Recasting Malaysia–US Relations in the Shadow of the War in Gaza

Galvanised by Israel’s ongoing bombing of Gaza following Hamas’s October 2023 attack, Malaysian Muslims have boycotted Starbucks, Pizza Hut, and other franchises with enough fervour to oblige some outlets to close. Protesters fault their parent companies for US support for Israel, although local owners and staff are overwhelmingly Malaysian and bereft of US foreign-policy clout. But American responses to the hostilities are themselves unusually divided. Shifts in US public opinion on the issue offer Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim an opportunity to leverage such developments with regard to how Kuala Lumpur approaches the US.

The Malaysian boycott campaign echoes not only the global Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement for Palestine, but also local precedents, most recently, against a local convenience store chain for selling socks some Muslims deemed offensive. It has also targeted a consortium’s bid to privatise Malaysia Airport Holdings Bhd., given the involvement of American firm BlackRock, which is alleged to have ties with Israel. Nearly two dozen Malaysian civil society organisations issued a statement urging their government not to proceed with the move. PM Anwar has reassured American firms that Malaysia still wants US investment; recent commitments from Tesla and other high-tech firms have been key wins. But he treads a careful line with Malaysians (over 60 per cent Muslim) in justifying not cutting ties with all companies that do business with Israel.

An existential right-wing partisan threat leaves Anwar’s administration especially chary of seeming softness in his commitment to the Palestinian cause. Indeed, Anwar has seized on this issue, deeply salient to Malaysians, as proof of his Islamist credentials. He has reaffirmed his support for Hamas in defiance of US pushback. That stance makes it hard for his administration to address potentially economically damaging — however surely unproductive — consumer activism.

PM Anwar and his government can leverage such trends with two approaches. First, the issue of Gaza offers the Malaysian government and civil society a real opportunity to add nuance to their relationship with the US. However convenient it may be to paint the US as uniformly behind Benjamin Netanyahu’s administration, swings and rifts in US public opinion have never been clearer. At least eight State Department officials resigned, citing the US role in Gaza, from October 2023 through May 2024. Pushback against Netanyahu has come even from (Jewish) Senate majority leader Chuck Schumer, as well as other high-profile politicians. These examples make clear how much is now in flux.

Gallup tracked a shift in the US, from narrow approval of Israeli military action in November 2023 to only 36 per cent in March 2024. The partisan divide is stark: by March, 64 per cent of Republicans approved, versus only 18 per cent of Democrats — making for a fraught election year, especially with a choice between pro-Israel Joe Biden and also pro-Israel, but overtly Islamophobic Donald Trump.

Other recent polling data confirm such gradations. Pew data from mid-February 2024 reveal stark disparities along partisan, age, and religious lines in attitudes toward Hamas’ attack, Israel’s response, and Palestinian and Israeli peoples and leadership (see Tables 1 and 2). These data not only complicate a reading of Israel as a ‘Jewish issue’ in the US — white evangelical Protestants are nearly as closely aligned with Israel as, and far less critical of Netanyahu’s administration than, Jews — but also suggest future implications. Should November’s elections return control of Congress or the presidency to the Democrats, Malaysia may find connections easier: however consistent Biden’s Israel policy has been, Republican support for the Israeli government and war effort is far higher, and they are far less sympathetic toward Palestinians generally. Specifically, 59 per cent of Republicans deem the way Israel has responded to Hamas’s attack acceptable, to only 22 per cent of Democrats. In particular, young Americans are markedly more critical of Israeli actions than their elders, across measures, and their sympathies incline more toward Palestinians. For instance, 21 per cent of respondents aged 18–29 find Israel’s response in Gaza acceptable, versus 53 per cent of those 65 and older.

This stark generational effect, compounded by partisanship, could signal shifts ahead in American policy and greater openness to engaging with the ‘Muslim world’. Anwar might leverage this turn and his own moderate-spokesperson international image, including to vindicate continued economic ties with a US decreasingly at odds with Malaysia on Palestinian rights.

Opinions on Israeli Government Vary in the US

Table 1: % of US citizens who say they have a(n) __ opinion of the Israeli government

Differing Sympathies

Table 2: % of US citizens who say their sympathies lie…

Second, and in line with this youth sentiment, the encampments that mushroomed across US university campuses this spring offer a useful resource for rights advocates in Malaysia, including reformists within the government. Many university administrations took a hard-line approach, calling in police to suppress and clear sites, and suspending or expelling students. Malaysia, too, has a history of harsh treatment of campus activism, citing similar disruptive effects. Yet here we have an example of campus protest that, in resisting official strictures, galvanised thoughtful critiques among American youth. Moreover, in the best tradition of campus activism, these protests have helped shift the wider debate. Even Israel loyalists increasingly now disentangle criticism of its government from criticism of Jews and Judaism, and support for Palestinian citizens from support for Hamas or other parties. That modulation could temper accusations of Malaysians committed to Palestinian welfare as ‘antisemitic’. 

The Malaysian government could glean from this example a greater appreciation for the value of student and youth protest, even if — perhaps especially if — it challenges established norms. As these encampments, walkouts, teach-ins, and other efforts demonstrate — including how damaging their suppression has been to a cause most Malaysians hold dear — academic freedom and university autonomy are pivotal to fostering debate and engagement. Crackdowns are not something to emulate, but the culture that led students in the US to believe they could and should take a principled stand is. Malaysian youth too, have shaped and can continue to shape public opinion, all the more readily when allowed space for speech and protest. Indeed, an unknown tally of Malaysian students in the US have participated in these efforts, many of them as Muslims, among other American and international Muslims, Jews, and others.

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