The Battle for Sabah: Key Players, Critical Issues and Potential Scenarios

INTRODUCTION

Although the current term of the Sabah State Legislative Assembly is scheduled to expire only in December 2025, there is widespread speculation about an early election. Sabah’s political landscape remains one of Malaysia’s most intricate and polarised arenas, deeply divided along territorial, ethnic, party, and personality lines.

The question is not whether the ruling coalition Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS) can maintain its grip on power amid challenges from the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and Parti Warisan (Warisan), but also whether the state’s fluid context will be influenced by the political undercurrents in Peninsular Malaysia, which would further dictate the timing of the election.

This article begins with an exploration of Sabah’s demographic composition, historical political fluidity, and the formation and challenges facing the GRS coalition. It then moves to an examination of the major political entities, including GRS, UMNO, Warisan, and other standalone parties. The subsequent section sets out the key issues facing voters in the state such as political stability, economic development, infrastructure woes, and the contentious Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63) debate. The final section outlines possible outcomes of the upcoming elections, considering various strategic alliances and the potential impact on Sabah’s future governance.

BACKGROUND

Sabah, like its neighbour Sarawak, has a multiracial and multireligious society, significantly more culturally heterogeneous than the eleven states in Peninsular Malaysia. Sabah, one of the thirteen states in the Federation of Malaysia, was elevated in 2021 to become one of the Borneo States, reflecting its autonomy as a “region” and “equal partner” in the federation in line with the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63). This status distinguishes Sabah and Sarawak from the eleven states in Peninsular Malaysia, as both states have unique political histories, cultural backgrounds, and vast geographical areas. Sabah’s population of approximately 3.41 million is ethnically diverse (Table 1).

Table 1: Sabah’s Total Population by Ethnic Groups

Ethnic Groups	Population	Percentage
Kadazandusun	660,777	19.3
Bajau	565,499	16.5
Malay	307,494	9
Murut	106,484	3.1
Other Bumiputeras	673,233	19.7
Chinese	248,920	7.3
Indian	5,962	0.2
Others	39,989	1.2
Non-Malaysian	810443	23.7
Total	3418785	100

Sabah is known for its turbulent past, including the fluidity of its politics. It is the only state in Malaysia that has changed its government more than five times. The last government that was toppled was the Warisan-led government in 2020. Unlike Sarawak, Sabah’s politics are more open and not insulated from federal politics. The entry of UMNO in 1991 opened the floodgates for Peninsula-based parties to establish their state chapters in Sabah.

Sabah was administered by a Peninsula-based party under UMNO until its ouster by Warisan in 2018. Warisan’s term was short-lived, and it was defeated by GRS in 2020. Initially formed as a loose grouping for Perikatan Nasional (PN), Barisan Nasional (BN), and Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) to face Warisan prior to the 2018 general election, GRS officially registered as a coalition in March 2022, comprising parties like Bersatu (Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia), Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP), Parti Solidariti Tanahairku (STAR), and United Sabah National Organisation (USNO) (Table 2).

However, Bersatu’s membership in GRS ended following a mass exodus of its founding members in Sabah, including Hajiji Noor, the current Chief Minister of Sabah. This group acquired the defunct Parti Gagasan Rakyat (Gagasan) as their new home in December 2022.

Most recently, the state was roiled by the 2023 Sabah political crisis, also known as the “Kinabalu Move”. This began on January 6, 2023, when the GRS collapsed after BN withdrew support for Chief Minister Hajiji Noor. This led to mass resignations from Bersatu, a failed coup attempt by UMNO leader Bung Moktar and Warisan President Shafie Apdal, and the eventual expulsion of Bersatu from GRS. The crisis concluded with the approval of the Anti-Hopping Law on May 25, 2023, aimed at reducing political instability.

As Sabah braces for another state election, which is speculated to be called earlier rather than later, all eyes are on GRS to see if the coalition can survive. Many are questioning whether Gagasan, the anchor party, can win support from other component members to administer Sabah for another term.

