PAS’ Contentious Contention: Non-Malay Voters Should Stay Home

“We lost the narrative,” is how Penang Chief Minister Chow Kon Yeow described Pakatan Harapan (PH)’s loss in the Sungai Bakap state by-election to Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS).

Most analysts and commentators have since endorsed Chow’s view. While Chow, however, has sought to portray the result as a passive “loss” for PH, in fact, PAS — the strongest party in the Perikatan Nasional coalition — actively outperformed PH in using the by-election as a narrative-building opportunity.

Indeed, Sungai Bakap was one of many messaging moments PAS has seized since 2018 to socialise notions of political belonging — and unbelonging — to voters grappling with rising costs, unaffordable housing, declining subsidies, low wages and precarious jobs.

It has since worked the result as part of a bigger campaign aimed at restructuring Malaysians’ understanding of national citizenship, outlining who’s in (Malay Muslims) and who’s out (racial and religious minorities).

Take as an example one of the most important lessons from this by-election — when PH fails to communicate with its non-Malay supporters, it leaves them demoralised. So, they stay home in protest, whereas Malay voters have the option of choosing PAS.

Analysts’ estimates differ slightly, as do their explanations, but just over 40 per cent of Chinese and 50 per cent of Indian voters turned out to vote, compared with 80 per cent or more of Malay voters.

What about how PAS is narrating the result? While economic grievances cross racial and religious lines, the conclusions PAS wants voters to draw differ dramatically. Its aim is for Malaysians, particularly Malay Muslims, to understand non-Malay and non-Muslim political non-participation as foundational to national unity and social cohesion.

Immediately after the by-election, PAS National Unity spokesperson Halimah Ali argued that it not only won over Malay voters but also “non-Malay youth who have also begun to give their confidence to PAS”. She elaborated that Sungai Bakap proves that the “multiracial public” is starting to “embrace the politics of national unity”, namely by recognising that politics is the domain of “the Malays, who are the largest group in the country”. Accordingly, Malay political contests should have “the strong support of other races, including Chinese and Indians”.

How might we make sense of Halimah’s seemingly confounding claims? 

To be clear, Halimah’s claim about non-Malay youth supporting PAS in Sungai Bakap is unproven and likely untrue if understood in terms of youth vote shares by race, given the low non-Malay voter turnout in general, and her lack of figures to support her claim. Analysts have only published data showing that PH lost youth support — a different proposition.

For this reason, (Sungai Bakap) is a perfect staging point for reinforcing PAS messages that Penang — and by extension, Putrajaya — is a non-Malay and non-Muslim stronghold that PAS supporters must conquer.

However, it is only untrue if we understand “support” in terms of non-Malay voters turning out to vote and actively choosing PAS at the ballot box. It is, however, a way for PAS to interpret the results to endorse non-Malay disengagement, all the better to frame Malaysian political contests as rightfully Malay Muslim-only affairs. As such, non-Malays “support” Malays as the nation’s only legitimate political actors by staying home.

As Halimah elaborated, by not voting, and indeed behaving as political bystanders, non-Malay voters have also distanced themselves from “racism and extremism”, by which Halimah means the putatively “pro-Chinese” politics that PH espouses. Her implication is that they should cease to press their ethnic and religious claims and interests in national political forums, such as elections. In short, given that political participation is a key right of citizenship, non-Malay voters best support Malay Muslims to realise their political aims by ceasing to function as citizens at all.

PAS’ attitude towards minorities’ claims is also evident in its recent dispute with coalition partner Gerakan about vernacular schools, which often seek corporate support to help fill government funding gaps, including from alcohol companies, which PAS opposes. They should not accept this money, nor will PAS advocate for government funding, because, in PAS’ view, these schools should not exist.

PAS’ Sungai Bakap comments exist as part of a wider reframing of notions of citizenship so that Malay Muslims, the nation’s true citizens, should retake areas that PH holds, like Penang, because it includes the “Chinese” Democratic Action Party (DAP). In addition to “pro-Chinese”, PAS is also portraying PH’s policies as “pro-rich” — drawing on a categorical equivalence between “Chinese” and “rich” that has a long history in Malay politics.

Take, for example, Kedah Chief Minister Sanusi Md Nor’s 2023 comments about Penang’s housing market. Taking aim at official policy thinking about development across the “Greater Penang” urban conurbation — which includes parts of Kedah and Perak — Sanusi argued that it benefits only the rich.

Instead of Penang’s development spilling over into Kedah and boosting its fortunes, Sanusi continued, it is Kedah that is fuelling Penang’s growth, which he suggests is extractive and ungrateful. Sanusi points out that Penang prices out its lower- and even middle-income residents with unaffordable urban developments — even on lands where they have sacrificed their “blood”, an allusion to their Malay-ness. Displaced, they are relocating to Kedah, which is their true source of shelter and compassion, not Penang.

Sanusi’s argument here connects seamlessly with other comments he has made in the past, including pointing out that Penang was once a part of Kedah — implying that Kedah could conceivably take back Penang — not only for Kedah, but from the DAP.

The Sungai Bakap by-election result should not be read as proof of Islamist “extremism”. Instead, it is evidence that PAS is making mainstream narrative mileage out of small moments like state by-election wins in semi-rural and peri-urbanising areas like Sungai Bakap, part of the “greater Penang” dynamic Sanusi highlighted.

For this reason, it was a perfect staging point for reinforcing PAS messages that Penang — and by extension, Putrajaya — is a non-Malay and non-Muslim stronghold that PAS supporters must conquer. After all, racialised criticism of housing prices speaks to grievances felt not only in Penang but also in the Klang Valley, showing that PAS is addressing a mainstream national audience.

The federal government would do well to counter these arguments, as more such small wins for PAS could signal bigger wins down the track.

Yet with another state by-election coming up in Nenggiri, Kelantan, ahead of which United Malays National Organisation leaders have allegedly warned the DAP — their own coalition partner — to stay away, we may soon witness indirect methods employed again.

2024/249