Myanmar’s Worsening Human Resource Crisis
Published
Four years of civil strife and conflict, compounded by forced conscription, have led to Myanmar’s dire human resources crunch.
On 23 January 2025, Myanmar’s State Administration Council (SAC) published the by-law for the National Service Law, which it activated last year. The by-law not only prohibits eligible young people from leaving the country without official permission but also authorises the military to sue family members of potential recruits abroad, causing concern among Myanmar diaspora communities. The enactment of the by-law has exacerbated the mass exodus of young people, which began in 2021 post-coup and intensified last year. The number of Myanmar citizens who have migrated to foreign countries, especially Thailand — legally and illegally — has increased while the overall number of individuals seeking and taking employment abroad has skyrocketed.
The conscription laws, combined with decreasing opportunities and insecurity, have led to a shortage of labour in various domestic industries, causing Myanmar’s economy to shrink and development to slow down. The SAC’s attempt to conscript the country’s remaining human resources for its war efforts potentially leaves essential businesses and industries in shambles.
The labour shortages in various industries have been caused by the widespread desire of its youth to work abroad and the SAC’s indiscriminate recruitment policy. The withdrawal of foreign firms due to the years-long conflict and decreasing foreign investment has also forced young people to look abroad for new opportunities. The number of companies registered with SAC’s Directorate of Investment and Company Registration (DICA) has plunged: in January 2019, 1,733 foreign companies were registered but by January 2023 only 774 were. In late 2024, severe labour shortages forced garment factories, which once dominated the country’s export sector, to stop accepting new orders. It was reported that the level of factories’ output for this sector fell by 20 per cent.
Simultaneously, workers have suffered from low wages. There are reports that the military had ordered employers of conscripts to continue paying the latter’s salary, forcing employers into a difficult situation.
The human resources crisis stems from post-coup governance policies which prioritised military success over human resources and economic developments.
Industries and businesses hit hard by the shortages of labour include, but are not limited to, agriculture, rubber plantations, restaurants, pottery, tea plantations, and salt production. Farmers from Mon State and the Ayeyarwady Region had to reduce their sowing rate due to increasing labour shortages and costs, while conflict-generated instability has made it difficult for the farmers to sustain their businesses. The capacity of businesses in Myanmar to recruit new staff has decreased, prompting job agencies to suspend operations.
The problem of child labour has resumed prominence, as teashops and restaurants are forced to hire minors as staff (for children as young as ten to seventeen years of age), which prohibits them from attending school, further exacerbating the educational crisis. Meanwhile, the mass exodus of skilled workers has created difficulties for certain industries, especially banking and technical sectors.
Although money transfers made by migrant and overseas workers back to their families partly buttress the domestic economy, the mass departure of human capital has taken a significant toll on Myanmar’s development. Different estimates suggest Myanmar’s gross domestic product (GDP) has shrunk by 9 to 11 per cent since 2020.
Another reason for Myanmar’s human resource crisis is the SAC’s attitude towards civil disobedience movement (CDM) participants. Recently, the junta forced seven hospitals in Mandalay to cease operations for employing medical professionals who participated in the CDM movement. In March 2024, a hospital in Moulmein had to suspend its operation for three months. In 2021, when the Covid-19 pandemic left thousands of casualties in its wake, the SAC detained CDM doctors who came out of hiding to provide medical assistance. Consequently, the quality of Myanmar’s public healthcare has diminished considerably following the military coup.
The SAC’s CDM policy has also affected the education sector, compounding teacher shortages and unassuaged by the SAC’s substitution of under-qualified teachers for those who have resigned. Although resistance groups are supplementing Myanmar’s declining educational quality with their own schools, these schools are being continuously bombed by the military. The junta’s limitation on internet connectivity and the worsening electricity shortages have made the resistance’s work of providing parallel education even more difficult. Over the past four years, Myanmar’s development agenda has been abruptly stopped as the country has been dragged into instability and then civil war. The human resources crisis stems from post-coup governance policies which prioritised military success over human resources and economic developments. This is shown by the junta’s indiscriminate conscription, relentless bombing of parallel schools, and transferring of employees from business sectors into war efforts. The junta’s desire to take CDM participants out of any employment has impacted important sectors, especially education and healthcare. In contrast to the 2010s, when technocrats based overseas returned to Myanmar to contribute to the country’s development, after 2021 few academics and experts return to Myanmar and do so at their own risk due to the junta’s intolerance of criticism and opposition. If the SAC continues to put military victory above every other consideration, the growing human resource crisis will affect Myanmar’s trajectory for years, even decades, to come.
2025/74
Htet Hlaing Win is a contributor to the Myanmar section of Asia in Review, published by the German-Southeast Asian Centre of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance (CPG).









