Expanding Southeast Asia-Kazakhstan Dialogue: Strategic Imperatives

Kazakhstan’s rise as a middle power has gone hand in hand with Central Asian economies growing in importance as trade partners, sources of resources such as critical minerals and sources of tourists. The US, Russia, Japan, South Korea, the EU, India, and since 2023, China and Germany have been competing in this resource-rich and strategic region. To keep pace, ASEAN should follow suit.

Kazakhstan is the largest country in Central Asia. It has been proactively seeking to establish itself as the leader in the Central Asian region by proposing several multilateral initiatives. Last year, Kazakhstan saw frequent high-level visits and numerous new bilateral initiatives between Southeast Asian countries and Kazakhstan. Similarly, ASEAN should consider engaging with Kazakhstan. While such broader collaboration faces challenges, these can be overcome to provide mutual benefits in several areas.

The first motivation is to build closer economic relations between ASEAN countries and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is a gateway to Central Asia. This allows Southeast Asian companies to gain access to new markets and resources, while Central Asian countries benefit from foreign direct investment that can drive economic growth and development. This is particularly relevant as Central Asia seeks to diversify its investment sources beyond traditional partners like China and Russia. In addition, more collaborative projects in logistics and infrastructure would improve connectivity between Kazakhstan and Southeast Asia, facilitating the movement of goods, and thereby enhancing trade relationships. This potential is illustrated by an agreement on economic and trade cooperation signed between Thailand and Kazakhstan in 2024. Both sides are keen to enlarge the supply of domestic agro-industrial goods to Thailand as Kazakhstan plans to launch an agri-food hub.

Through agricultural exports, Kazakhstan can also assist ASEAN in bolstering its food security. Food security is an area of significant collaborative potential because Kazakhstan is investing in digital solutions to improve agricultural efficiency and sustainability by integrating technology into traditional farming practices. This approach offers valuable insights and technologies to ASEAN economies that are looking to promote rural development and food security through digitalisation in agriculture.

The second motivation to bolster relations is related to political and security considerations. Kazakhstan has aimed to deepen its engagement with the Southeast Asian region as part of its multi-vector foreign policy (not aligning itself with any great power or alliance and engaging with a diverse set of countries). Specifically, Kazakhstan’s new Foreign Policy Concept for 2020-2030 refers to ASEAN as one of the regional organisations that Kazakhstan should expand ties with. This could be achieved by utilising existing frameworks such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), founded by Kazakhstan in 1992.

Kazakhstan is a gateway to Central Asia. This allows Southeast Asian companies to gain access to new markets and resources, while Central Asian countries benefit from foreign direct investment that can drive economic growth and development.

CICA has received a muted response from ASEAN. However, since 2021, CICA has had “new challenges and threats dimension” with priority areas such as combating terrorism, security of and in the use of information and communication technologies, combating illicit drugs, and public health, which are highly relevant for ASEAN. Thus, CICA provides a platform for ASEAN to engage in security discussions that address mutual concerns.

Another possible area for closer cooperation is sustainable development. Both ASEAN and Kazakhstan are committed to realising the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The ASEAN Centre for Sustainable Development Studies and Dialogue (ACSDSD), which serves as a platform for policy dialogue among ASEAN member states and external partners, could involve Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan has large lithium reserves necessary to produce lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles and ACSDSD can play a role in sharing knowledge on responsible mining frameworks.

Finally, enhancing digital policy cooperation between ASEAN and Kazakhstan presents a significant opportunity for both. Both regions face challenges in digital skills gaps among their populations. Kazakhstan’s emphasis on training specialists in AI and digital technologies aligns with ASEAN’s goals to enhance digital literacy. Joint educational programmes or exchange initiatives could be developed to equip the workforce with the necessary skills, focusing on areas such as AI, data analytics, and digital entrepreneurship to enhance ASEAN’s and Kazakhstan’s digital transformations.

While it makes sense for ASEAN to expand cooperation with Kazakhstan as a grouping, two main challenges remain — institutional and socio-cultural. In terms of institutions, Kazakhstan has sought ASEAN Dialogue Partner status since 1995, but a moratorium on new applications has been in place since 1999. This has limited Kazakhstan’s ability to formally engage with ASEAN. Furthermore, the country’s application to join the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has not been discussed in detail, and the forum has not lifted its moratorium on new members since 2007. Kazakhstan is also not well-known in Southeast Asia, limiting socio-cultural exchange.

Nevertheless, these constraints can be overcome. ASEAN could consider two options – granting dialogue partner status to Kazakhstan and establishing an ASEAN-Kazakhstan dialogue framework or launching a C5+1 platform that would include all five Central Asian countries. The C5+1 initiative is a diplomatic framework that the US initiated with Central Asia in 2015, and it could serve as a model. Other countries have a similar framework, such as Central Asia plus Japan dialogue. A similar platform between ASEAN and Central Asia would enhance communication and foster coordination and effectiveness of new initiatives.

To mitigate the socio-cultural constraints, supporting tourism and people-to-people exchanges is necessary. To boost tourism, visa-free policies were recently put in place between Kazakhstan and Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos. Connectivity was also strengthened when AirAsia X became the first Southeast Asian airline to set up a direct air link between Kuala Lumpur and Almaty. Similarly, Singapore and Kazakhstan are planning to establish direct flights, and most recently Cambodia has expressed interest. These developments bode well for people-to-people connectivity between the two regions and should be further encouraged.

While ASEAN-Kazakhstan engagement holds promise, expanding formal dialogue mechanisms faces institutional constraints. The moratorium on new ASEAN Dialogue Partners reflects concerns about institutional capacity and the potential to dilute the effectiveness of existing partnerships. Lifting this moratorium would require Kazakhstan to demonstrate substantial strategic value compared to other applicants. The creation of an ASEAN-Kazakhstan dialogue framework must therefore address ASEAN’s institutional capacity limitations. On the other hand, a broader C5+1 platform risks overshadowing Kazakhstan-specific initiatives while increasing ASEAN’s diplomatic commitments. Moving forward requires finding ways to tackle such practical issues and build these institutional bridges.

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