Parti Islam Se-Malaysia’s (PAS) Outreach to Non-Muslims and Its Contradictions

The 71st Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) Muktamar (congress) from 15-16 September 2025 was filled with the usual discussions that a party preparing for the next general election (GE) – due by 2027 – holds. Speeches at this event contained themes of PAS’ confidence in its expanding influence, the reaffirmation of its Islamic credentials, and an insistence that it is ready to lead a multi-racial Malaysia. PAS President Hadi Awang said, “We are ready to lead Malaysia and our priority is to get support and win the election.” Yet, beneath this rhetoric lies a paradox that PAS has yet to resolve: how does an Islamist party, whose leadership is constitutionally and doctrinally restricted to Muslims, meaningfully reach out to non-Muslim Malaysians, who make up 36.5 per cent of the population?

PAS is riding on a wave of unprecedented strength, with 43 seats it is the largest party in the Dewan Rakyat (Parliament), and it aims to double that to 80 in the next GE. To govern, however, a party must secure not just Malay-Muslim strongholds but also multi-ethnic constituencies where winning Chinese, Indian, and East Malaysian votes would be decisive to secure a simple majority of at least 112 of the 222 parliamentary seats.

This is PAS’ central dilemma: its leaders recognise that PAS cannot form the next Malaysian government by appealing exclusively to its traditional base of conservative Malays. Hence, their efforts in the past year are an attempt to broaden this base, such as by distancing PAS from racist remarks by the party president’s son and by courting the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) to join Perikatan Nasional (PN). This is despite MCA condemning Hadi Awang for calling non-Malays the root cause for corruption in Malaysia back in 2022. Unless PAS resolves these internal contradictions, it will continue to dominate Malay politics while alienating non-Muslims.

PAS leaders repeatedly claim their struggle is for the wellbeing of all Malaysians but their outreach remains constrained by the party’s apparent ideological red lines. At the recent Muktamar, for instance, PAS announced that its Non-Muslim Supporters Wing (Dewan Himpunan Penyokong PAS, DHPP) had been elevated to become an official party wing with the former “friends of PAS” now associate members. With this new status, non-Muslims in PAS now have more voice, with the right to vote and to be voted into positions within the wing.

… Beneath the rhetoric lies a paradox that PAS has yet to resolve: how does an Islamist party, whose leadership is constitutionally and doctrinally restricted to Muslims, meaningfully reach out to non-Muslim Malaysians…?

Yet a striking contradiction came from Hadi Awang’s lengthy closing speech. Outlining the ideal qualities of a prime minister (PM), he said that a leader must improve people’s wellbeing, unite the Muslim world, and be knowledgeable in Islam. Ironically, the very attributes Hadi listed are arguably embodied by the current PM Anwar Ibrahim, who has positioned himself as a fierce defender of Palestinian rights and advocated Muslim solidarity while championing Malaysians’ welfare and inclusive governance. Anwar is known to be close to Islamic scholars from around the world.

Additionally, PAS’ push for moral policing and flirtation with implementing hudud laws at the federal level often alienate non-Muslims. Even in Kelantan and Terengganu, where the party rules comfortably, non-Muslims face interference in their daily lives, seen in cases such as a woman being fined for wearing shorts and a purported ban on female singers for a performance at a temple. These contradictions continue to fuel distrust by non-Muslims and suggest that PAS’ outreach to them is more tactical than transformative.

If PAS aspires to govern Malaysia, it must first convince non-Muslims that their rights, religions, culture, and political participation will not be eroded under a PAS-led administration. This is the bridge that PAS has not yet crossed. Although it currently works together with Gerakan as part of PN, it is within a framework of non-Muslims accepting the supremacy of Muslim leadership in Malaysia, which perpetuates political inequality. This may enhance PAS’ popularity among the Malays, but its capacity to win trust across communities remains doubtful.

Without credible outreach, PAS risks being boxed in as a powerful opposition or at best a junior partner that is formidable in rhetoric but limited in governance prospects. This also plays out in the question of who from PAS could potentially be a unifying prime minister if it were to form a government since the party does not appear to be moving away from its ulama leadership model with the top five leaders winning uncontested ahead of the Muktamar. The 2025 Muktamar made clear that PAS envisions itself as the next ruling party. However, the party will not be successful unless PAS shows genuine intent to stop its exclusivist rhetoric and practices. The Muktamar is only one of many platforms by which potential Malaysian voters will judge PAS. Bersatu previously attracted moderate Malays to vote for PN; with growing cracks within the coalition, PAS’ positioning of itself as an inclusive party for all Malaysians in its quest to govern the country will hinge on real, not apparent, change.

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