Islam-State Relations under Prabowo: More Carrots and More Sticks, But Less Progressive and Less Civil?

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between Islam and the Prabowo Subianto administration has been described as one that is being shaped by political pragmatism rather than ideology. Under Prabowo, Islamic organisations of all stripes—Nahdlatul Ulama (the traditionalist), Muhammadiyah (the modernist), the Prosperous Justice Party (the Islamist)—are represented in the Red and White Cabinet. Moreover, hard-line Islamic groups such as Rizieq Syihab’s Islamic Brotherhood Front (formerly the Islamic Defenders Front, FPI) and several Salafi groups such as Bachtiar Natsir’s Ar-Rahman Qur’anic Learning Centre (AQL) and Zaitun Rasmin’s Wahdah Islamiyah have also been friendly to Prabowo. The conventional understanding is that Prabowo’s rise marks the end of the tense relationship between the state and several Islamist groups, which had posed a serious challenge to former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, who subsequently built a strong alliance with NU to wage a political crusade against the then-politically empowered Islamist opposition.

Using a political economy approach to analyse state-Islam relations in Indonesia, this article argues that the failure of Indonesian Muslims to create a strong social base to underpin their political aspirations, along with their reliance on state resources for survival, forced them to perpetually recalibrate their attitude towards the state. As Hadiz and Robison argue, none of the organisations representing political Islam in Indonesia has been able to build a cross-class alliance that would enable them to launch powerful populist politics to advance their agendas independently. This forces the Islamic groups to recalibrate their ideological expression to negotiate with the state or gain access to state power, which they primarily use to gain the upper hand in conflicts among themselves. Consequently, the intensity or tone of ideological contestation among Indonesian Muslims is often tied to conflicts among the oligarchic elite, who may capitalise on religion or sectarianism to attack rival elites.

Given his amiable relationship with Islamist groups who supported him in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, Prabowo now focuses more on tightening his control over the more mainstream Islamic groups, mainly NU and Muhammadiyah. Support from the two organisations is crucial for him, as he faces opposition from NGO activists, academics and progressive media concerned about his authoritarian tendencies. Unlike Jokowi, who relied almost exclusively on carrots to secure NU’s and Muhammadiyah’s support, Prabowo uses both carrots and sticks to secure their complete loyalty. The result is a deepening co-option of the two Islamic organisations that have long been considered a bastion of “civil Islam”. As a result, they are now forced to challenge the progressive forces within civil society, which remain politically weak and disorganised.

MORE CARROTS AND NEW STICKS FOR NU AND MUHAMMADIYAH?

Prabowo uses NU and Muhammadiyah primarily to legitimise his policies. The two organisations have served mainly as a cushion against critical voices coming from Prabowo’s traditional enemies, namely NGO activists, critical academics and the progressive media. Prabowo continues his predecessors’ co-option strategy by offering cabinet positions to the two Islamic organisations. Both groups are thus well represented in his Red and White Cabinet. Under Prabowo, Muhammadiyah has been granted a mining concession, while NU retained the one given by Jokowi. These concessions were offered to the two Islamic organisations at a time when they were seeking funds to expand their institutional outreach and ideological influence nationally and globally. However, unlike Jokowi, Prabowo appears to have also used coercive measures to keep them in line.

… the intensity or tone of ideological contestation among Indonesian Muslims is often tied to conflicts among the oligarchic elite, who may capitalise on religion or sectarianism to attack rival elites.

For NU, particularly its current chairman, Yahya Cholil Staquf, the changing balance of power presents them with more challenges than opportunities. While several NU officials had been implicated in corruption before, this is the first time that the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has investigated a relative of the sitting NU leader. After months of speculation, the KPK has slapped corruption charges on Yaqut Cholil Qoumas, the former religious affairs minister under Jokowi, who is also Yahya’s younger brother and former leader of NU’s paramilitary wing, GP Anshor. Yaqut stands accused of complicity in a corruption scandal centring on the management of the 2024 special hajj quota granted by Saudi Arabia. A PBNU executive, Aizzudin Abdurrahman, has also been implicated in the graft scandal, which is believed to have caused Rp 1 trillion in state losses, according to the anti-graft agency. It remains to be seen if Yaqut will eventually be convicted. One thing is for sure: NU has less leverage to protect him now.

