Facilitating Gainful Labour Migration in Southeast Asia Remains an Elusive Task

INTRODUCTION

Southeast Asia’s economic landscape creates conducive conditions for labour migration — but poses challenges to making the process productive and beneficial. Cross-border migration is induced by differences in income and labour market conditions, and likelier to happen among immediate neighbours. Geographic proximity reduces cost and generally corresponds with cultural and linguistic compatibility, and closer diplomatic ties. Accordingly, Singapore and Brunei, high-income countries by the World Bank’s definition, with upper-middle-income Malaysia and Thailand, have become established as the region’s labour-receiving countries. Indonesia is also counted among the wide range of upper-middle-income countries, but continues to be mainly a migration-origin country, while lower-middle-income Philippines, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam are substantial labour-sending countries. The scene is more dynamic, with net immigration of Thai workers into Malaysia, but the defining feature of Southeast Asia’s migration map is the presence of three main hubs — Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore — each with a distinct composition of worker source countries.

This article surveys the state of labour migration in Southeast Asia and evaluates relevant domestic and ASEAN policies, mainly in the labour-receiving countries. Southeast Asian countries are trying to improve migrant management, mitigate abuse, and redress forced labour in supply chains which violates human rights and may trigger commercial sanctions. ASEAN aspires to integrate the regional labour market for skilled workers for the mutual benefit of ASEAN member states (AMS), with increased attention to the protection and reintegration of low-skilled migrant workers in recent years. However, the region has fallen short due to inadequacies of both ASEAN and its AMS, notably in pervasive labour brokerage structures that exacerbate workers’ vulnerability to exploitation. This article concludes with a discussion of the challenges and opportunities for the region in facilitating mutually beneficial labour migration.

LABOUR MIGRATION PATTERNS

Economic and demographic conditions shape cross-border labour migration in Southeast Asia. Table 1 displays countries from highest to lowest per capita income and key migration statistics. Expectedly, the upper four countries have a larger share of migrants in total population. Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand saw steep increases in this share between 1990 and 2010, and since then migrant labour’s presence has become established, with their population share holding steady or slightly growing until 2024. Singapore and Brunei, with markedly higher per capita incomes and smaller populations, are the most reliant on migrant labour. Malaysia and Thailand also attract migration; Malaysia maintains substantial income differentials vis-à-vis Indonesia and the Philippines, while Thailand presents employment opportunities to its immediate neighbours Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar.

Table 1. Southeast Asian countries: Migration overview

	GNI per capita†	Number of international migrants ‡ (thousand)			International migrants per total population ‡ (%)			Women % of international migrants
	2023	1990	2010	2024	1990	2010	2024	2024
Singapore	70,590	729	2,160	2,842	24.0	42.6	48.7	57.1
Brunei	34,480	73	101	120	28.7	25.6	25.9	43.4
Malaysia	11,710	1,028	3,087	3,807	5.8	10.8	10.7	22.9
Thailand	7,200	288	2,640	3,179	0.5	3.9	4.4	43.8
Indonesia	4,810	92	113	446	0.1	0.0	0.2	46.2
Philippines	4,320	135	178	87	0.2	0.2	0.1	29.7
Vietnam	4,110	89	84	326	0.1	0.1	0.3	52.8
Cambodia	2,390	38	82	84	0.5	0.6	0.5	46.1
Laos	2,110	23	33	51	0.5	0.5	0.7	35.6
Myanmar	1,230	134	76	79	0.3	0.2	0.1	45.2

Labour migration statistics are sparse in general, and uneven across countries, due to difficulties in data collection and inconsistencies in public disclosure. The International Labour Migration Statistics (ILMS) database, compiled by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) from national governments, shows three main sources: population census, labour force surveys, and immigration records – specifically, work permits. The scope varies across sources, with census datasets capturing migrants of all ages and both working and non-working populations, while labour force surveys and work permit data focus on labour migration. Undocumented migrants, by definition, bypass official accounting systems, but some sources estimate these numbers, providing a fuller picture of the foreign workforce. Data sources also offer varying degrees of granularity, in terms of the socioeconomic and employment composition of migrant workers. Data accessibility is a further challenge. Countries often have data that are not disclosed, notably Singapore, which reports in totalities while withholding details of migrant labour that its effective management systems would have documented. The following discussion attaches the caveat that we must handle migration data carefully and tolerate inconsistencies across countries.

