Negeri Sembilan State Polls Will Shape National Politics

Following the Johor state election on 11 July, all eyes will be on the next state election in  Negeri Sembilan on 1 August. This election will be a reprise of the July poll, pitting the main coalition of Pakatan Harapan (PH) against Barisan Nasional (BN) and Perikatan Nasional (PN). The PH-BN contest in Johor, and now Negeri Sembilan, might portend – if the trend continues – a parting of ways at the federal polls, which have to be held by early 2028.

While the current state government features PH and BN in a coalition, the Chief Minister is from Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s party – making PH the incumbent. The stakes are high for PH, as it performed poorly in Johor, winning eight out of 56 seats — a decline from its previous 12 seats. Negeri Sembilan, one of the three PH stronghold states in Peninsular Malaysia, will be pitched as a bellwether for support for PH more broadly, which currently helms the federal government alongside BN. Prior to dissolution, PH held 17 seats in Negeri Sembilan’s state assembly, with BN’s 14 and PN’s 5. In the 2023 state election, PH earned a popular vote of 38.7 per cent, followed by PN’s 37.7 per cent and BN’s 22.2 per cent.

Negeri Sembilan was not due for a state election until 2028. The state’s legislative assembly was dissolved following a dispute over Chief Minister Aminuddin Harun’s legitimacy. Initially, 14 United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) members of the state assembly withdrew their support for him, but the party’s national leadership reversed the decision. Aminuddin eventually called for the dissolution of the state assembly. These events were in turn precipitated by a royal tussle, in which the position of Negeri Sembilan Ruler Tuanku Muhriz was contested.

The background is important, since this royal feud will likely be the centrepiece of the state election. Negeri Sembilan has a unique Adat Perpatih tradition, in which four territorial chiefs, known as Undang Yang Empat, select the Ruler. The present crisis began when the four Undangs disputed the removal of the Undang of Sungei Ujong, elaborated upon here. By 12 June, the crisis had precipitated into politics at the national level, as the Conference of Rulers — a constitutional council comprising nine hereditary Malay rulers and four state governors — was asked to decide which claimant to recognise as the legitimate Negeri Sembilan Ruler. This Conference, originally scheduled for 23 to 25 June, was postponed.

Political alignments are fast forming alongside the different ‘sides’ of the dispute. Broadly, supporters of PH lean towards Tuanku Muhriz, while BN and PN supporters side predominantly with the Undangs, with some exceptions. The electorate in the more rural and semi-urban seats would be considered strong adherents of the Adat Perpatih tradition and would closely follow its rules. One major challenge is that the Adat Perpatih is an unwritten customary law, which has sometimes resulted in inconsistent interpretation and application.

If this outcome (BN-PAS win) prevails, it would lead to a state-level coalition distinctly different from the current federal-level coalition government, in that BN is cooperating not with PH but with PAS.

The dispute has also become fodder for finger-pointing. For instance, political activist Chegubard has alleged that Democratic Action Party (DAP) secretary-general Anthony Loke disbursed large funds to parties seeking to stir issues involving the Undang institution, which the latter has dismissed as serious slander. The Chief Minister’s press secretary had even referred to Loke as the “fifth Undang”, which was a term initially used in BN circles to portray DAP as meddling in state affairs beyond their ambit. This led an UMNO Negeri Sembilan committee member to issue a statement, demanding an apology from the press secretary. The committee member added that the Undang title carries with it history and dignity, and that it was inappropriate to make such a statement even in jest. Although the press secretary has since apologised, these comments serve to buttress the sentiment that DAP (and by extension PH) do not respect Malay customary traditions. The press secretary is from Parti Amanah Negara, a party in the PH coalition.

The seats within Malay-majority, and rural or semi-urban constituencies will therefore be the closest watched, since opinions are now deeply divided regarding the royal dispute. Even small swings in support can have an impact. In the 2023 state election,  11 seats were won with less than 1,000 vote majorities; eight of them were held by BN incumbents. These 11 seats include BN’s Sungai Lui, Palong, Jeram Padang, Lenggeng, Juasseh and Seri Menanti (where the royal palace is situated).

Other seats to watch include Ampangan, where PH won with a slim majority of 329 votes, as well as PKR stronghold Sikamat, Aminuddin’s seat since 2008 (won in 2023 with a 2,662 majority). Linggi is another seat worth watching: Aminuddin is set to contest in the new constituency, a BN stronghold, as well as Chennah, in which DAP’s Loke will face MCA in a straight fight. Apart from the royal-cum-political dispute, housing, the cost of living, public transport (within urban areas), FELDA settler issues, agricultural subsidies and youth migration from rural to urban areas), will be amongst the issues affecting grassroot sentiment.

However, how the coalitions coordinate with each other in terms of seat negotiations will impact the election outcome. For instance, UMNO and PAS have indicated they will cooperate to ensure that there are no three-corner fights, with UMNO retaining its 14 seats and PAS its three seats, while the two seats previously held by Bersatu would be allocated to UMNO or PAS.

If the number of seats held previously is an indication of electoral outcomes, there is a possibility that an UMNO-PAS state government can be formed (19 out of 36 seats), a simple majority which would inch out PH (17 out of 36 seats). If this outcome prevails, it would lead to a state-level coalition distinctly different from the current federal-level coalition government, in that BN is cooperating not with PH but with PAS. This could be indicative of national-level dynamics in the general election to come – but this is predicated on the UMNO-PAS relationship working well. The Muafakat Nasional (MN) coalition comprising UMNO and PAS was a short-lived experiment after BN lost its hold on federal power in May 2018. The MN coalition was never tested against any real political stakes of government formation.

However, PH could succeed if it pushes the narrative that UMNO — with its initial withdrawal of support — was the one that ‘betrayed’ the coalition and caused the state government collapse. This gambit may win over sufficient votes in marginal seats to retain PH’s incumbency. It will be a tight race on 1 August, and one to watch as state dynamics continue to shape national politics in Malaysia.

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