PAS’ ‘Civilisational Outrage’ at the US Rings Hollow When China Gets a Pass

Malaysia signed a new trade pact with the US on 26 October 2025 on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit. One of the requirements is for Malaysia to align its export controls and sanctions screening with US standards, a concern that is amplified in domestic politics as potentially undermining Bumiputera privileges. Without missing a beat, opposition leaders claimed the agreement was lopsided and eroded national sovereignty. The government defended it as a pragmatic safeguard to protect Malaysian exporters from ongoing tariff disruptions. In frustration, Prime Minister (PM) Anwar Ibrahim dismissed calls for his resignation over the matter.

The opposition Parti Se-Islam Malaysia (PAS) framed Malaysia’s engagement with the US as not only an economic dispute but also a civilisational one. The party tapped into the idea, popularised by the late political scientist Samuel Huntington, of a ‘clash of civilisations’, that global politics is ultimately shaped by clashes between different cultures rather than by ideology or economics alone. PAS used religious language to depict the US as being morally corrupt and Islam’s antagonist: for instance, PAS president Hadi Awang called President Donald Trump a “great devil”, decrying Malaysia’s invitation to him as ASEAN’s guest. PAS Deputy President Tuan Ibrahim Tuan Man even announced a rally to protest Trump’s presence at the ASEAN Summit, claiming that Malaysia had betrayed Palestine by hosting the US president.

After the summit, Hadi likened the Malaysia–US trade deal to the situation of a small snake caught in an anaconda’s grip, in a Facebook post. He drew on the story of Prophet Sulaiman’s wise leadership over small ants from the Quran to juxtapose against Malaysia’s “leaders who dance with arrogant rulers”. PAS is also riding the wave of anger over Gaza, which resonates deeply among Malaysian Muslims (and non-Muslims) due to Palestine being the land of the prophets and home to Islam’s third-holiest site (the Al-Aqsa Mosque).

The government countered that Malaysia, as ASEAN chair, was obligated to invite all dialogue partners regardless of political sympathies, but the ‘civilisational’ rhetoric proved potent. Netizens criticised Anwar’s leadership and even fabricated headlines claiming he had “admitted to major mistakes”, underscoring how the ‘civilisational’ narrative appealed emotionally. PAS positioned itself as Islam’s moral compass, contrasting its purity with Putrajaya’s seeming compromise with the enemy. This episode reveals how identity politics shape political mobilisation in Malaysia.

Yet PAS’ outrage is selective. While PAS rails against the US as a threat to Islamic civilisation, it has quietly cultivated cordial ties with another power whose record toward Muslims is no less troubling.

In December 2024, Hadi met China’s ambassador Ouyang Yujing at the Chinese embassy in Kuala Lumpur to promote better relations between China and Malaysia, especially the states under PAS’ rule. This was not a one-off encounter. Although PAS leaders have condemned China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims, the party has maintained cordial and cooperative relations with Chinese officials. Notably, delegations from Perikatan Nasional (PN), including PAS members, and PN’s state governments have undertaken working visits to Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Beijing. This paradox resembles PM Anwar’s stance toward the US, where he is critical of Washington’s support for Israel yet willing to work with the US for Malaysia’s national interest.

PAS’ civilisational narrative casts PM Anwar’s openness to Western cooperation as religious compromise, even as it quietly practices the same realpolitik with Beijing. Domestically, the party often accuses the Democratic Action Party (DAP) of being “communist”. For instance, in 2022, Hadi claimed DAP was “pro-communist” and tied to the ashes of Chin Peng. While PAS mobilises the “communist” label to discredit the DAP, it borrows the same spirit of collectivism, calling on supporters to trust “the masses and the party”.

To collapse diplomatic pragmatism into a moral binary between the righteous and the corrupt is to purposely misunderstand Malaysia’s role as ASEAN Chair.

PAS’ positions on the Taliban and Iran, by contrast, are consistent with its civilisational narrative. Both entities are portrayed as part of the global ummah resisting Western hegemony. In 2021, Hadi’s son (also an assemblyman) publicly congratulated the Taliban after its takeover of Kabul, while Hadi described the Taliban as having changed for the better. PAS has defended Iran against US pressure, seeing them as fellow victims of Western hostility.

These positions make sense within PAS’s geopolitical worldview of Islamic solidarity against Western domination. What is inconsistent is how PAS applies its moral lens to non-Western powers. The same party that calls Washington an oppressor of Muslims rarely condemns Beijing for its treatment of Uyghurs or Moscow for bombing Syrian civilians. It is here that PAS’ selectivity becomes evident: it demonises PM Anwar’s engagement with the US as moral capitulation, whereas its own engagement with China is PAS’ “strategic diplomacy”.

To collapse diplomatic pragmatism into a moral binary between the righteous and the corrupt is to purposely misunderstand Malaysia’s role as ASEAN Chair. Inviting Trump to Kuala Lumpur does not make Malaysia pro-US any more than hosting Li Qiang makes Malaysia subservient to China. ASEAN’s strength, under Malaysia and Anwar Ibrahim’s leadership, lies in its openness and capacity to engage all external powers. This nuance is not lost on Malaysians, with some commending Anwar’s effort to maintain strategic balance.

PAS is entitled to oppose the Malaysia-US trade deal on substantive differences, but when its critique turns ‘civilisational’ by painting the US as evil while exempting other powers from scrutiny, it reveals a selective moral vision, not a principled one.

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