France-Philippines New Defence Agreement: A Pivotal Step?

On 26 March 2026, Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro and his French counterpart signed a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA). Celebrated as the first such agreement between the Philippines and a European country, the SOVFA marks the culmination of a multi-year process of alignment between Paris and Manila and represents a crucial step in the Philippines’ efforts to diversify its security partnerships with like-minded states. While the Marcos Jr administration has signalled a potential “reset” with Beijing, such overtures are unlikely to yield meaningful gains. Manila should keep prioritising cooperation with potentially crucial security partners for its maritime deterrence needs.

The SOVFA builds on three points of convergence between the two countries over the past three years. The first is geostrategic: France has significant geopolitical interests in the Indo-Pacific, given its overseas territories. Strengthening partnerships with regional countries in times of instability is central to France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, as the SOVFA will regulate French troops’ territorial access to the Philippines. The SOFA also aligns with the Philippines’ 2023–2028 National Security Policy. The policy seeks to strengthen military cooperation with other countries for external defence, obtain defence-industrial investments for military modernisation and promote “regional and international peace and stability” with like-minded partners.

Second, the SOVFA’s accompanying declarations show that France’s alignment with Manila in supporting the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the normative framework for elevating the bilateral relationship. Moreover, as the Philippines strives to re-orient and modernise its military capabilities, the agreement strengthens the role of France as a security provider. This is done by developing interoperability in “emergency and disaster response, maritime security and domain awareness, and other mutually beneficial areas.”

Third, the strategic convergence between France and the Philippines is the result of a multi-year rapprochement. France conducted a port visit to Manila during the Duterte administration, and in 2022 the parties expressed their will to expand their strategic partnership. The French shipbuilder Naval Group opened a resident office in Manila in 2020. Bilateral cooperation accelerated, with France’s reaffirmation of its support for the 2016 Arbitral Award in 2023, along with expressions of concern over incidents in the West Philippine Sea (the Philippines’ formal name for parts of the South China Sea which lie in its exclusive economic zone) in the following years. The talks on the SOVFA commenced in 2023. Subsequently, the French Navy dispatched vessels for visits to the  Philippines over three years: the FREMM frigate Lorraine in 2023, the destroyer Bretagne in 2024, and the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaullein 2025. France also opened a resident defence mission in Manila in 2024, and sent a small contingent to the Balikatan exercises last year and this year.

The SOVFA enables greater military interoperability and joint deterrence signalling, and might even compensate for temporary shifts in US security policy.

It is in this context of deepening bilateral defence ties that French defence and shipbuilding firms formulated big-ticket bids, such as the Naval Group’s offer of Scorpene-class submarines and OCEA’s sale of 40 patrol ships to the Philippine Coast Guard. The SOFVA shows how France’s geostrategic push and clear displays of “normative alignment” on the West Philippine Sea issue are in line with the Marcos Jr administration’s efforts to re-establish a “credible deterrence” posture in the West Philippine Sea. This is done in part through key asset acquisitions, as underscored in the National Security Policy of 2023–2028.

Beyond bilateral convergence, the SOVFA must also be understood within the Philippines’ broader strategy of diversifying its security partnerships. The SOVFA enables greater military interoperability and joint deterrence signalling, and might even compensate for temporary shifts in US security policy. Moreover, such agreements symbolise a more autonomous foreign policy for Manila, beyond what is often portrayed as an “overreliance” on Washington. From a wider perspective, the Marcos Jr. administration has developed a Comprehensive Archipelagic Defence Concept (CADC), aiming to develop capabilities to defend the entirety of the archipelago.

However, the ongoing Middle Eastern crisis and the resulting energy pressures in the Philippines are likely to complicate the management of Manila’s defence-oriented partnerships. These developments have exposed the risks of US volatility, particularly in areas where cooperation with like-minded partners remains underdeveloped, such as economic security. As a consequence, rather than pursuing its strategy of soft containment of China through new partnerships, the energy crisis caused by Trump’s war in Iran has prompted a “reset” between the Philippines and China, initiated by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs Theresa Lazaro and endorsed by President Marcos Jr himself. The objective seems to partially sideline the disputes and revive cooperation in maritime energy exploration, to avoid a derailment of the Philippines’ growth trajectory due to energy shortages. Two of Marcos Jr’s predecessors, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Rodrigo Duterte, attempted to effect such policies, but ultimately failed to do so.

It is precisely in this context that the SOVFA came at an awkward juncture for the Marcos Jr administration. Manila’s outreach to Beijing was done in a frisson of panic, due to the looming energy crisis. As such, prospects for meaningful Sino-Philippine cooperation in offshore energy remain unrealistic. Instead, keeping momentum with new security partners such as France should remain the priority for Manila, as such security partnerships contribute to make the Philippines’ defence posture more resilient and interoperable. Even as Manila keeps diplomatic channels with Beijing open, such partnerships should accelerate, precisely to give Manila more negotiating power and more capability to resist maritime coercion.

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