It is worth noting that Yahya has been widely regarded as a close ally of Jokowi. Under Yahya’s leadership, Jokowi granted NU greater access to state resources. It then mobilised its resources in the regions, at Jokowi’s behest, to help the Prabowo-Gibran Rakabuming Raka pair win the presidential election in February 2024. This alliance was clearly an asset when Jokowi was in power. Under Prabowo, who remains suspicious of Jokowi, it became a liability. This explains why Yahya decided to move closer to Prabowo by breaking off a deal he had made earlier with a company linked to mining oligarch Garibaldi “Boy” Thohir to manage NU’s mining concession in East Kalimantan. Boy is the brother of State-owned Enterprises Minister Erick Thohir, a close ally of Jokowi and chairman of NU’s human resource research and development institute (Lakpesdam). Prabowo reportedly expressed his disapproval of NU’s choice of investor for its mining concession during a meeting at the State Palace with Yahya, who later decided to offer the opportunity to a company linked to Hasyhim Djojohadikusomo, Prabowo’s younger brother, according to Tempo. Yahya’s move is rational: NU cannot operate its mines without Prabowo’s support. In addition, Yaqut’s fate may lie at the mercy of Prabowo, who has the power to pardon him. Yahya’s manoeuvres, however, have raised concerns among other NU elites.

Without Jokowi’s backing, Yahya’s position has become precarious. His rivals within NU were quick to capitalise on the situation by staging a coup against him. It appears that various factions within NU now consider Yahya and his clique, known as the Rembang faction, a political liability, given that Yahya and his brother, Yaqut, are now caught in the crossfire of the rising power struggle between Jokowi and Prabowo. NU’s Supreme Council (Dewan Syuriyah), led by Miftach Achyar, impeached Yahya on the grounds that he broke the organisation’s constitution by inviting a pro-Israel speaker to an NU leadership training programme and allegedly accepting money from a corruption suspect. Yahya’s camp, however, insinuated that the conflict was driven by Yahya’s decision to cancel NU’s deal with Boy and pursue another with Hashim. The Miftach camp downplayed the insinuation, saying that Yahya was removed to save the organisation. They later held an extraordinary congress to elect Zulfa Mustafa as acting chairman, practically creating a polarity within Indonesia’s largest Islamic organisation. The conflict ended after Yahya formally apologised to Miftach on 29 January 2026 and agreed to jointly organise a national congress to find his successor in either July or August. While Yahya’s legitimacy and influence are visibly declining within NU, it is unlikely that the organisation would distance itself from Prabowo and retain its close alliance with Jokowi even after Yahya’s departure. A close ally of Miftach, Syaefullah Yusuf, now serving as NU’s secretary general, is the social affairs minister in Prabowo’s cabinet. NU cannot afford to completely lose its access to state power, especially when the current political climate has mainly been conducive to its traditional ideological rivals. As a sign of loyalty to Prabowo, Yahya publicly declared NU’s support for Prabowo’s controversial decision to join Donald Trump’s Board of Peace, which the US president established to end the conflict in Gaza but has largely been met with scepticism by Indonesian Muslims.

Muhammadiyah, meanwhile, benefits more from the changing power structure after 2024. It now has more ministerial seats in the cabinet than it did under Jokowi. Muhammadiyah secured seven ministerial and deputy ministerial seats, while NU secured only five, despite having mobilised its resources to help Prabowo win the election. It is safe to say that most elite factions within Muhammadiyah’s establishment are supportive of Prabowo, including those who were once critical of him, such as former chairman Din Syamsuddin. That said, high-profile figures linked to Muhammadiyah are also subject to corruption investigations by the KPK. Hilman Latief, the general treasurer of Muhammadiyah, is also implicated in the hajj graft case. Hilman was the director of the hajj and umrah organisation under Yaqut. The KPK has questioned him in relation to the case, though it has yet to charge him formally. While claiming to respect the law, both NU and Muhammadiyah have questioned the credibility of the probes into their cadres. 

In addition to Hilman, another Muhammadiyah member, Ira Puspadewi, was recently convicted of corruption and sentenced to 4.5 years in prison for her role in the graft case involving the acquisition of PT Jembatan Nusantara by the state-owned transport company PT ASDP Indonesia Ferry. Ira, in her capacity as president director, approved the acquisition, something that the KPK considered problematic. Her conviction is highly controversial, given that Ira did not benefit from the alleged crime. This has cast doubt on the KPK’s credibility. Prabowo then commuted her sentence, reportedly following high-level lobbying by Muhammadiyah’s leadership. Still, the amnesty given to Ira is problematic. Regardless of the credibility of her prosecution, the amnesty is likely meant to show that Prabowo is in charge and that only he can save those in legal problems. He did this before, granting amnesties to former trade minister Thomas “Tom” Lembong and then PDI-P secretary general Hasto Kristiyanto. The problem with Prabowo’s interference, regardless of its legality, is that it undermines the rule of law. Ira, Tom, and Hasto could have appealed to have their convictions overturned instead.

There is no tangible evidence suggesting the KPK cherry-picked its targets at Prabowo’s behest. But the fact that Prabowo has repeatedly shown his willingness to commute legal convictions against his political rivals and allies only indicates that prosecutions could be easily politicised. Yaqut is now facing trial, while Hilman is not off the hook yet. Prabowo could easily use the ongoing graft investigation as a bargaining chip to secure the loyalty of both NU and Muhammadiyah, deepening his co-option of arguably the most influential mass organisations in the country.