Table 2: Main Political Parties and Coalitions in Sabah

Parties	Coalitions
Parti Gagasan Rakyat (Gagasan or PGRS)	Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS)
Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS)	Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS)
Parti Solidariti Tanah Airku (STAR)	Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS)
Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP)	Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS)
Parti Harapan Rakyat Sabah (PHRS)	Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS)
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO)	Barisan National (BN)
Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah (PBRS)	Barisan National (BN)
Democratic Action Party (DAP)	Pakatan Harapan (PH)
Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR)	Pakatan Harapan (PH)
United Progressive Kinabalu Organisation (UPKO)	Pakatan Harapan (PH)
Parti Kesejahteraan Demokratik Masyarakat (KDM)	Standalone
Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS)	Perikatan Nasional (PN)
Parti Warisan (Warisan)	Standalone
Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu)	Perikatan Nasional (PN)

KEY POLITICAL PLAYERS

The next paragraphs will set out the main political parties, their share of the state legislative assembly’s 73 seats, and – where relevant – their membership in coalitions.

GRS Members

Gagasan, the largest party in Sabah, holds a dominant position within GRS with 26 seats. Despite its dominance, Gagasan is relatively new and is actively working to recruit new members and bolster its support base across the state. Led by Hajiji Noor, its support is predominantly concentrated in Muslim Bumiputera areas, lacking significant backing from the Kadazandusun community. Additionally, the party grapples with the absence of a strong ideological foundation for Sabah. It lacks a cohesive policy, ideology, vision, and mission – a nationalist underpinning that could attract support from all walks of life in the state.

Another significant component of GRS is PBS which holds seven seats and is currently the oldest party in Sabah. Despite its multiracial stance, PBS boasts a robust following among the Kadazandusun people. While PBS has commendable grassroots following, it also faces criticism for failing to appeal to younger voters, with some labelling it a party for the elderly.

Similarly, STAR enjoys strong support in the Kadazandusun community, especially in the interior areas of Sabah. With six seats in the State Legislative Assembly, STAR’s popularity is largely driven by loyal supporters of Jeffrey Kitingan, a veteran politician known for his nationalist views and persistent advocacy of MA63 and “Sabah for Sabahans”. However, like PBS, STAR’s support is geographically limited to Kadazandusun areas, which constrains its broader political influence.

In an effort to bolster their positions, PBS and STAR signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on April 18, 2024. This agreement aims to strengthen their support base within the Kadazandusun community and foster unity among their followers. Through this MOU, PBS and STAR are signalling to other political entities that the 13 seats they currently hold are non-negotiable.

Other members of GRS include SAPP, Parti Harapan Rakyat Sabah (PHRS), and recently Parti Cinta Sabah (PCS).

UMNO

Currently, UMNO holds 13 seats in the State Legislative Assembly, primarily representing Muslim Bumiputera areas. Its strengths include a long-standing presence in Sabah since 1991, solid party machinery, loyal supporters, and support from UMNO at the federal level. However, UMNO faces significant weaknesses due to factional conflicts. These conflicts involve at least three groups led by Bung Mokhtar, the Sabah UMNO chief; Rahman Dahlan, the Sabah UMNO deputy chief and Tuaran UMNO division; and to a certain extent, Salleh Said, the state assemblyman for Usukan. Bung’s absence at the Tuaran UMNO Divisional Convention on June 22, 2024, officiated by UMNO president Zahid Hamidi, fueled speculation that the rift between Rahman and Bung has widened. Despite Zahid’s denial of factional issues in Sabah UMNO, many perceive the fractures as stemming from a proposed pact with the UMNO-offshoot Warisan, which was supported by Bung but opposed by Rahman. Failure to address these factional problems could prove costly for UMNO, potentially derailing its plans to regain power.

Pakatan Harapan

Pakatan Harapan (PH) comprises Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), Democratic Action Party (DAP), and United Progressive Kinabalu Organisation (UPKO). The grouping currently holds seven seats in the state legislative assembly.

PKR is the most vulnerable party within PH, but it receives considerable support from the urban working class and some support from younger voters. While PKR in Sabah can benefit from Anwar’s patronage support as prime minister, it lacks strong personalities to elevate the party’s stature. This has prompted some members to leave, citing the lack of decisive leadership.While the appointment of Mustapha Sakmud as the new Sabah PKR chief could revitalise the party, his relatively low profile may limit his effectiveness.

