Malaysia’s Proposed PM Term Limit: Some Things to Consider

Anwar Ibrahim started this year with a spring in his step. On 5 January, his “New Year mandate” speech announced a raft of economic relief for households and SMEs and a few institutional reforms. Quite saliently, he also announced legislation to limit the prime minister’s (PM) term in office. While these plans for 2026 have been on the cards for some time, it is important to note that their rollout follows Pakatan Harapan’s (PH) trouncing at November’s Sabah state election and mounting criticism of tardy reforms.

The proposed prime ministerial term limit of 10 years or two terms would curb the concentration of power in an individual and encourage party leadership succession. The benefits of achieving these through legislation may be overstated; parliamentary systems provide certain checks and balances absent in presidential systems, where term limits are the norm.

Nonetheless, the Madani government, anchored by PH, is proceeding with this well-received 2022 election promise. Besides the principled reasons for setting PM term limits, Malaysians might also reflect on Mahathir Mohamad’s 24-year rule as PM, especially his first 1981-2003 tenure, which saw the erosion of democratic institutions and the rule of law. This reform entails no public funding and Anwar, who is 78 and has indicated interest in serving just one more term, could leave behind a magnanimous legacy.

But there are pitfalls to instituting the prime ministerial term limit without concurrently legislating fixed parliamentary terms — also promised in PH’s 2022 manifesto. The pursuit of the stand-alone reform could increase political instability.

The flaw begins with the enumeration of the limit, both in time (10 years) and tenure (two terms). This arises because Malaysia’s parliamentary system, which follows the Westminster model, does not fix the electoral cycle. After a general election, Malaysia’s King will appoint the Member of Parliament (MP) whom the King regards as commanding the support of a majority of the House of Representatives as PM. Subsequently, the newly elected parliament will convene. It is the PM’s prerogative to call for an election within five years after that parliament’s first sitting. Within that time, the PM may also be forced to resign if he loses the House majority. In his place, the King may appoint another MP as PM. The durations of parliament and the prime ministership are indeterminate.

Malaysia’s proposed PM limit envisages two full five-year terms, but this is not guaranteed; hence, the paired 10-year specification. However, the law must stipulate which will prevail, between 10 years and two terms — and Malaysia’s lawmakers will be compelled to append a “whichever is longer” clause.

The upper limit permits leaders to stretch their tenure to a maximum. It makes no sense for the legislation to stipulate “whichever is shorter”, which would allow the limit to be reached at two terms regardless of the number of years. This would negate the goal of setting a maximum and introduce an inordinately wide range to the term limit — potentially as low as two years (for a PM who only manages two one-year terms). Allowing two terms to be the binding constraint could also incentivise parties to withdraw support for a PM before a full parliamentary term, trigger a snap election, and hasten that PM’s disqualification from holding the highest office again.

… there are pitfalls to instituting the prime ministerial term limit without concurrently legislating fixed parliamentary terms …

However, the “whichever is longer” clause, by allowing a person to serve as PM for more than two terms (up to 10 years), would introduce the prospect of a PM in a third term being forced to resign after a cumulative 10 years. Parliament could navigate this transition and elect a new PM between election cycles, but the 10-year term limit operates best when it coincides with two full-term parliaments of five years each.

A PM helming a coalition government and nearing a 10-year limit could also become vulnerable to being unseated. If the person has governed for eight to nine years, having a one to two-year expiry on the premiership would handicap the person’s bid to return to power and undermine his party’s campaign more broadly. Such tactical advantages might persuade a coalition partner to withdraw from government and trigger a snap election.

Efforts to limit the PM’s term should avoid introducing conditions that can induce political disorder and disruptions to full-term parliaments. Parliamentary fixed-term legislation should include rules compelling the PM to complete the term, such as by requiring a two-thirds majority to call a snap election, following the UK’s fixed-term parliament law of 2011-2024.

There should also be reforms that mitigate the ouster of a sitting PM. Parliamentary rules could be amended to strictly require a no-confidence motion in parliament, rather than machinations outside the House. Supplementary actions could also be taken, such as giving equal constituency funding to all MPs instead of depriving the opposition, which can fuel grievances and motivate them to collaborate in a power grab.

The time-based 10-year PM term limit would apply to leaders who have assumed the post between elections or were previously unable to complete a full term. Notably, parliamentary fixed-term law can intervene again to mitigate expedient manipulation of the election cycle. A second-term PM nearing a cumulative five years in office might be tempted to call a snap election to maximise the 10-year term PM limit. Consider, for instance, the hypothetical case of a PM weighing two possible outcomes: completing the term and then seeking re-election, which would entail being a prime ministerial candidate for a maximum of two years, or calling a snap election, which could enable a stronger campaign for a five-year mandate. The two-thirds majority requirement to call a snap election would provide a check against personal opportunism overriding the full-term parliamentary obligation.

The Madani administration must not bulldoze this reform but consider the case for jointly delivering the PM term limit and parliamentary fixed-term promises. Anwar Ibrahim can set the precedent by serving a full parliamentary term until January 2028. This would mean that the next general election should be held around March 2028, thus ushering in a more wholesome democratic experiment.

Anwar would surely want to institute rules that enhance parliament’s full-term durability. If he returns as PM, the second term would be more secure; if he does not, better reforms would burnish his legacy.

2026/18