The working-age migrant stock, totalling about nine million in Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand in 2019, underscores the position of these three countries as the major regional immigration hubs. Migrant workers’ share of employment sits in the range of 3-14 per cent in Thailand and 10-15 per cent in Malaysia, depending on the data source and the counting of undocumented workers (Figure 1). Malaysia and Singapore, which more regularly report aggregated immigration data, registered a drop in work permit holders in 2020 at the height of Covid-19 induced economic restrictions and border closures, but the numbers have rebounded to pre-pandemic levels.

Figure 1. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand: Foreign migrant workers as a share of total employed

Notes: Labour Force Surveys are the source for calculating total employed in all countries and for estimating migrant workers in some Malaysia and Thailand; number of migrant workers based on: Singapore (work permits); Malaysia (work permits issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs; estimates based on LFS); Thailand (work permits and undocumented workers estimated by IOM, LFS).  

Figure 2. Brunei, Malaysia and Thailand: Share of ASEAN-origin workers in total foreign workers

A few further patterns are worth noting. Women constitute the minority of migrants in all countries except Vietnam and Singapore, especially the latter, where the services-dominant economy and large presence of domestic workers spur demand for women workers (Table 1). Malaysia’s male-majority working-age migrant profile corresponds with the reality that migrant workers often fill manual, routine, and sometimes dangerous roles in manufacturing, construction, and agriculture. The profile of migrant-origin countries is instructive. In Malaysia, foreign work permit data show 36 per cent coming from Indonesia, 6 per cent from Myanmar, and 3 per cent from the Philippines, with considerable South Asian presence (28 per cent Bangladesh, 17 per cent Nepal, and 6 per cent India). In contrast, migrant workers in Thailand overwhelmingly originate from its immediate neighbours Myanmar (66 per cent), Cambodia (17 per cent), and Laos (8 per cent). The neighbour factor also looms large in Brunei’s migrant workforce, with Indonesians comprising 31 per cent, Malaysians 14 per cent, and Filipinos 12 per cent.

The data highlight the potential for regional migration that fills labour demand gaps in destination countries and provides employment and remittance to origin countries. The constraints and country-specific features must also be weighed. Geographic contiguity predominates in Thailand. Its porous land border with Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, compounded by the post-2020 coup crisis in the latter, also fuel informality and clandestine migration that amplify workers’ vulnerability.

Various pull factors come into play in Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei. Besides offering higher wages and liveability, these countries can also draw on a global talent pool due to the wide usage of English in commerce and government. Commonalities in Malay and Indonesian language, culture, and religion facilitate Indonesian labour migration, particularly to Malaysia (Data on migrant worker nationality are not available for Singapore). Nonetheless, despite the proximity and affinity, Indonesians’ share of foreign work permits in Malaysia has steadily declined, from a preponderant 75 per cent in 2000 to 50 per cent by 2007-08 and under 40 per cent since 2017. Indonesia’s economic growth has narrowed the income gap with Malaysia and attenuated Malaysia’s attractiveness, but deficiencies in formal migration channels have also constrained labour inflows from Indonesia and the region, while lucrative labour recruitment opportunities in South Asia have increasingly shifted Malaysia’s focus westward. Irregular cross-border flows persist.

The educational and occupational composition of migrant labour reflect a bias for workers in low-skill, low-wage positions, particularly in Malaysia and Thailand. Among migrants, the share with lower secondary schooling or less is 63 per cent in Malaysia and 92 per cent in Thailand, according to recent data, hugely exceeding that for non-migrants: 17.5 per cent in Malaysia and 62 per cent in Thailand (Figure 3). The concentration of migrant workers in occupations requiring basic qualifications and skills translates into wage disparities. In 2019, migrant workers earned 38 per cent and 45 per cent less than non-migrants in Thailand and Malaysia, respectively.