 STILL NO CARROTS, BUT FEWER STICKS FOR ISLAMISTS

Prabowo has yet to give any political positions to the Islamist groups. That said, he maintains good relations with them. This was the case even after he joined the Jokowi government following the bitterly contested 2019 election, which alienated many of his hard-line supporters. The Islamists have now openly expressed their support for Prabowo. The move is likely triggered by the growing tension between Prabowo and Jokowi, who retains some influence within the government, mainly through his eldest son, Gibran, Prabowo’s vice president. They may see the conflict as an opportunity to retaliate against Jokowi and boost their influence in state affairs.

Prabowo’s election is a boon for the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). After 10 years in the opposition, primarily because it was shunned by the Jokowi-PDI-P alliance rather than by choice, the Islamic party has finally returned to the executive body. It has at least one of its cadres in Prabowo’s cabinet, Yassierli, currently serving as the manpower minister. The FPI has also moved closer to Prabowo after initially showing reservations, mainly because of Prabowo’s alliance with Jokowi. Its top leader, Rizieq Syihab, recently called on Muslims to support Prabowo in “fighting corruption”. He made the call during a reunion event for the 212 movement, which was seen as the most significant political challenge to Jokowi. It appears that the revival of FPI’s support stems from the fact that, under Prabowo, several political figures and businessmen linked to Jokowi, such as Yaqut, are facing legal charges for alleged corruption.

Prabowo may not have granted the Islamist groups the same concessions as he did to NU and Muhammadiyah, but he does let them thrive despite the political decisions taken by his predecessor to disrupt and eventually disband them.

Prabowo may not have granted the Islamist groups the same concessions as he did to NU and Muhammadiyah, but he does let them thrive despite the political decisions taken by his predecessor to disrupt and eventually disband them. In the grand scheme of things, especially considering the Islamists’ ideological battle against the “moderate” and “liberal” Muslims within NU and Muhammadiyah, supporting Prabowo is the rational choice for them. It is not because they believe Prabowo is the ideal “Muslim candidate”, but because Prabowo’s government, unlike that of Jokowi, does not engage in a witch hunt against “anti-Pancasila” groups like the FPI and HTI. Prabowo has therefore levelled the playing field slightly for the competing Islamist groups in Indonesia.

CONCLUSION: THE TWILIGHT OF ‘CIVIL ISLAM’?

NU and Muhammadiyah will remain the dominant Islamic organisations defining mainstream Islam in Indonesia. Prabowo still needs both organisations to manage conflicts and control political dissent within civil society. The organisations, meanwhile, need state resources to protect their institutional interests. It is worth noting that, ideologically, both organisations represent the kind of Islam that poses little threat, if any, to the interests of the ruling elite. Their influence may decline, while the Islamists, with Prabowo’s permission, would likely have more wiggle room to promote their sectarian or radical ideology. That said, none of these organisations has the political and financial capital to disrupt the political status quo. More importantly, they are not ideologically opposed to collaboration with the political elite. NU’s and Muhammadiyah’s decision to accept mining concessions from the Jokowi and Prabowo administrations is a clear indication of their dependence on state resources for institutional development as well as the malleability of their ideology. That the Islamists have softened their rhetoric against Prabowo also indicates their reliance on elite support in their ideological battle against “liberal” or “secular” Muslims. This change in the configuration of power may explain why identity politics seems to have dissipated in Indonesia after the 2024 elections. It is not because Indonesian Muslims have become less intolerant or more inclusive. It is just the logical corollary of the current nature of elite conflicts.

That said, there is no question that we are seeing a deepening co-option of mainstream Islamic organisations by the state, either through accommodation or coercion. It remains to be seen how far NU and Muhammadiyah would compromise their values to keep their relations with Prabowo amicable. Concerns have been raised about whether both organisations could maintain their roles as champions of “civil Islam”, given their support for Prabowo’s problematic policies. Their alliance with Prabowo has inevitably strained their relationship with the more progressive elements within Indonesian civil society. The younger and more progressive members of NU have also warned their leaders about the risks of forging a Faustian deal with the oligarchic elite, which they believe is responsible for sustaining social, political, and economic inequality. However, as long as the progressives within both NU and Muhammadiyah have not created a cohesive social base to underpin their ideals, it will not be easy for them to escape the cycle of co-option by the elite. In this scenario, the application of “civil Islam” ideals will continue to be contingent on the power dynamics of the politically and economically powerful.   

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This is an adapted version of ISEAS Perspective 2026/8 published on 13 February 2026. The paper and its references can be accessed at this link.