Kamala Harris and ASEAN: Values and Climate Agenda Will Complicate Trade Ties

The US presidential election will likely be decided by a razor-thin margin. Donald Trump’s protectionist trade inclinations are well known, but considerably less is understood about Kamala Harris’ views on trade and how they may play out in the ASEAN region. The US is ASEAN’s second-largest trading partner, while ASEAN is fourth for the US — a relationship made even more important thanks to the region’s geopolitical significance.

While clearly articulated policy positions from team Harris on the region are scant, a number of signals suggest what a putative Harris trade policy and approach to ASEAN might look like.

Having cut her political teeth in San Francisco — the bastion of American liberal values — Harris’ political leanings fall squarely within the progressive wing of the Democratic party. Reproductive rights, affordable housing, criminal justice reform, cracking down on corporate abuses, DEI (diversity, equity and inclusion) and measures to address climate change are all areas where she has staked out firm advocacy positions. She instructs her aides to analyse prospective policy measures through the lens of how they would affect women, children and minorities.

Her position on trade has been less clearly articulated, but what is known will not enthuse proponents of traditional free trade agreements.  While in the Senate, she voted against the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) (the renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement or NAFTA)  and indicated that if she had been in the Senate at the time, she would have voted against both the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the original NAFTA.

As one of only 10 Senators to vote against USMCA, her primary objection was that the revised agreement did not go far enough in fighting climate change. Harris sees trade as a tool that should be used to advance various non-trade objectives (NTOs).

Expect Harris’ progressive ethos to feature prominently in her administration’s trade policy, allowing some degree of differentiation from her predecessor Joe Biden, while bolstering a trend that is already well underway. Values-related issues, including NTOs on human rights, freedom of religion, labour rights, climate change and democratic values, are moving to the centre of the US trade agenda. The concept of “friendshoring” is built on the premise that trade should be oriented towards those who share US values.

A Harris administration trade policy geared towards American values and workers, and the imperative to address climate change is unlikely to play well in ASEAN. Many in the region simply hold different views on governance, social issues and apportioning responsibility to address climate change. Recent US and European Union policies that condition trade on adherence to stringent environmental standards are facing strong pushback from ASEAN.

A Harris administration would be prone to deliver lectures (and condition trade) on ‘values’ that will not necessarily resonate in ASEAN, while attempting to coax ASEAN into tilting closer to the US in the context of the US-China strategic rivalry.

For an indication of how this would play out under Harris, keep your eye on the yet-to-be-completed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). IPEF, which includes seven ASEAN members, is intended as a “new style” trade agreement that eschews traditional market access commitments but seeks to deepen trade bonds by bolstering cooperation on supply chains, anti-corruption efforts and the environment. An incoming Harris administration would be responsible for completing negotiations.

Expect Harris to attempt to make IPEF more reflective of her own progressive leanings. Her trade team would likely demand more stringent labour and environmental provisions and less “tech-friendly” digital rules. It is unclear whether IPEF partners would be willing to accede to these demands, particularly given that the US lacks the negotiating leverage of offering market access. The manner in which IPEF talks play out will provide an early bellwether of where the US-ASEAN relationship might be headed.

US trade policy under a Harris administration would share her predecessor’s worker-centric orientation — meaning that traditional trade liberalisation and market access would continue to be de-emphasized — but progressive values-related issues would likely play an even greater role in shaping trade relationships.

A Harris administration would be prone to deliver lectures (and condition trade) on “values” that will not necessarily resonate in ASEAN, while attempting to coax ASEAN into tilting closer to the US in the context of the US-China strategic rivalry.

There is little in this proposition to appeal to ASEAN. Values that the US considers “universal” are not necessarily universal in Southeast Asia, and for most countries in the region, their national interests are best served by balancing between the US and China. Worse yet, the primary ingredient ASEAN wants — secure and preferential access to the US market — is off the table.

US entreaties under a Harris administration are likely to receive a polite hearing in ASEAN, and for some, the US security relationship will remain critical. With or without preferential trade access, the US will remain an important economic partner, and the imperative to maintain American engagement as a counterbalance to China will endure.

For the most part, however, the US and ASEAN will talk past each other. ASEAN will press for secure trade access that Harris will not deliver, and the US will push ASEAN on geopolitical, climate and social issues that are either contrary to ASEAN interests or mostly irrelevant.  

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