We can observe parallel patterns in the occupational profile of migrant workers (Figure 4). The classification may vary across countries, but international convention classifies three tiers as: low-skilled (elementary jobs), middle-skilled (farmers/fishers; production line, service, clerical, or craft jobs), and high-skilled (managers, technical or professional jobs). A much higher share of migrant workers in Malaysia and Thailand are in low-skilled jobs, compared to non-migrants, and the converse occurs in the high-skilled category. Data are also available for Brunei, where in 2023, 24.0 per cent of migrants were high-skilled, compared to 44.5 per cent of non-migrants, reflecting the appeal of Brunei as an “expatriate” destination.

Figure 3. Malaysia and Thailand: Educational attainment of non-migrants and migrants

Figure 4. Malaysia and Thailand: Occupational skill profile of non-migrants and migrants

STRUCTURES AND POLICIES

Country-level progress and deficiency

Labour migration patterns outlined above derive from structural and policy factors, which operate in the context of broader economic, demographic, and labour market conditions. Southeast Asian economies are undergoing socioeconomic developments and structural changes alongside demographic shifts that affect labour supply and demand. Relatively higher population growth and younger workforces, coupled with limited economic opportunities at home, induce labour migration out of lower-middle and low-income countries. In Malaysia and Thailand, the prevalence of low-paying jobs and labour-intensive production across agriculture, manufacturing, construction, and services sectors has opened up gaps in the labour market that local workers are unwilling to fill. Economic advancement also tends to lower population growth, shrinking the proportion of the working-age population. These conditions induce labour migration, particularly of younger workers. The predominance of services in advanced economies, notably Singapore and Brunei, spurs migration focused on service jobs, including domestic work.

Structural factors and policy decisions in labour migration systems also shape cross-border movement and worker wellbeing. Singapore’s effective administration and city-state compactness facilitate regulatory compliance, averting irregularity and affording foreign workers clearer protection, albeit with exemptions from wage floor or social insurance provisions. Singapore’s position as a talent magnet and commerce-finance hub induces high-skilled worker immigration from Southeast Asia and around the globe.

…”the labour brokerage model stands out as the common feature across the Southeast Asian region.” Such operations allow intermediaries to source foreign workers, and with their leverage and profit motive, to extract high fees and subject workers to debt bondage and forced labour conditions.

Malaysia and Thailand have instituted policies and regulations to facilitate orderly labour migration. In the past five years, Malaysia has officially phased out labour outsourcing, extended workplace insurance and unemployment insurance benefits to migrant workers, and in 2021, promulgated its National Action Plan on Forced Labour which seeks to eliminate the problem by 2030. In 2023, Thailand adopted its second National Action Plan on Business and Human Rights, outlining 18 action points specifically for migrant workers.

However, both countries have faltered in the implementation of regular and secure pathways for foreign workers. Research shows the persistence of irregular migration, human trafficking, and labour exploitation in Malaysia and Thailand. Both countries’ non-recognition of refugees also leaves asylum seekers in limbo, a situation exacerbated in Thailand by the Myanmar post-2020 coup political crisis which has triggered influxes of people without legal status who are more vulnerable to abuse.

Amid country-specific features of migrant worker recruitment, “the labour brokerage model stands out as the common feature across the Southeast Asian region.” Such operations allow intermediaries to source foreign workers, and with their leverage and profit motive, to extract high fees and subject workers to debt bondage and forced labour conditions. Workers are frequently deprived of legal and contractual coverage and placed at the mercy of labour contractors, who may deceive workers into harsh work conditions contrary to prior promises. Corrupt government officials may collude in bypassing official documentation at entry points or border crossings. Irregular migration exposes workers to exploitation from the start, but many workers enter through official channels and later become undocumented, whether by deceit or factors beyond their control, such as the automatic cancellation of work permits when workers’ employment is terminated or if they leave their employers to escape abusive conditions.

ASEAN’s approach

Labour has migrated for centuries in the region, but rapid growth in the 1990s coupled with concerns over the lack of coordinated response prompted ASEAN to establish some standards in the late 2000s (Table 2). The Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, or Cebu Declaration of 2007, promoted “full potential and dignity of migrant workers in a climate of freedom, equity, and stability in accordance with the laws, regulations, and policies of respective ASEAN Member Countries”. The Declaration also committed “receiving states and sending states to cooperate to resolve the issues of migrant workers unintentionally becoming undocumented”, and to respect fundamental rights without undermining the receiving country. The Cebu Declaration’s exclusion of migrants who are undocumented upon entry to their destination country attenuates its oversight of the pressing problems of irregular migration and human trafficking.