In the last two elections, DAP has seen its support in Sabah diminish. Nevertheless, the party’s support is expected to remain steady, particularly among urban Chinese voters. Previously, DAP also enjoyed support from non-Chinese communities in Sabah. However, this support has dwindled due to defections and anti-Peninsula sentiment against Peninsula-based parties. Moreover, DAP struggles to shed the perception that it caters primarily to urban Chinese voters.

On a related note, UPKO faces strong challenges from GRS members PBS and STAR. Despite rebranding efforts, many still view UPKO as a Kadazandusun-based party, making it difficult for it to expand its support to include Muslim Bumiputera and Chinese voters. Despite UPKO boasting a significant number of young leaders and supporters, these are noticeably less active in voicing public issues and stepping forward to represent the party in the public sphere.

Other Standalone Parties

Warisan currently holds a significant position in Sabah as the largest opposition party with 14 seats. Most of these are concentrated on the east coast of Sabah, an area where Warisan’s leader, Shafie Apdal, is highly revered. Here, Shafie is a well-known and respected figure, often seen as a “brand” name due to his numerous contributions to the community. In the 2020 state election, Warisan and its allies came neck and neck with their nearest challenger, GRS, and secured the highest number of popular votes at 43.42 percent, or 317,541 votes. However, given Malaysia’s first-past-the-post parliamentary system, this translated into a relatively small number of seats.

Despite its strong presence, Warisan faces several challenges. First, its support base is largely confined to the East Coast, where Shafie and his extensive family network are influential. Second, Warisan struggles to garner widespread support from the Kadazandusun community. The departure of Warisan vice president Peter Anthony in 2021 to form his own party left a significant gap in Kadazandusun support. Currently, the only Kadazandusun majority constituency held by Warisan is Moyog, represented by Warisan Deputy President Darell Leiking. However, support for Darell has diminished, especially after his defeat to UPKO’s Ewon Benedick in the 2022 general election in the Penampang parliamentary constituency, under which Moyog falls.

As the political competition in Sabah intensifies, Warisan has tried to strengthen its position. However, some members believe that Shafie has lost his vision for the party, particularly after his decision to expand to Peninsular Malaysia, a move widely criticised within the party. According to a former Warisan divisional leader, Shafie has also faced criticism for being overly assertive, with calls from members to change the party’s approach in order to regain public trust going unheeded. This discontent has led to more members leaving the party, with some joining Gagasan on the East Coast, which is poised to be Warisan’s main challenger alongside UMNO.

Parti Kesejahteraan Demokratik Masyarakat (KDM) is a relatively new party formed in 2022 by Peter Anthony after leaving Warisan. It holds two parliamentary seats and one state seat. Despite its recent establishment, KDM has shown promising prospects, particularly in areas where the Murut and Rungus communities are predominant. Wetrom Bahanda, a significant figure in the party, is Member of Parliament for Kota Marudu, while his younger brother Vernon, currently partyless, represents Kudat. Peter Anthony himself is the current state assembly member for Melalap. According to a senior party leader, KDM has the potential to make a significant impact, particularly in challenging PBS and STAR in the Kadazandusun areas, as well as in areas where the Rungus and Murut communities are the majority. These communities perceive KDM as offering something new and different from PBS and STAR, which they feel lack fresh ideas and enthusiasm among the community.

Table 3: Parties and Number of Seats at the Sabah’s State Legislative Assembly

Parties	No of Seats
Gagasan	26
PBS	7
STAR	6
SAPP	1
PHRS	1
Direct Member of GRS	1
UMNO	13
PBRS	–
DAP	4
PKR	2
UPKO	1
KDM	2
PAS	1
Warisan	14
Total	79 (73 + 6 nominated assemblymen)

CRITICAL ISSUES AT PLAY

As Sabah gears up for the upcoming election, many issues are expected to come to the forefront, with most revolving around infrastructure and the state’s autonomy.

Infrastructure

On the issues of infrastructure and development, many voters compare the state with its neighbour Sarawak, noting that the latter is advancing faster in infrastructure development and new sectors such as digital economy and renewable energy. In terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Sabah’s GDP in 2022 was RM81.9 billion compared to Sarawak’s RM140 billion in 2023. When it comes to income per capita, Sabah’s was RM36,020 in 2022, compared to Sarawak’s RM80,857 in the same year.

