Japan’s Counter-Strike Capabilities: Southeast Asians Should be Circumspect

Japan recently announced its new security strategy in three documents – the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Defense Buildup Program – opening a path to its procurement of intermediate-range ground attacking capabilities. This is a clear departure from Japan’s “defensive defense” posture and self-imposed restrictions against the possession of long-range force projection capabilities. The change that primarily responds to the toughening strategic environment in Northeast Asia also augurs the emergence of defensive arrangements that Japan might make in Southeast Asia, especially in a Taiwan contingency scenario.

The new strategy keeps pace with growing expectations within Japan to acquire more credible deterrent capabilities as well as American demands that allies’ assume greater defensive burdens amid rising tensions in East Asia. It sets a spending target at 2 per cent of GDP by FY 2027, inclusive of the defence budget and “related costs”. The Defense Buildup Plan has an extended scope of ten years, with the budget at 1.6 times the current level for the coming five years.

The taboo against ground attack capabilities, which Japan embraced after World War 2, faced growing challenges by North Korea’s repeated ballistic missile testing and China’s steady buildup of missile forces. The missile defence that the U.S. and Japan heretofore pursued in East Asia has been of limited nature, aimed at intercepting a small number of incoming missiles presumably from North Korea. Relying on solely defensive mid-air interceptions and leaving the ground attack operations to the U.S. is no longer sufficient, as Washington had scrapped all ground-based intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles under the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia. Even if the U.S. is willing to deploy such missiles to counter Japan’s adversaries, it is unlikely to find suitable hosts for the missile batteries in and around Japan.

Japan has, therefore, opted for a minimalist counter-strike capability of its own. The debate within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) since 2020 ruled out pre-emptive first strikes, yet permitted minimally credible counter-strike capabilities to disrupt the missile launch sequences of adversaries with conventional warheads. Japan has a plan for more than ten types of missile development, upgrade, and procurement. The most immediate procurement of intermediate-range ground attack capabilities will likely be the U.S.’ ship-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles. New indigenous developments, including the upgrade of Type-12 ground-to-surface and ASM-3 air-to-surface missiles, would enhance Japan’s anti-ship defence along the Okinawan chain of islands.

Japan’s move into counter-strike capabilities not only aims at improving deterrence against foreign attacks on its territories, but also at dissuading China from invading Taiwan. The latter scenario would have serious implications for Southeast Asia.

Reactions from Southeast Asian nations to Japan’s muscularity have been relatively muted. Rather, ASEAN concerns appear to be centred on the lack of cohesion among its members to ensure the group’s centrality in the face of Japan’s evolution into a normal power. This is unsurprising given that Southeast Asia has responded positively to Japan’s expanded regional security roles in recent years. In the 2023 State of Southeast Asia Survey, Japan is perceived to be the most trusted major power in the region.

That said, Southeast Asian countries may need to be more cognisant of the nearer-term scenarios in which a more muscular Japan would be called into action. Japan’s move into counter-strike capabilities not only aims at improving deterrence against foreign attacks on its territories, but also at dissuading China from invading Taiwan. The latter scenario would have serious implications for Southeast Asia. The release of Japan’s new security strategy coincides with rising Sino-U.S. tensions over the Taiwan Strait. Although Prime Minister Kishida maintains ambiguity about Japan’s Taiwan policy, other key Liberal Democratic Party officials increasingly recognise and speak about inevitable Japanese involvement in a Taiwan contingency. In the event of Chinese attacks on American bases in Japan or SDF bases in order to preempt intervention by the two countries, Japan can respond with “use of force to the minimum extent necessary”.

Should conflict between the U.S. and China break out over Taiwan, the impact on Southeast Asia will be profound as some ASEAN member nations might be dragged in. This is the context in which Southeast Asian nations should consider their future defence and security interactions with Japan. The Philippines, for one, will find itself on the front-lines, given its proximity to Taiwan.

Given the Philippines’ close affinities with U.S. allies in Northeast Asia, the momentum is ripe for an informal trilateral cooperation including Japan. Japan-Philippines security ties grew under the Duterte administration through coast guard assistance, port call visits and joint military exercises. Both countries held the first Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) in 2022 and have agreed to seek a reciprocal access agreement as well as an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. During President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s visit to Japan in February 2023, he offered a visiting forces agreement to Japan, similar to the one signed with the United States. The Philippines’ under-utilised airbases, such as Clark Air Base and Basa Air Base, offer attractive sites for diversified logistical support for the U.S. and Japan. They would serve as alternatives if China launches missile attacks to wipe out key bases in Japan prior to an invasion of Taiwan.

In November 2022, the two countries held their first joint air defense exercise outside of the previous confines of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The U.S. Marines’ “concurrent” bilateral exercises with the Philippines Marines and the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force in October 2022 were followed by a joint naval exercise in the Sulu Sea between the U.S., Japan, Australia, France, United Kingdom, and the Philippines. Naval operations in the northern part of the South China Sea, including but not limited to anti-submarine operations conducted there by the U.S. and Japan, would benefit from port access to the Philippines. Japan’s evolution towards a more muscular approach is focused on its home territories, but it would have implications on Southeast Asia as well.

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