Nonetheless, an important institution was established in the form of the ASEAN Forum on Migrant Labour (AFML), which fosters deliberations and issues recommendations arising from its annual meetings. Among the recurring themes of AFML meetings are the promotion of rights awareness, effective recruitment practices and regulations, digitalisation, and access to justice. The AFML also includes activists and advocates in its proceedings, recognising the grassroots insight and valuable contributions of civil society organisations that might be omitted from traditional government-business-trade union tripartite platforms.

After the launch of the AEC Blueprint, which focused on skilled labour in selected sectors, ASEAN incrementally added policy documents on emerging issues. As reflected in a series of policy statements, the region sought to address problems interrelated with the mass numbers of medium- and low-skilled labour migration, including human trafficking, return and reintegration, social protection portability, and protection during crises. Exposure of human trafficking and forced labour by the media and civil society, and international scrutiny or sanctions — such as through the US State Department’s Trafficking in Persons report and the Customs and Border Protection’s Withhold Release Orders (WROs) which bans imports into the US from companies deemed to perpetrate forced labour practices — have focused more attention on these problems in the region. The Covid-19 pandemic experience with mass repatriation of migrant workers heightened concern for a regional framework overseeing their return and reintegration, and for social protection to be more portable such that workers can retain their coverage while moving around the region. 

Table 2. ASEAN Milestones on Labour Migration and Worker Protection

2007	ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (Cebu Declaration)
2008	ASEAN Forum on Migrant Labour (AFML)
2008 2015	ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025
2015	ASEAN Convention against Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children (ACTIP)
2018	ASEAN Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers
2020	ASEAN Guidelines on Effective Return and Reintegration of Migrant Workers
2022	ASEAN Declaration on Portability of Social Security Benefits for Migrant Workers in ASEAN
2023	ASEAN Declaration on the Protection of Migrant Workers and Family Members in Crisis Situations

One of the challenges of regionalism is the diluted commitment of countries that have invested in bilateral arrangements, chiefly memorandums of understanding (MoU) between labour-receiving and labour-sending countries. Thailand has signed separate bilateral MoUs with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam; Malaysia maintains MoUs with Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Philippines, and Thailand – as well as Bangladesh, India, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. MoUs can address the specific needs and requirements of two participating countries, and are understandably an instrument of choice for facilitating labour migration. Nevertheless, their enforcement can result in disparate terms and conditions, and entrenchment of vested interests in the labour recruitment system, compared to a system prioritising workers’ rights, fairness, decent work, and low migration cost. Malaysia recently announced plans to review its MoUs; such efforts could be simplified by upholding common standards and practices in labour migration into Malaysia from all sending countries.

ASEAN has decidedly prioritised skilled labour in its regional integration ambitions. The precedence accorded to skilled labour was articulated in the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint in 2008, and reiterated in the AEC Blueprint 2025’s commitment to “widen ASEAN people-to-people, institutional, and infrastructure connectivity through ASEAN and sub-regional cooperation projects that facilitate movement of capital as well as skilled labour and talents”. Its vision of “A Highly Integrated and Cohesive Economy” articulated the main objective of “[facilitating] the seamless movement of goods, services, investment, capital, and skilled labour within ASEAN in order to enhance ASEAN’s trade and production networks, as well as to establish a more unified market for its firms and consumers”. To this end, ASEAN established mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) in eight skilled occupational groups in the decade leading up to 2015: engineering services (2005), nursing services (2006), architectural services (2007), surveying (2007), dental practitioners (2009), medical practitioners (2009), tourism professionals (2012), accountancy services (2014).

The MRA scheme aims to enhance the mobility of professional and technical workers through ensuring that their qualifications are recognised and obviating the cumbersome need for local re-certification. However, the process has been critiqued as an “additional but weak and non-binding layer of institutional migration governance which only affirms the generally disengaged stance of ASEAN countries”. In a similar vein, Mendoza and Sugiyarto (2017), in one of the very few appraisals of implementation, conclude that progress had been “painfully slow and uneven” after more than a decade of implementation, due to incomplete recognition processes and lack of follow-through by AMS. The absence of new MRA occupational sectors in the past decade indicates diminishing resolve among AMS, although ASEAN could still benefit from skilled labour mobility in facilitating trade, investment, and social interaction.