The clearest indication of this disparity is the development of the Pan Borneo Highway. In Sabah, the progress of the Pan Borneo Highway is painfully slow, affecting investor confidence. It is also blamed for the high unemployment and poverty rates in Sabah. Overall, the progress of the Pan Borneo Highway in Sabah is 87 percent under Phase 1A of the project, while Phase 1B is still ongoing, with the government now initiating an open tender for contractors to apply under Phase 1B to manage the project. In contrast, the Pan Borneo Highway in Sarawak is now 98.91 percent completed.

The GRS-led government is also criticised for frequent electricity disruptions. This has led some to question the government’s seriousness in addressing poor infrastructure and the availability of basic amenities to attract more local and foreign investors.

Sabah also suffers from a lack of water supply, with a report indicating that the proportion of residents with access to safe drinking water is far lower than the national average. When the water problem affected a local public university — Universiti Malaysia Sabah – a group of students staged a demonstration in front of the Higher Minister of Education Zamry Kadir on January 8, 2024, during his visit to the university. This prompted Prime Minister Anwar to instruct the relevant parties to submit a report regarding the problem at the university, despite the government having approved RM3 million to resolve the issue. On June 14, 2024, another group of students along with local NGOs, staged a demonstration in front of the chief minister’s office. The demonstration received wide publicity but was dismissed by some government leaders as politically motivated.

On the issues of infrastructure and development, many voters compare the state with its neighbour Sarawak, noting that the latter is advancing faster in infrastructure development and new sectors such as digital economy and renewable energy.

If not handled well by GRS, these basic issues could potentially become tools weaponised by the opposition.

Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA 63)

The MA63 remains a highly contentious issue in Sabah, particularly regarding the 40 percent entitlement that the state government claims has been unpaid by the federal government since 1974. Under Article 112C and Section 2 in Part IV of the Tenth Schedule of the federal constitution, Sabah is entitled to receive this revenue. This refers to the total revenue collected by the federal government from Sabah, after deducting any expenditure or expenses incurred by the federal government in generating that revenue. These include direct taxes like income and corporate tax, customs and excise duties, fees for licenses and permits, charges for federal services, royalties from natural resources, and other indirect taxes. State leaders argue that this entitlement is crucial for Sabah’s economic development and that it is the federal government’s responsibility to fulfill this obligation.

However, the GRS government under Hajiji has been criticised for not exerting enough pressure on the federal government to secure the payment, and for preferring instead to work alongside the federal government. Hajiji realises that without the support of the federal government, it would not be easy to extract concessions. He does not want history to repeat itself, where a confrontational approach would only jeopardise the state’s chances of getting what it wants from the federal government.

GRS, under the leadership of Hajiji, has reaffirmed its support for Pakatan Harapan, stating that “people are more confident about a tie-up between GRS and PH ahead of the state election”. The focus on the collaboration between GRS and PH is intense as observers keenly watch whether GRS can secure prime minister Anwar Ibrahim’s commitment to fulfilling the state’s demands under MA63. There is speculation as to whether Anwar will reciprocate Hajiji’s efforts, and whether Hajiji would consider aligning with other political factions should Anwar fail to meet these expectations as the state election looms.

Doubts about GRS’s commitment to pursuing the 40 percent entitlement continued to grow when a government-appointed lawyer argued that the Sabah Law Society’s (SLS) lawsuit against the federal government over the 40 percent revenue rights was unnecessary, claiming that the state government was actively engaged in discussions with the federal authorities. This stance led to public backlash and accusations of GRS’s lack of seriousness in pursuing Sabah’s 40 percent entitlement. The controversy resulted in the lawyer’s dismissal, with the State Attorney-General’s Chambers taking over the representation in the legal challenge at the Court of Appeal. How GRS handles the MA63 issue and the 40 percent entitlement will be closely scrutinised, and has the potential to be a significant point of contention for the opposition.

POTENTIAL SCENARIOS

The upcoming election in Sabah is unpredictable. However, several potential scenarios can be outlined based on current trends and likely political manoeuvres.

