The “Jokowi Factor”: How Joko Widodo Helped Prabowo to Win Indonesia’s Presidency

Analysts and political figures have argued that social media was key to Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto’s presumptive victory in Indonesia’s 14 February 2024 presidential election. His campaign team was certainly effective in deploying its strategies. By circulating catchy content such as Prabowo’s “gemoy” dance or “oke gas” song through TikTok and other social media platforms, Prabowo seems to have successfully won the hearts and minds of Indonesia’s youth, who comprise 56 per cent of Indonesia’s electorate. Meanwhile, others have argued that the Joko Widodo (Jokowi) factor was pivotal, citing numerous initiatives undertaken by Jokowi to support Prabowo’s electoral bid, which included ramping up the distribution of social assistance to the needy in the lead-up to the election.

This article argues that despite the importance of Prabowo’s social media campaign, his success would not have been possible without Jokowi’s intervention. The evidence is clear. Prabowo conducted months of formidable social media campaigning, including spending Rp8.67 billion (about US$550,000) on advertisements on Meta platforms between August and October 2023 (before official campaigning and the formal nominations of the three presumptive candidates’ vice presidential running mates). Notably, the tide of potential votes shifted significantly in Prabowo’s favour only after he officially registered as a candidate alongside Jokowi’s oldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, on 25 October 2023. Allowing Gibran to run as Prabowo’s running mate signalled Jokowi’s serious but tacit intent in supporting Prabowo.

This article argues that despite the importance of Prabowo’s social media campaign, his success would not have been possible without Jokowi’s intervention.

Before this, Prabowo and his rival, former Central Java governor Ganjar Pranowo, were neck and neck in terms of electability. According to a poll commissioned by the Indonesia Survey Institute (LSI) a week before Prabowo registered his candidacy with Gibran, Prabowo’s electability rating stood at 37 per cent, only slightly topping Ganjar’s 35.2 per cent.

However, a month after all the candidates registered, another LSI national survey showed that Prabowo-Gibran’s electability rose sharply to 45.6 per cent in December 2023 (up from 35.9 per cent in late October 2023). In contrast, Ganjar-Mahfud’s electability decreased from 26.1 per cent to 23.8 per cent. This indicates that some potential Ganjar voters shifted their votes to Prabowo-Gibran after Jokowi ostensibly endorsed Prabowo’s candidacy.

In what ways did Joko Widodo help Prabowo to win the election?

Most analysts highlight the efforts made by Jokowi closer to election day. Many point to his efforts to ramp up the distribution of social assistance, specifically visiting Ganjar’s home province, Central Java, conceivably to undermine the latter’s popularity there. Jokowi even announced raises for civil servants’ salaries, which was believed to significantly boost potential votes for Prabowo.

However, these analyses may have overlooked that voters’ increased support for Prabowo was possible also because of Jokowi’s efforts to maintain his own popularity through populist social initiatives and policies. Since assuming power in 2014, Jokowi has consistently maintained his practice of interacting with Indonesians through countless impromptu visits (colloquially known as blusukan) nationwide. Although Jokowi is a pro-investment and developmental president whose stance on forging ahead with large infrastructural projects has sometimes disadvantaged the poor or disenfranchised, as exemplified by the recent eviction of poor residents in Rempang Island in the Riau Islands province to facilitate an eco-city development project, he has also aggressively implemented populist initiatives to cushion the impact of the more unpopular ones. These included handing out “basic necessity” (sembako) packages comprising rice, palm oil, other essentials, and even non-essential items like T-shirts and bicycles.

This practice has struck a deeper chord with ordinary Indonesians, especially the rural poor and Indonesia’s large underclass. (Editor’s note: According to the Asian Development Bank, some 9.5 per cent of Indonesians lived below the poverty line in 2022.) Concerns of dynastic politics, nepotism, and corruption, which were at the centre of media attention, primarily captivated the attention of a limited, more educated segment of the Indonesian population. Ultimately, the current unofficial election results show that what mattered to voters was their sitting president’s populist tactics and the expectation that Prabowo and the president’s son, as vice president, would continue to give them handouts.

Additionally, Jokowi has introduced various social welfare programmes to support the poor, including the Indonesia Smart Card for education and the Indonesia Health Card for healthcare access to the underprivileged. An LSI survey released in December 2023 reaffirmed that Jokowi’s commitment to providing social assistance to the needy was the primary reason people praised him for his exceptional performance as president. Through phone interviews, LSI asked over 1,400 respondents nationwide about their views of the performance of presidential and vice-presidential candidates during their campaign debates, the candidates’ electability, and the government’s perceived neutrality in the election.

This combination of Jokowi’s populist social initiatives and related policies appealing to the poorer masses was pivotal in sustaining his high popularity throughout both terms of his presidency. This widespread popularity proved beneficial when he implicitly sought support from the electorate for Prabowo and Gibran. Even though Jokowi never openly declared his support for the pair, the president’s supporters and sympathisers understood the weight of his gestures. They rallied behind Prabowo, believing him to be the candidate most likely to continue with Jokowi’s policies and to ensure the Widodo clan is not left out in the political wilderness.

The final election results are scheduled to be officially declared only on 20 March 2024. Nevertheless, one recent Kompas survey revealed that significant numbers of Prabowo voters in 2024 had voted for Jokowi in 2019, comprising as much as one-third of Prabowo’s total voter base. This means those voters voted against Prabowo five years ago, underscoring Jokowi’s sway.

To sum up, without Jokowi’s intervention, Prabowo and Gibran would not have had such an easy win in last month’s election.

2024/71