Tertiary-level qualifications and skills certifications span a vast range and also face the problem of recognition or transferability across countries. Mutual recognition of skills (MRS) arrangements have filled this gap on a more ad hoc and bilateral basis with ILO facilitation, for instance, for Cambodian skilled construction workers in Thailand. The ASEAN Qualifications Reference Framework (AQRF) is a wider and more formalised initiative that aligns national qualifications, which vary in the number of levels, to a regionally standardised 8-level framework. After AQRF’s endorsement in 2014, the AQRF committee was formed and held annual meetings during 2017- 2019. While its principal goals are to facilitate lifelong learning and student mobility, AQRF has the potential to promote regional mobility for workers with certified skills. Four AMS — Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand — have completed their AQRF Referencing Reports, which map national qualifications frameworks onto the AQRF, and the next batch of reports from Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam are in progress. Take-up of the AQRF has been slow, but by design it is aligned with ASEAN’s economic integration objectives and still holds out the potential to facilitate technically and professionally skilled labour flows.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Can Southeast Asian countries and ASEAN provide better for the nine million migrants working within the region? Can labour migration expand while protecting workers and delivering benefits for both sending and receiving countries?

The ASEAN Economic Community’s goal of facilitating high-skilled worker mobility via profession-specific MRAs continues to be elusive. It is difficult to envisage breakthroughs. The current climate of global economic uncertainty and technological transformation of service jobs through artificial intelligence inclines governments toward shoring up domestic labour markets, including employment security for citizens, particularly specialised professionals. Malaysia, as ASEAN Chair, is promoting 2025 as the ASEAN Year of Skills, to address training and talent development within countries. The process could potentially benefit the region by expanding the base of trained and certified workers across numerous fields. Consolidating the AQRF and popularising its usage could bolster migration of skilled workers with broader effect than the MRAs, and would be aligned with ASEAN integration, something re-emphasised in the wake of President Trump’s destabilising tariff measures.

Constructive standardisation in the region could also help avert a race-to-the-bottom scenario in which countries attract foreign labour by maintaining exploitative practices that favour vested interests but harm workers and ultimately disserve their economies.

Geographic proximity and ASEAN diplomatic facilitation, alongside cultural, linguistic, and religious common ground, continue to offer advantages to intra-regional migration. The greater diversity of origin countries for migrant labour in Singapore and Malaysia, and predominance of Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos in Thailand’s migrant workforce will also prevail. Influxes from Myanmar in the wake of the country’s political crisis have stressed Thailand’s regulatory capacity; unsurprisingly, workers in this wave of irregular migration endure more precarious working and living conditions. Notwithstanding these challenges, labour-receiving countries’ adherence to international standards, regional commitments, and national legislation would enhance protection for migrant workers who are continually exposed to risks and perils. Regional efforts to reduce the cost of formal migration and mitigate undocumented cross-border flows would also be aided by more complete and transparent data. To plug the gaps in ASEAN’s migration database, the AMS, especially labour-receiving countries, need to be more effective in counting undocumented workers (Malaysia, Thailand), and more forthcoming with migration data (Singapore).

Regional coordination of labour migration — particularly for the vast majority who are in low-skilled jobs — remains elusive. Each country faces unique challenges, but as discussed above, a systemic shift away from the current labour brokerage model would constitute a major breakthrough. Profiteering labour brokerage operations fill gaps in formal migration systems. It is difficult to shift toward more direct recruitment, or more regulated systems that reduce the fees and debt extracted from workers, but countries with established diplomatic ties and mutual economic interests are arguably better poised to overcome these challenges.

Constructive standardisation in the region could also help avert a race-to-the-bottom scenario in which countries attract foreign labour by maintaining exploitative practices that favour vested interests but harm workers and ultimately disserve their economies. Recent proposals for ASEAN to establish guidelines for eliminating forced labour would send a timely and important signal. The question remains whether ASEAN, under Malaysia’s chairmanship, will step up the momentum in 2025.

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This is an adapted version of ISEAS Perspective 2025/37 published on 22 May 2025. The paper and its references can be accessed at this link.