First and foremost, although it is anticipated that GRS will regain power, it is unlikely to be as strong as GPS in Sarawak, which can act independently in implementing major policy decisions for the state. Also, GRS is highly unlikely to expand its influence beyond the seats it currently holds. The coalition will also face significant challenges from UMNO and Warisan, particularly in Muslim Bumiputera areas.

As in past Sabah elections, GRS will likely leverage its incumbency and access to state resources to undermine its rivals. Meanwhile, UMNO’s and Warisan’s support is expected to remain relatively stable due to their strong grassroots networks and machinery. In the absence of any major popular issues that could weaken the ruling coalition and cause a major voter uprising, voters tend to favour the incumbent. The internal and structural challenges UMNO and Warisan face further discourage voters from shifting their allegiance.

The timing of the state election is a lingering question—it could be this year or next. However, Hajiji has strongly hinted that it could be held sooner rather than later. If the election is this year, Hajiji faces the possibility of GRS entering the election as a weakened coalition, which is risky. His other option is to delay the election until next year to build political support as widely as possible. However, this delay would also provide UMNO and Warisan the opportunity to regain their strength.

…although it is anticipated that GRS will regain power, it is unlikely to be as strong as GPS in Sarawak, which can act independently in implementing major policy decisions for the state.

The next question concerns alliances between parties and coalitions. Hajiji emphasised that GRS is comfortable working with Sabah PH, but not other parties. This reaffirmation follows GRS’s survival of the Kinabalu Move. Furthermore, Anwar Ibrahim praised Hajiji’s “political silat” for maintaining the stability of the Sabah government.

Following the failed attempt to overthrow the GRS-led government, questions have arisen about UMNO’s and Warisan’s next move. Contrary to numerous views predicting its downfall in Sabah, UMNO retains significant strongholds of support. Its influence in Sabah remains formidable, and rumours of its imminent collapse appear to be greatly exaggerated. UMNO’s loyal supporters are poised to uphold their support, which is crucial in securing the party’s continued significance in Sabah. Similarly, Warisan commands strong backing, especially along Sabah’s East Coast, where its charismatic leader, Shafie Apdal, is held in high esteem. Shafie’s extensive family ties and the many individuals who owe him loyalty provide a rock-solid base of support that shows no signs of faltering. Warisan is set to sustain its clout in this area, leveraging Shafie’s local reputation and loyal followers.

Will these two parties form a pact and continue to challenge GRS in the upcoming election? While conceivable, this alliance faces strong opposition from factions within UMNO and Warisan, which could derail their cooperation. Additionally, the decision to form a pact is not fully sanctioned by UMNO at the federal level, further complicating the situation. BN deputy chairman Mohamad Hasan stated that only the coalition headquarters can decide on cooperation with other parties in an election, despite UMNO in Sabah enjoying “administrative autonomy”. With the current factional war within UMNO widening and the decision to form a pact being made solely by the BN central leadership rather than the state, the chances of working with Warisan are now slimmer.

The political situation in Sabah remains highly unpredictable. One possibility is that GRS could choose to collaborate with Warisan, emphasizing local party or coalition solidarity. Alternatively, UMNO and PH could team up, leveraging their federal-level pact. Anwar’s reluctance to support Shafie’s return as chief minister suggests another scenario: GRS, UMNO, and PH might form a pact to eliminate Warisan as a contender. Finally, there is also the possibility that GRS, UMNO, PH, and other smaller parties in Sabah could compete in an open election, deciding on coalition memberships only after the election results are in.

The outcome of these elections will have far-reaching consequences for Sabah’s future. Should GRS maintain strong support from the federal government, a dominant, unified coalition could emerge to govern Sabah, similar to the political climate in Sarawak. However, unlike Sarawak, Sabah’s politics is less isolated and more vulnerable to the influence of Peninsular Malaysia’s politics, making it challenging for GRS to remain independent and to assure its allies and supporters that it can operate without federal intervention. This interdependence ensures that national trends and developments will continue to shape the state’s political environment. The ongoing interplay between local dynamics and federal influences will be a defining feature of Sabah’s political trajectory.

---

This is an adapted version of ISEAS Perspective 2024/67 published on 10 September 2024. The paper and its references can be accessed at this link.