Indonesia’s ‘In-Between’ Foreign Policy

Indonesia’s foreign policy has recently appeared inconsistent. Several episodes explain this perception. First, the controversy surrounding President Prabowo Subianto’s decision to join the US’ “Board of Peace” raised questions about Indonesia’s diplomatic signalling. Meanwhile, Jakarta continues its pragmatic engagement with China while preserving working relations with Russia and has joined BRICS. Yet, in other areas, particularly trade negotiations, Indonesia has shown willingness to accommodate pressure from Washington. Indonesia’s relatively muted response to the US and Israel’s war against Iran has reinforced the impression that Jakarta prefers to tread carefully rather than take strong positions. These inconsistencies and swings between several major powers without clear goals have prompted analysts to say that Prabowo’s foreign policy is “all style with no substance”, even a “gado-gado” (salad). This inconsistency raises a question: Does Indonesia lack a clearly defined long-term strategy or is it simply hedging?

A familiar explanation is that Indonesia is hedging, trying to maintain good relations with major powers to protect its autonomy and economic interests. Some observers describe this as “choosing not to choose” in an era of great power rivalry, which captures an important part of Indonesia’s diplomatic behaviour, but describing Indonesia as simply hedging does not fully explain why its diplomacy so often gravitates towards the middle to maintain distance between competing powers. Hedging is portrayed as a deliberately ambiguous strategy, a way for countries to maximise flexibility while avoiding difficult choices.

Yet, in Indonesia’s case, the middle position is not only about strategic calculation but also about how the country understands its role in the international system. Taking certain positions may appear inconsistent with Indonesia’s ‘self-image’; it has long defined itself as a country that sits in-between different regions, powers and political traditions.

Geographically, most Indonesians perceive their country as lying between the Indian and Pacific Oceans; the government often presents itself as a bridge between the two regions. Diplomatically, Indonesia identifies as a middle power. Politically and culturally, it promotes an image of moderation.

Simultaneously, Indonesia’s foreign policy identity is closely tied to its long-standing commitment to non-alignment. Since the Cold War, Jakarta has positioned itself among post-colonial states seeking a more equitable international order, emphasising autonomy, solidarity and resistance against domination by major powers. Over time, these narratives have become part of how Indonesian policymakers understand the country’s place in the world. Leaders and policymakers often describe Indonesia as a “bridge-builder”, between the Global North and the Global South, Western and non-Western perspectives, and different multilateral groupings.

Partners may expect clearer positions, while the domestic audience can become confused by shifting diplomatic signals.

Presenting Indonesia as a country that connects rather than divides has become an important element of its diplomatic identity. These historical narratives, combined with the ‘self-image’ of a liminal identity (where Indonesia sits in between different classifications), create what this author calls an “in-between foreign policy identity”. This is not simply hedging, neutrality or non-alignment but a recurring tendency to position Indonesia between competing camps, even when circumstances call for clearer alignment.

Indonesia’s long-standing foreign policy principle, bebas dan aktif (free and active), especially the “bebas” dimension, reflects this. Originally articulated by the country’s first Vice President Mohammad Hatta, the concept was intended to preserve Indonesia’s autonomy rather than place Indonesia permanently in the middle. In practice, however, the principle has often been interpreted by leaders and policymakers as maintaining a middle or balanced position between competing powers. This “free and active” stance has become an end in itself, rather than a tool to achieve Indonesia’s interests.

Different Indonesian leaders have emphasised different aspects of the country’s role in the world. Under the first president, Sukarno, Indonesia projected itself as a leader of anti-colonial movements and the Global South. Later leaders placed greater emphasis on stability and economic pragmatism.

These variations suggest that Indonesia’s foreign policy identity is not fixed, but contested and evolving. This in-between self-image shapes how Indonesia behaves and what choices appear politically acceptable. Over time, bebas aktif has become an important motif of justification: even when Indonesia’s foreign policies appear to shift, leaders continue to frame them as consistent. Bebas aktif guides policy and provides the vocabulary through which policy is defended and made politically acceptable.

This helps to explain why Indonesia’s diplomatic identity shapes how foreign policy options are presented and justified. Policymakers may have several possible courses of action, but some may clash with the role Indonesian foreign policy elites believe Indonesia should play internationally. Positions too closely aligned with one major power or ideological camp may be politically uncomfortable. Remaining somewhere in the middle thus becomes a strategic choice – the safest and most familiar way to present Indonesia’s actions.

Indonesian elites still evoke bebas aktif regardless of how close Indonesia might fall in with a great power. Consider how President Prabowo Subianto reminded Indonesians that their country is “still free and active” even though many have criticised Indonesia’s cautious response to the war in Iran as “getting too close to the US”. While some of President Prabowo’s foreign policy moves appear more assertive, unconventional or even personalised compared to his predecessor, they are still framed in terms of bebas aktif. At times, this produces policies that appear reactive or inconsistent, as Prabowo attempts to reconcile new initiatives with long-standing expectations of Indonesia’s role. Even when policies move in different directions, the language used to justify them remains consistent.

For many years, staying between competing powers allowed Jakarta to maintain productive relations with a wide range of partners. Today, however, rivalries among major powers are intensifying. Under such conditions, remaining comfortably in the middle becomes more difficult. Countries are more frequently expected to signal where they stand on key issues, even if they prefer to avoid clear alignment.

This creates new pressures for Indonesia. Partners may expect clearer positions, while the domestic audience can become confused by shifting diplomatic signals. Hence, Indonesia’s challenge is how to sustain its long-standing instinct to remain ‘in-between’ to preserve strategic autonomy, as global rivalry sharpens. The question is whether Indonesia can and should continue to stay in the middle, in a world where great powers are becoming less tolerant of ambiguity.

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