarine cables. These developments underscore Vietnam’s growing confidence as a regional energy producer.

As Vietnam continues its ascent, internal economic strength will be indispensable in navigating transformations in the rules-based international order.

But while renewable energy capacity has surged, private investment has slowed. EVN, the national power utility, has struggled to maintain subsidies for renewable producers. This undermined investor confidence. Meanwhile, Vietnam’s revived nuclear ambitions have encountered setbacks. While Vietnam and Russia signed a cooperation agreement in January, Japan has withdrawn from one project, citing overly ambitious timelines. These issues highlight the difficulty of translating energy ambition into sustained outcomes.

Since the CPV’s 13th Congress, Vietnam has demonstrated greater autonomy in financing large-scale infrastructure projects. Long Thanh International Airport was funded primarily by the Airports Corporation of Vietnam, a state-owned enterprise, alongside loans from state-owned banks, while sections of the North–South Expressway relied on public-private partnerships. Although some segments initially explored foreign financing, the state has largely avoided dependence on external capital. Vietnam can be more selective when engaging foreign investors.

However, questions remain around the flagship North–South high-speed railway project. When announced, the government pledged to go it alone with financing, despite an estimated cost of USD67 billion. Yet a viable financing model has yet to emerge. Vinspeed withdrew its proposal in May, and the Ministry of Construction has since acknowledged difficulties in research, evaluation, and investment method selection.

Strategic autonomy does not imply rejecting foreign financing altogether, but rather expanding options so that turning inward becomes feasible. Vietnam’s use of Chinese loans to finance a railway linking Hai Phong with China’s southern Yunnan province illustrates this pragmatic approach: external capital employed selectively, without compromising overall strategic flexibility.

The most difficult internal component of Vietnam’s strategic autonomy might lie in nurturing large private enterprises that can participate in global value chains. Resolution 68 was a watershed, placing the private sector at the heart of Vietnam’s growth strategy and setting a target of cultivating at least 20 large private enterprises by 2030. South Korea offers a useful example. Firms such as Samsung Electronics, SK Hynix, Hyundai, and LG anchor strategic sectors whose disruption would carry systemic costs for major economies. From advanced displays to high-value memory chips, diversified industrial strength grants Seoul a degree of strategic maneuverability despite its limited geopolitical weight.

Vietnam has no shortage of large domestic conglomerates, such as Vingroup, Hao Phat Group, and Masan Group. However, it remains unclear whether these firms can translate domestic success into sustained international competitiveness. At home, many benefit from structural advantages unavailable beyond Vietnam. They often have influential political connections and/or privileged access to resources owing to their origins as state enterprises. Bridging this gap is essential for the private sector to contribute meaningfully to national strategic autonomy.

Ho Chi Minh once remarked that strength is the gong and diplomacy the sound; the larger the gong, the louder the sound. As Vietnam continues its ascent, internal economic strength will be indispensable in navigating transformations in the rules-based international order. In today’s deeply integrated global economy, cultivating that strength requires careful management of both external engagement and internal development. Vietnam has mastered the former over the past four decades; bolstering the latter will help enlarge its gong, enhancing its strategic autonomy and soft power strategy.

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