From Likes to Lies: Disinformation in the Philippines and Thailand

Within a year, important national elections were held in the Philippines and Thailand. These elections will shape the political arena in both Southeast Asian countries, whose regimes have undergone significant democratic backsliding in the last decade. The consequences of this rise in authoritarianism are social polarisation, militarisation of politics, and the weakening of institutions. Added to this is another threat to the sociopolitical fabric of Thailand and the Philippines — the rampant spread of disinformation in electoral politics.

Filipinos and Thais are one of the most digitally-connected citizens. An average Filipino spends over 10 hours online every day whereas a Thai spends a bit over 8 hours. This puts Filipino users in first place in world rankings. The Thais come in at ninth place.

Such reliance on social media makes the two countries particularly vulnerable to disinformation – false and erroneous information that is spread deliberately to hurt individuals or organisations. This reared its ugly head in the Philippines with the trailblazing victory of populist leader Rodrigo Duterte in 2016, and continued during the 2019 mid-term elections, where fake news helped administration-backed candidates sweep national positions. For Thailand, the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) was very active in combating information maladies, such as the pervasive use of disinformation or sharing fake news for political gains, during both the 2019 and 2023 campaigning seasons.

Learning from other Southeast Asian countries, the Thai government put in place stringent regulations regarding the use of social media in electoral campaigning. This was something that the Philippines was unable to do for its 2022 elections. For example, the use of disinformation in political campaigns carries a fine of up to THB 200,000 (US$5,722), potential imprisonment and disqualification. This also included campaigning based on policy promises that look ambiguous or fiscally unfeasible. As a result, Thai politicians have generally refrained from the overt use of disinformation and misinformation in their campaigns, unlike in the Philippines.

However, this did not prevent disinformation from seeping through the electoral regulation cracks in Thailand. Similar to the Philippines, disinformation was diffused in an obscure manner through private messaging platforms such as Line in Thailand. This was apparent when Pita Limchareonrat, the leader of the Move Forward Party (MFP), posted a screenshot of a Line chat on his Instagram with the caption debunking the allegation that MFP is seeking to cancel the retirement pensions of civil servants and military personnel. Later, MFP revealed that the spread of disinformation in this case was the doing of cybertroopers – which form part of military-backed information operations.

The shared patterns, issues, and challenges of disinformation in the Philippine and Thai elections raise concerns about the use of political  disinformation during electoral campaigns in Southeast Asia.      

Another commonality between the two countries is the mobilisation of “influencers” for micro-campaigning. While Thailand’s campaign regulations resolutely disallowed celebrities to campaign for a party through radio or television broadcasting, it allowed for the use of “electronic means” for campaigning. As a result, the use of social media influencers or online media outlets became a sensible and impactful option for parties. Some influencers even offer parties a rate card, indicating the price list for different types of content production to be posted on their platform. Some are even willing to do it for free for the party that they like —this blurs the line between genuine support and paid content.      

The use of social media influencers is an element of a well-articulated information architecture that began months or even years before the official campaigning season, which means that such efforts in political persuasion and socialisation continue unabated despite electoral regulations. This replicates the Philippines model where President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. slowly rebranded himself and glamourised his family’s legacy through online content. During his campaign, he hired influencers,  notably on TikTok, to post positive content. Several studies on elections in the Philippines have shown that influencers, whether paid or unpaid, have become parts of elaborate disinformation ecosystems. And in cases where disinformation is funnelled by influencers long before the polls, electoral regulations do not apply to them at all.

Lastly, there were similar initiatives to address disinformation through independent and civil society-led factcheckers in Thailand. During the 2022 election campaign, Filipino press and NGOs launched Tsek.ph to curb the negative impact of fake news. However, their narrow reach and inability to penetrate mainstream information channels limited the effectiveness of fact-checking.

In Thailand, Cofact.org was launched as a collaborative fact-checking mechanism. However, it shared similar limitations as Tsek.ph. Turning to platforms’ social responsibility, then, seems to be an intuitive alternative. However, while Meta had set out a set of specific guidelines for political advertisements in the Philippines, it did not have one for Thailand. TikTok, on the other hand, banned paid political advertising by influencers and regular users. Nonetheless, the nature of the platform makes it difficult to distinguish political advertisements from genuine support for candidates or parties. It is unclear how effective this measure truly was in combating dis/misinformation. Like YouTube, TikTok uses artificial intelligence to curate content for its users (Facebook and Twitter use AI as well, but they do so differently from TikTok, in areas such as moderating harmful content). As such, TikTok users experience content on the platform differently. This makes it harder for mechanisms to filter content.

The shared patterns, issues, and challenges of disinformation in the Philippine and Thai elections raise concerns about the use of political disinformation during electoral campaigns in Southeast Asia. The difference in the political regimes of both countries also implies that addressing political disinformation will depend on state capacity and willingness. As an emerging regional phenomenon, political disinformation will be difficult to tackle as it becomes part of the winning electoral formula in the region.

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