Indonesia’s Democratic Transition and Stalled Military Reform

One of the mandates of Indonesia’s Reformasi (reform) was to reform the military by establishing civilian supremacy over a professional armed force. In late 1998, driven by external pressure from civil society organisations (CSOs) and growing reformist elements within the military, the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) initiated internal reform. To date, however, TNI’s military reform agenda has yet to achieve its objectives.

The 2025 revision of the TNI Law drew public criticism that the military was backsliding on earlier progress. The amendment provides legal justification for the TNI’s expanded role under the guise of military operations other than war (MOOTW). By leaving the scope of such operations loosely defined, the amendment reflects the current administration’s growing tendency to address non-traditional security issues with a traditional security approach, as evidenced by its food estate projects and Free Nutritious Meals programme.

In the long term, the TNI’s stalled reforms directly undermine the provision of national defence, compromise TNI’s combat capacity, erode civilian control and weaken accountability mechanisms. Recent developments such as the Minister of Defence’s designation of Aceh, Jakarta and Papua as “centres of gravity” critical to national stability and economic activity, the expansion of the regional military commands (Komando Daerah Militer, Kodam) and the proposed addition of 750 combat battalions by 2029 will further test the limits of military professionalism by diverting TNI from its external defence orientation.

These military expansions have prompted renewed interest in the dynamics hampering Indonesian military reform. This commentary draws on insights from the author’s online interviews conducted between July and September 2025 with nine members of CSOs, comprising mid- to senior-level representatives from non-governmental organisations, think tanks and independent analysts. The findings reveal recent ground-up perspectives on the dynamics underpinning TNI reform under the presidencies of Joko Widodo (2014–2024) and Prabowo Subianto (2024–), complementing the wider discourse on Indonesia’s post-Reformasi democratic transition. The interviewees were chosen based on their engagement with military reform, including their visibility in public discourse (media interviews, publications and public events) and their involvement with government institutions. Their work spans research, policy advocacy, monitoring and litigation.

The interview findings suggest that at least three factors explain the dynamics behind Indonesia’s limited military reform. First, military reform remains an agenda driven by political and military elites, resulting from negotiated democratic governance rather than a consolidated transition. Since the late President Abdurrahman Wahid’s administration (1999–2001), successive governments have relied on the military’s power and network to sustain governance, especially when civilian political competition weakened government legitimacy. Additionally, the persistence of the regional command structure highlights how little incentive the executive or the military have to dismantle embedded power networks. Maintaining the military command structure has facilitated civilian elites in extending policy enforcement to the subnational level. Rather than being fully removed from politics, the military has merely repositioned itself to adjust to democratic norms governing civil-military relations.

…legitimacy alone is insufficient to guide military reform. Legislative oversight… is essential… and also depends on the military’s perception of legislators as capable partners.

Second, the shrinking civic space in the past decade has reduced CSO members’ ability to advocate for military reform. For instance, Civicus Monitor classifies Indonesia’s civic space as being “obstructed” since 2018. In interviews with the author, CSO members expressed similar concerns over declining CSO relations with the Parliament and the government over the past decade. While former President Joko Widodo’s electoral victory was backed by strong CSO support, engagement with his office became more procedural and less substantive during his second term. Under President Prabowo Subianto, such engagement appears to have become severely limited.

As a result, interaction between CSO members and state actors remains informal and personal. Indonesia’s civil society landscape remains vibrant, but its ability to influence decision-making is now highly constrained. The tokenism of CSO participation and concerns of intimidation, as demonstrated by the criminalisation of activists and repression of Papuan journalists, attest to the steady erosion of civic space under Prabowo. This condition is worsened by the absence of firm political opposition.

Third, legislators would benefit from more defence expertise to ensure that the TNI keeps pace with the evolving security landscape. In a robust democracy, a civilian government guides military reform, mandated by the people through elections. However, legitimacy alone is insufficient to guide military reform. Legislative oversight, which extends beyond budgetary issues, is essential; this process also depends on the military’s perception of legislators as capable partners. Perhaps the relevant Indonesian CSOs, scholars and policy analysts can further strengthen their engagement with Parliament to ensure that legislators have a stronger grasp of issues, such as regional security threat assessments, organisational modernisation, the welfare of military personnel and civil-military cooperation.

Since the beginning of Reformasi, Indonesia’s military reform has been inconsistent, shaped by the ebb and flow of the country’s democratic consolidation. Indonesia needs military reform that enables all defence stakeholders, including the TNI, Parliament and CSOs, to exercise their capacity and rebuild their independence, to ensure balanced civil-military relations. The failure to fully implement reform would have wider consequences for the Indonesian public and may even undermine the TNI. Stalled military reform risks diminishing military professionalism, which in turn may weaken TNI’s operational effectiveness and combat readiness when confronted with external enemies.

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