Southeast Asia Countries Won’t Let War in Ukraine Affect Ties with Russia

The extraordinary bust-up between US President Donald Trump and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on 28 February underscores Trump’s determination to force Ukraine and Russia to the negotiating table. While Southeast Asian countries are left to ponder the ramifications of the spat for their defence ties with America, they would, nevertheless, welcome an end to the conflict.

The prospect of an armistice between Moscow and Kyiv raises the possibility that America (though probably not Europe) may lift some of the economic sanctions against Russia. That might ease cost of living pressures in some Southeast Asian countries. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 exacerbated rising food and energy prices across the region and disrupted supply chains.

But long before Trump returned to the White House, many Southeast Asian countries had already decided not to let the war interfere with their relations with Russia.

Following the invasion, all Southeast Asian states except Vietnam and Laos voted more or less consistently in support of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions condemning Russian aggression. They did so again on 24 February, the third anniversary of the invasion. But only a few Southeast Asian leaders condemned Russia by name. Singapore was the only country to target Moscow with financial sanctions.

Most regional states adopted a neutral position, refusing to take sides in what they regarded as a major power dispute that was of little concern to them. Vietnam and Laos did not want to damage relations with a country they considered an old friend. Indonesia, in particular, accused the West of double standards: Israel was treated quite differently for its actions in Gaza compared to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Since the start of the war, the leaders of seven ASEAN member states have even met with President Putin in person (only Brunei, the Philippines, and Singapore have not). Russia’s chairmanship of BRICS last year did not put off Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam from becoming BRICS partners. Western sanctions did not stop Southeast Asian states from trading with Russia.

The ASEAN-Russia Dialogue Partnership has been largely unaffected by the war. Astonishingly, in July 2024 the two sides celebrated Russia’s accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, despite the fact that Russia’s attack on Ukraine was an egregious violation of all the treaty’s core principles. Last month, both sides agreed to strengthen their strategic partnership.

Despite the conflict, several Southeast Asian countries have advanced their ties with Russia.

Since the start of the war, the leaders of seven ASEAN member states have met with President Putin in person (only Brunei, the Philippines and Singapore have not).

Last week, Min Aung Hlaing, the leader of Myanmar’s 2021 coup, was in Moscow — his fourth visit to Russia since he seized power in February that year. He wants more Russian arms to fight his opponents (the last pair of six Su-30 fighter jets ordered in 2018 were delivered in December 2024). He has also looked to Russia to ease the country’s energy crisis (including wind and nuclear power), invest in the country’s infrastructure and endorse his election plans (which even ASEAN has refused to do). In return, the regime has offered to send up to 10,000 Myanmar workers to Russia to help alleviate the country’s acute labour shortage brought on by its war against Ukraine. Min Aung Hlaing will also be attending the Victory Day celebrations in Red Square on 9 May to mark the 80^th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany.

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto’s plans to bolster ties with Russia are also moving forward. In November 2024, the Indonesian and Russian navies held an exercise in the Java Sea. Two months later, Russian warships participated for the fifth time in the Indonesian-led multilateral Komodo naval drills. In what would be a first, Indonesian troops may also participate in Zapad-2025, a large-scale land exercise to be conducted by Russia and Belarus in September. Zapad-2025 will take place in Belarus, which Moscow used as a springboard to invade Ukraine.

On the same day as Indonesia voted for the UNGA resolution on Ukraine, Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s defence minister at the time of the invasion and now Secretary of the Security Council, arrived in Jakarta to discuss ways to increase bilateral defence cooperation. No details emerged, but the two sides may have discussed arms sales, possibly including resurrecting the sale of 11 Su-35 fighter jets which Jakarta ordered in 2018 but cancelled in 2021 due to the threat of the US’ Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). CAATSA allows US presidents to impose punitive measures on countries that buy arms from Russia (Trump invoked it twice in his first term, but is unlikely to use it against Indonesia if the deal goes ahead).

After Jakarta, Shoigu flew to Kuala Lumpur, where he met with Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. The Malaysian leader has praised Russia for its support for Palestinian statehood. Malaysia is also looking for new fighter jets, and given Anwar’s trenchant criticism of America’s support for Israel over Gaza, buying US-made jets is out of the question. Russian jets may not be as advanced, but they are cheaper and Moscow is willing to take part payment in Malaysian commodities such as tin and rubber.

Vietnam is Russia’s closest partner in Southeast Asia. Putin and Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin visited Hanoi in June 2024 and January 2025 respectively. During Mishutin’s visit, Russia and Vietnam signed a nuclear energy cooperation agreement which could pave the way for Russian companies to participate in the construction of the Ninh Thuan nuclear power plant. That project, which Russia agreed to finance in 2010, was cancelled in 2016 but has now been revived. Vietnam is also looking for new fighter aircraft, and Russia’s Su-57 stealth fighter might be a contender, if the price is right. Vietnamese President To Lam will almost certainly attend the Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on 9 May.

If the Trump administration ends Russia’s isolation, Putin will almost certainly want to capitalise on this in Southeast Asia. His attendance at the ASEAN-led summits in Malaysia later this year cannot be ruled out. Nor can a side trip to Indonesia to commemorate 75 years of diplomatic relations.

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