Improving Indonesia’s Submarine Cable Resilience

Submarine telecommunication cables are essential for modern communications. Around 98 per cent of global electronic communications are transmitted by hundreds of submarine cable systems. 11 additional cable systems are being planned, including the trans-Pacific Bifrost system, which will connect Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore and Indonesia to the western part of the continental US.

While most cases of cable breakages are due to wear and tear, natural causes, or accidents, there have been growing concerns of intentional damage to underwater infrastructure. Between 2023 and 2025, there have been 11 incidents of damage to submarine cables in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly around Taiwan. While some incidents were attributed to natural causes or human-related accidents, there is growing suspicion of deliberate attacks on communications infrastructure.

Indonesia’s ambition to expand its digital economy by 2045 depends on its capacity to secure its sprawling network of submarine cables. The country has 217 submarine cable segments with a combined length of 115,104 km crisscrossing its seabed. However, previous incidents underscore gaps in the country’s capacity. The main threats to Indonesia’s submarine cables are human activities, such as fishing and anchor-dropping. Cases where submarine cables were intentionally targeted are rare. There are no recorded incidents attributable to state actors, and it remains difficult to prove criminal intent should such cases occur.

Nonetheless, as the importance of submarine cables increases, so too do the risks. Indonesia faces regulatory and operational gaps that undermine its submarine cable resilience.

Indonesia has a convoluted and fragmented regulatory framework governing permits for cable laying, maintenance, and decommissioning of such links. The result is a sprawling undersea mess of cables laid in marine protected areas and fishing zones, increasing their vulnerability to accidents.

Submarine cables are mostly protected from intentional depredation under Article 113 of UNCLOS 1982, but it falls upon states to adopt and enforce such laws, especially for cables within their national jurisdiction. In Indonesia, Law No. 36/1999 on Telecommunications imposes a maximum penalty of six years’ imprisonment or a fine of 600 million rupiah (US$35,835). However, Indonesian agencies are unable to consistently monitor submarine cables due to capacity and budgetary shortfalls. This affects the availability of remote sensing technologies and the frequency of routine patrols. These limitations, in addition to the inherent difficulty in proving intentional harm, make adequate enforcement challenging.

Indonesia also lacks domestic cable repair capacity. Out of 63 cable ships globally, four cable ships are registered and based in Indonesia, with three possessing repair capabilities. None, however, is owned by Indonesian entities. Additionally, the country’s cabotage policy restricts foreign-flagged cable ships from conducting repairs in national waters. Generally, foreign cable ships can traverse Indonesian waters, but they are prohibited from engaging in activities relating to cable-laying or maintenance during their passage. Some exemptions might be granted, but this has been done mostly on an ad-hoc basis. This contributes to delays in repairs.

… these efforts still fall short of addressing the operational gaps in cable resilience, particularly in repair capacity and real-time monitoring. Indonesia requires investing in additional cable repair capacity.

Nationally, there have been efforts to improve the overall security of critical information infrastructure (CII). Presidential Regulation No. 82/2022, which governs the steps and procedures for securing CII, is one example. Although not explicitly mentioned, it can be reasonably interpreted as recognising submarine cables as CII, which enables the allocation of political resources to be dedicated to their protection. The regulation aligns with best practices for improving cable resilience.

To address undersea cable sprawl, a national committee on submarine cables, led by the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs and Investment, was formed in 2021 to plan and manage existing and upcoming cable networks. Since then, the committee has mapped and designated approved routes for Indonesia’s submarine cables. It has also launched an integrated online database of existing and proposed cable projects (E-PIPAKABEL) and incorporated the approved cable routes into the publicly available national ocean map managed by the Navy’s Hydrography Centre.

While useful, these efforts still fall short of addressing the operational gaps in cable resilience, particularly in repair capacity and real-time monitoring. Indonesia requires additional investment in cable repair capacity. The recent addition of the Bentang Bahari, the first Indonesian-owned commercial cable ship, is a small step. The government should consider offering incentives to companies to acquire new cable ships, similar to what Japan has done.

Further investment in remote sensing is also necessary, especially where cables pass through protected areas or dense shipping lanes. However, this may be challenging considering the current administration’s austerity measures. In the meantime, government agencies may consider partnering with civil society. NGOs such as the Indonesian Ocean Justice Initiative can analyse and report patterns of cable failures, while community-based groups can provide auxiliary support on the ground.

Considering Indonesia’s plans to expand its cable network, it is also prudent to actively participate in regional cooperative arrangements to improve the resilience of submarine cables in the EEZ and waters beyond national jurisdiction. This could be built on the guidelines on strengthening cable resilience issued by ASEAN in 2019, which mainly provide best practices and recommendations for expediting repairs. However, they are not legally binding, making their contribution to improving cable repair capacity marginal.

Furthermore, improving maritime domain awareness (MDA) capabilities is imperative. Securing submarine cables is an inevitably transnational issue, thus requiring multilateral cooperation. It is important to tap into existing regional cooperative mechanisms for information-sharing. Although Indonesia has been ambivalent vis-à-vis the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, it should enhance its existing maritime cooperation with Australia and Japan to improve cable resilience through training in underwater monitoring.

The current administration has lofty aspirations to expand Indonesia’s digital economy and capabilities by 2045. Progress towards that goal, however, requires improving the resilience of the physical infrastructure to make this possible.

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