Sabah First? 2025 State Election Shows Voters Want Results Not Slogans

The long-anticipated 17th Sabah state election has concluded with predicted and yet surprising results. The heightened “Sabah First” rhetoric — a political slogan and sentiment prioritising Sabah’s autonomy, interests and leadership by local-based parties — was less decisive than expected. The sentiment surrounding the “Sabah First” slogan belies the fact that the divided politics of the state will continue.

With 1.7 million voters choosing from a record 22 parties and 596 candidates, the ballot resembled a democratic marketplace — rich in options but fragmented in direction. While some view this as a recipe for instability, others interpret it as part of Sabah’s ongoing political evolution, in search of a model distinct from neighbouring Sarawak, whose relative stability is often credited to the dominance of local-based parties and entrenched elites. Yet beneath the surface of this crowded contest, the battleground coalesced around a few key rivalries. Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS), Warisan, Perikatan Nasional (PN), and Barisan Nasional (BN) competed in Bumiputera constituencies. GRS, Parti Solidariti Tanahairku (STAR), United Progressive Kinabalu Organisation (UPKO), and Parti Kesejahteraan Demokratik Masyarakat (PKDM) in non-Muslim Bumiputera areas. The ethnically mixed and plurality seats saw open contests among all the key parties. The latter represent seats where no ethnic group commands more than 60 per cent of the population.

Despite internal tensions and allegations of corruption, GRS still emerged as the largest bloc, securing 29 seats (Table 1). What accounted for GRS’s victory? Was it the effectiveness of the “Sabah First” narrative, or a genuine surge in the coalition’s popularity? A closer look at the results, especially GRS’s net swing from 2018, suggests that the coalition’s success owed less to increasing voter support than to structural advantages: incumbency, vote-splitting among opponents, and candidates with strong personal followings.

GRS Win: Structural Advantages

Table 1: Number of Seats Contested and Won by Party/Coalition

Notably, GRS experienced a negative vote swing in most constituencies compared to 2018 and 2020. Only four of its incumbents registered a positive net swing, with Kawang recording the highest at +11.1 per cent. This underlines a critical point — GRS won not because of widespread enthusiasm, but because it remained the best-organised and most recognisable force in a splintered field. The opposition’s disarray helped GRS. In many seats, Warisan, PN, PH (Pakatan Harapan), BN, and independents split the anti-GRS vote.

For PH, the election results were sobering. Despite sustained campaign efforts and Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s visible involvement, PH won only one of the 22 contested seats. Posters of Anwar bearing slogans such as “PMX Loves Sabah: PMX Fulfils the 9 MA63 (Malaysia Agreement 1963) Demands” and “PMX Loves Sabah: RM6.9 Billion (US$1.69 billion) – Sabah Receives the Highest Allocation” failed to translate into votes. PMX is an abbreviation for Malaysia’s 10^th prime minister, referring to Anwar.

PH’s weaknesses were clear: poor local leadership, parachuted candidates, and inadequate machinery. The coalition’s sole victor was Jamawi Jaafar in Melalap, but Jamawi’s victory was not so much due to PH’s appeal; he won because of his personal brand, as he is a well-established local leader with a strong service record. Overall, PH’s inability to convert its federal platform into local traction highlights its disconnect from Sabah’s politics. Still, PH’s base remains. Candidates who fail to secure at least one-eighth of the total votes cast in their constituencies lose their RM5,000 (US$1,224) deposit. Only two of its 22 candidates lost their deposits, suggesting residual support that can be revived.

One of the election’s biggest surprises was the urban Chinese swing. The Democratic Action Party (DAP), which fielded seven candidates under PH, lost all of them to Warisan, with margins exceeding 20 per cent in constituencies like Likas, Elopura, and Kapayan. This reflects a middle-class backlash against PH, compounded by low turnout (49-56 per cent) in urban areas. Warisan, despite its weaknesses, managed to capitalise on this shift as voters consolidated around the most viable non-incumbent force in their areas. The Chinese and urban “tsunami” sends a clear message: many urban Chinese voters view the government’s reform agenda as piecemeal, selective, inconsistent and lacking political courage compared to what was promised before PH came to power.

For PH, the election results were sobering. Despite sustained campaign efforts and Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s visible involvement, PH won only one of the 22 contested seats.

The election also tested the appeal of Sabah First sentiment — a message echoed by all parties but most loudly used as a rallying cry by local-based parties like STAR and UPKO. Both, however, performed dismally. STAR contested 46 seats and won only two; UPKO fielded 25 candidates and won three seats. Also, both lost a majority of their candidates’ deposits, suggesting that voters value performance, networks, and candidate accessibility over slogans. The proliferation of local-based parties all claiming to champion Sabah’s interests has also diluted the potency of the Sabah First narrative, leaving voters to focus on who can actually deliver.

The outcome of the election is not a consolidation of local autonomy but a reversion to fragmented politics. GRS has yet to evolve into a hegemon like Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS), which has effectively propagated its “Sarawak First” agenda. State-federal relations will likely remain reciprocal: Sabah needs federal funding and recognition while the federal government needs Sabah’s support in national politics. Thus, contentious issues like the 40 per cent federal revenue return, oil and gas rights, and parliamentary seat allocation are likely to be settled politically rather than legally. Peninsular-based parties have not lost everything in Sabah, but their future in Sabah depends on adapting to local expectations, avoiding last-minute strategies, and building strong grassroots networks. Sabah’s 2025 state election highlights that personality, performance, and political structure matter more than slogans. While Sabah First remains a resonant political idea, voters continue to judge candidates by delivery of promises and not declarations of state autonomy alone.

2025/394