Myanmar’s 2025 Election: Rhetoric and Realities

Myanmar’s generals are once again offering elections as a transition process in Myanmar, promising a return to stability. The State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) regime is reprising the military’s 2010 playbook, when it dangled the 2011 transition to democracy as an attempt to stabilise the country and its economy.  Electors have no real choices, however. Given that key opposition parties (including the National League for Democracy or NLD) have decided to forgo participation in the polls, the military and its political proxies are expected to do well. But this would be largely symbolic and would not resolve many of the contradictions that forestall a return to the state of affairs before the 2021 coup.

The November 2010 election was an exercise in transition from full military rule to a military-backed successor. The military ceded executive power to the Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP), and ended the house arrest of NLD chair Aung San Suu Kyi. The USDP administration offered broader political and economic participation, diversifying investment and external relations. A semi-civilian government presented an illusion of change to which external interlocutors could match their responses with “action for action” measures meant to encourage more reforms and changes. The military retained its privileged role in politics. The SSPC is now offering a potential “USDP 2.0” transition promise.

There are some similarities and differences in the run-up to the SSPC’s elections. Different from 2010, the polls are staggered in three phases: 28 December 2025, 11 and 25 January 2026. The electoral system was predominantly first-past-the-post in 2010; now, the SSPC has introduced a new mixed electoral system combining first-past-the-post and proportional representation for upper house and state/ regional assembly seats. Similar to 2010, the regime in power has rewritten electoral rules and deregistered opposition political parties. Some civilian candidates have been disqualified. A known known in 2010 was the then military chief, Senior General Than Shwe, leaving the political scene. In 2025, the known unknown is the SSPC chief’s political aspirations. A recent hint by the SSPC spokesperson about Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s “experience in state duties” reveals where the general’s future interests might lie.   

… the writing on the wall is clear for anyone making a decision: the military is not going to cede its political power. It will not pursue a transition process that affects its core interests.

The military and its supporters seem largely confident in their ability to prevail. A reliable source shared with the authors that ranking military officers support the election and view it as a way out of their current problems. Fatigued rank-and-file military personnel hope that clashes with resistance groups will cease after the elections, though this may be unlikely. Ordinary people are also weary of the conflict and the strain of coping with increasing socio-economic hardships since 2021. Those with imprisoned family members hope for an amnesty post-election, however imperfect. The military is capitalising on these sentiments. However, there is an element of uncertainty. The resistance continues to oppose the elections, and may consider dialogue if a new administration complies with or considers some of its key demands. The main demands of the resistance groups are an end to violence, the release of political prisoners, the military’s withdrawal from politics, and transitional justice. It is unlikely that any administration emerging from these elections would consider all the demands favourably.

Long-time Myanmar watchers have warned of the high risks attendant to buying into the SSPC’s “election-as-transition” reset. There are varying levels of interest and attention, however. ASEAN has emphasised prioritising peace over elections, as has the European Union, though individual member interests may differ from the collective position. Myanmar’s neighbours, including China and India, have pragmatically decided to take the SSPC’s rhetoric at face value.  Australia has expressed deep concern. US lawmakers are urging a rejection of the elections after the Trump administration removed temporary protection status for Myanmar nationals, citing the SSPC’s election plans. Some countries, other than China, are also exploring possibilities for rare earth extraction deals.

A full economic revival seems unlikely, not just because of the presence of hundreds of active armed groups contesting the military in several parts of the country, but also due to various economic policies that are used to control the macroeconomy and resource the regime. Even so, some foreign companies are seeking to benefit from the conflict economy through resource extraction projects, such as rare earth and mineral mining. However, a war-driven economy centred on resource extraction will not foster sustained national development. Key constraints — such as capital controls, foreign exchange requirements, trade licenses, logistical deficiencies, and electricity shortages — will likely remain post-election, although some relaxations and improvements are possible. Few economic actors view Myanmar’s election as fundamentally altering the country’s political landscape. For them, the question is whether the election improves stability and predictability rather than whether it brings a return to democracy.

The handful of political parties contesting for seats in parliament have shied away from discussing political issues, instead focusing their campaigns on bread-and-butter concerns, including, interestingly enough, corruption and public services delivery. They seem poised to act opportunistically, depending on their electoral performance. Without a strong political rival in the polls, the USDP is a clear frontrunner, with walkovers in some constituencies, even winning 28 seats during the campaign period. Voters who would normally vote for the opposition do not plan to vote in the current elections — this would be to the USDP’s advantage. At the moment, mainly USDP supporters are likely to vote. To add to their advantage, the military has deployed retired senior military officers to the USDP and the pro-military National Unity Party as candidates in the elections.

Resistance groups and their supporters remain resolute in their opposition to the polls, the military, and any new government that will emerge from the elections. The resistance does not view the 2025 elections as a way to bring the country out of the current political quagmire, as their main desire is for the military to leave politics. However, any action by the resistance to voice their opposition is also constrained by concerns over how their actions might have repercussions on supporters living under the SSPC’s draconian electoral laws.

Myanmar people are aware that the 2025 elections will be largely symbolic, and are resigned to the charade. For them, economic and security questions will drive their decisions. But the writing on the wall is clear for anyone making a decision: the military is not going to cede political power. It will not pursue a transition process that affects its core interests. For them, engagement means engaging on their terms. The election is a tactical exercise, involving the reshuffling of new executive roles, offering a veneer of stability and enough enticement to external partners to maintain legitimacy.

2025/403