The Myanmar Crisis and the Challenge of Maintaining ASEAN Consensus

As the Philippines assumes the ASEAN Chairmanship in 2026, the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) adopted in 2021 remains the central element of ASEAN’s response to the Myanmar crisis. However, ASEAN has struggled to reach collective agreement on ways to move forward with the implementation of the 5PC in Myanmar in the five years since the coup. A particular issue among member states is on engaging and recognising the junta as the legitimate government of Myanmar. In October 2021, ASEAN made the decision to exclude the junta’s leadership from attendance at high-level meetings owing to the junta’s poor implementation of the 5PC. Fervent objections from the junta notwithstanding, ASEAN member states (AMS) have demonstrated different interpretations of the consensus to avoid actions that could be seen as legitimising the junta. These differences continue to shape the bloc as it negotiates a response to the recent junta-organised ‘elections’ in Myanmar from December 2025.

These different interpretations highlight the challenges of maintaining ASEAN consensus in the Myanmar crisis. In her first meetings with the press this year, Philippine Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro reiterated ASEAN’s position on the crisis, stating after the ASEAN foreign ministers’ retreat that the decision to exclude junta leaders from high-level meetings stands and
“can only be changed by consensus”. However, it will be a difficult change to make in the current situation, given different views and interests of AMS in relation to Myanmar. While Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have stood by ASEAN’s collective decision limiting the junta’s presence at ASEAN high-level meetings, other member states have initiated and participated in efforts to engage with the junta separately to seek alternative avenues for the resolution of the crisis in Myanmar.

ASEAN’s expansion through the admission of Timor-Leste further complicates consensus-building by widening the range of political interests within the regional organisation. Against the backdrop of the Myanmar crisis, the expansion raises the question of the feasibility of insisting on decision-making by consensus without any alternative mechanisms. After all, many international and regional organisations have in place alternative decision-making mechanisms apart from consensus. More flexibility in decision-making has also been floated within ASEAN in the past, with suggestions for alternatives such as the ‘ASEAN-X’ mechanism to expedite economic integration and possibly extended to other issues, but without success thus far.

Reconsidering its principles of decision-making and the limits of consensus is important not just for ASEAN’s response to the Myanmar crisis, but also for the organisation more broadly.

Beyond considering alternative decision-making rules and mechanisms to enable progress on contentious issues, the Myanmar crisis suggests that ASEAN needs to consider elucidating the limits of the practice of consensus and to reinforce other norms and principles in the ASEAN Charter. Article 20, which codifies consensus and consultation as the fundamental principle for decision-making, provides that issues should be referred to the ASEAN Summit where there is a serious breach of the Charter. However, as the Summit comprises Heads of State or Government of AMS, it is unclear whether or how consensus should be applied in instances where there are disagreements. Even though sovereignty, equality and non-interference are fundamental norms and values in ASEAN, Article 2 of the ASEAN Charter also codifies other principles and values such as the commitment to enhance regional peace, security and prosperity, as well as adherence to the rule of law, good governance and constitutional government. These commitments should be further reinforced within the regional grouping.

Even as equality among members remains vitally important, there is a need to interpret the commitments made in the ASEAN Charter as a whole and to clarify its application of different norms, rules and principles. Doing so would enable ASEAN to build a clearer, more unified position on the Myanmar crisis, improving its internal cohesion in the long run as well as enhancing its credibility as a regional community. While internal fault lines have hindered progress in ASEAN’s response to the Myanmar crisis, clarifying and reinforcing the commitments to principles made within ASEAN can highlight what the regional organisation should do and align AMS’ positions behind the regional bloc.

The decision to exclude political representatives from a member state or disregard its objections is unprecedented in ASEAN’s history, whether in handling the Rohingya refugee crisis, conflicts between AMS or other instances of coups and domestic instability in the region. This suggests some willingness in ASEAN to take the necessary steps toward clarifying the practice of consensus. Reconsidering its principles of decision-making and the limits of consensus is important not just for ASEAN’s response to the Myanmar crisis, but also for the organisation more broadly. The members of ASEAN have a diverse range of interests arising from their varying circumstances; the Myanmar crisis is not the only issue within ASEAN that faces deep-seated disagreements among AMS. ASEAN has faced its fair share of criticism and scepticism regarding its ability to bear weight on difficult issues, particularly those involving member states’ domestic affairs, and it will likely continue to face challenges to its unity. Emphasising and building up core principles and values in the ASEAN Charter beyond non-interference and sovereignty will bring the region further towards building the ASEAN Community and fostering ASEAN unity in the long run.

2026/125