One Shock Too Many: Why Southeast Asia’s El Niño Response Must Be Different

Southeast Asia is no stranger to strong El Niños. Most ASEAN member states (AMS) have implemented various practices to mitigate the effects of the global climate phenomenon: early-warning systems, risk communications, water conservation plans, changes to planting calendars, war rooms, fire-risk monitoring, emergency plans and introducing buffer stocks. The upcoming “super” El Niño may “rank among the largest” and will be stacked on top of other disruptions. ASEAN countries will need to brace themselves and prepare accordingly.

Even before this El Niño season, which is expected to peak between November 2026 and February 2027, the region’s agri-food system was already hobbled by reduced planting, diminished fishery catches, and rising prices along the value chain. These came after the US-Iran war’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which disrupted supplies of fertiliser and energy.

Given that food insecurity has manifold impacts on the cost of living as well as social and political stability, the need to act is urgent.

The second disruption is the projected positive Indian Ocean Dipole, which would amplify the risk of peatland fires. The IOD last occurred in 1997 and 2015, causing two of the region’s worst peatland fires and transboundary haze incidents. Any resulting haze would fall hardest on outdoor workers, especially farmers; fine particulate matter could impair health and growth in crops and livestock. Figure 1 overlays the region’s rice planting calendars with typical heat-stress windows and this El Niño’s forecasted peak. It shows that unfavourable growing conditions overlap with the crop calendar for much of the year, leaving farmers few windows of respite. Regional rice production alone is expected to be reduced by two to eight per cent.

Stacked Heat Risks Ahead

Figure 1: Southeast Asia’s Rice Risk Convergence Based on High Heat Risk and Peak El Niño Periods, July 2026 – June 2027 (5 Largest SEA Rice Producers)

In light of these challenges, AMS cannot respond using the old single-hazard El Niño playbook. Staying food-secure now demands sharper policies and stronger preparation to avoid being overwhelmed.

As Southeast Asia is a net food producer, food supply is likely to remain available within the region. Affordability and access, however, are the growing threats, with the most dire impacts on low-income households. Price spikes will be driven not only by scarcity but by climate disasters, input price volatility, supply chain breakdowns, trade bans, hoarding or panic (Figure 2). The Philippines offers a cautionary example: in February 2025, the government was forced to declare a national food security emergency after retail rice prices remained stubbornly high even as global supplies eased. The price spike was due to all the reasons mentioned. The prices eased after the government released its stockpiles and imposed a retail price cap.

ASEAN countries should anticipate potential disruptions. The FAO has warned that the window for preventive action is closing. The most exposed countries are those with high import dependencies (particularly in rice) and weaker currencies. These include: the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. Though highly import-dependent, Singapore and Brunei are buffered by more stable currencies. Myanmar already faces a severe humanitarian food crisis and is in a category of its own. To compound matters, national governments have drawn on their financial reserves to subsidise fuel and fertiliser since the US-Iran war began, leaving less of a buffer to address the coming crisis.

Major Events Affecting Commodity Prices

Figure 2: Rice, Urea and Crude Oil Prices in USD, 2019 – 2026

Policy Implications

To prepare for this challenge, AMS should prioritise the following policies.

One, they should elevate food security from a single-ministry concern to a national security one. Multiple agencies and ministries should be involved. History shows that food unaffordability is combustible and can lead to political instability. Governments should coordinate food security from the centre, with targeted support for smallholder farmers and low-income households rather than broad subsidies or blunt price controls that rarely reach those most in need. For example, Malaysia’s prime minister has recently ordered urgent, centrally-coordinated El Niño measures.

Second, countries should plan for multi-country trade disruptions. For example, the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 showed how simultaneous shocks and defensive export bans cascaded across borders. Analysts at Goldman Sachs project that current shocks could push global food commodity prices up 15.8 per cent. The bank predicts that food insecurity will last well into 2028, as disruptions move through different crops’ planting and harvest cycles at different times. To mitigate this, governments should stress-test supply chains for concurrent failure points, diversify suppliers beyond single-origin dependence and coordinate rice import timing so buyers are not bidding against one another. They should closely monitor food, fertiliser and fuel prices. In addition, rice-surplus ASEAN countries should keep trade routes open and avoid imposing sudden export bans that would convert a supply shortfall into a crisis.

Third, countries should seek to raise domestic self-sufficiency in inputs. This should preferably be aligned with regenerative agriculture. The fertiliser shock stemming from the Russo-Ukraine war and the US-led war against Iran has underscored how much the region’s harvests depend on imported nutrients. The durable answer is to increase local production of chemical and bio-fertilisers (the latter includes bio and food waste). This will help to cut external inputs while rebuilding soils. Regional fertiliser stock monitoring and even joint procurement of urea, phosphates, and potash would help cushion price spikes. It also aligns with ASEAN’s Resilient and Regenerative Agriculture Priority Economic Deliverable, under the Philippines’ ASEAN chairmanship this year.

Fourth, ASEAN countries should deepen intra-regional cooperation and with close neighbours. The new ASEAN Food, Agriculture and Forestry Sectoral Plan 2026-2030 provides a valuable framework. Singapore’s food partnerships with New Zealand and Vietnam offer a template others could adapt. Such arrangements can further advance climate goals alongside securing calories. Vietnam’s “Green and Low-Emission” rice — certified under its million-hectare Mekong Delta programme and now contracted to buyers in Japan — shows how high-value markets can finance the shift to lower-input and climate-resilient farming.

Southeast Asia may be prepared for an El Niño phenomenon, but the lesson of 2026 is that the region needs to prepare for compounding food shocks. Given that food insecurity has manifold impacts on the cost of living as well as social and political stability, the need to act is urgent. Above all, the region is stronger when it collaborates. This work should begin now, when the window remains open.

2026/211