The Narrative Battle for Malay Muslim Support: PAS’ Exclusivist Dominance vs Madani’s Administrative Tactics

INTRODUCTION

Since 2022, partisans and observers alike have asked why the Madani federal government has been taking such an unconfrontational approach towards PAS and its narratives.

The question is entirely understandable. The PAS-dominated Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition holds 4 states, and PAS alone holds more seats in the federal parliament than any other single party. So threatening is its position that both the Malay Muslim-dominated parties of the Madani super-coalition — Keadilan and UMNO — are keen to appear entirely aligned with PAS on policy matters related to Islam and Muslims. Furthermore, Madani has shown it wishes not to rebut PAS politically, but to manage PAS’ impact using soft-touch public tactics combined with “administrative” measures that restrict its freedom to operate. This approach might hamper PAS’ freedom of action, but it gives the party an unprecedented opportunity to experiment with its messaging. It has grabbed this opportunity with creativity and enthusiasm.

PAS, however, is in a complicated position of its own, and might yet squander its narrative advantage. Its current narratives are exclusionary. While they work well to force Madani to stay in line and are suited for bargaining with future coalition partners, they also detract from PAS’ efforts to communicate with voters beyond its existing base. As a result, it has alienated non-Muslims, along with that proportion of the Malay Muslim electorate that baulks at its priorities. Its public communications professionals are aware of the problem and are working on ways to expand the party’s audience in case it is forced to change its approach.

And yet, PAS leaders consistently make chauvinistic statements that thwart these professionals’ desire for communications discipline. The result is that PAS is now openly grappling with its position on racial and religious minorities’ place in the nation. Its leaders’ statements cast these minorities as threats to Malay and Muslim power, arguing for their rights and freedoms to be stripped on the one hand; while, on the other, seeking to reassure them that they would be safe under PAS rule. In the process, it both threatens and fails to reassure these very same minorities, leaving many Malaysians concerned that PAS is really seeking co-option into an “Islamic unity” government with some or all parts of Anwar’s Madani coalition.

To discuss this conundrum, this article draws on media reports, the academic literature, and a series of 50 in-depth discussions with a wide range of political actors from across the political spectrum, spread out over six months from July to December 2024.

PAS – AN UNSTOPPABLE FORCE

The Malaysian political advocacy scene hosts a variety of minority non-Muslim ethnic and religious “community leaders” engaged in interfaith discussions and representation work. One institution these leaders work in is the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism and Taoism (MCCBCHST) – an interfaith organisation that defends non-Muslims’ rights and interests.

“They’re all in cahoots with each other,” one community leader said over tea and snacks in August 2024. By “they,” he meant the Malay Muslim-dominated parties in Malaysia’s federal parliament. His view was that they all intend to Islamise the state, along with the rest of the nation’s public and private institutions, the public sphere, and even private behaviour. “That’s why nobody is checking the PAS narratives. They compete at election time but then they just unite to push it through… They say we’ll protect you, but then they bring in the very same stuff.”

Such leaders fear being isolated and rejected by these parties, who always have the option of teaming up against them, including when they argue against Islamisation measures. Such measures include the Federal Territories Mufti Bill, which, if passed, could make the Mufti’s pronouncements binding without parliamentary oversight or the risk of prosecution for the officeholder. So, when these leaders perform their advocacy on minorities’ behalf, they frame their arguments entirely legalistically. “We can’t give them room to say we’re attacking Islam. We must always stick to the constitution,” the leader continued, reflecting an approach that is widespread among civil society actors.

These leaders’ concerns are justified. Their circle of representatives was recently accused of “Islamophobia” regardless of its members’ careful work framing their arguments. The MCCBCHST argued in September 2024 against the government placing officers from the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM) in every government department for fear they would intrude into non-Muslims’ affairs. Its statement was condemned as Islamophobic by PAS and Madani spokespeople alike.

Three months later, a retired UMNO leader confirmed these leaders’ judgment, offering his own view that Madani was not prepared to distance itself from PAS and its public statements. This leader has played a vastly different role in the nation’s political debates from that of the MCCBCHST, and for his Malay nationalist credentials, he is frequently sought out by up-and-coming MPs from UMNO and its splinter parties like Bersatu. “I wouldn’t know how to handle PAS,” he said. “We can’t combat them.”

When asked how Madani proposes to manage PAS if not by combating them, the UMNO veteran offered, “it’s best to do it administratively.” “I know they’re moving in a terrible direction,” he continued. “But we can’t do much. … Nobody can control them.” He elaborated, “if you try, you may end up being the victim.”

THE MADANI RESPONSE I: ADMINISTRATIVE TACTICS

As the two vignettes above demonstrate, Malay Muslim political actors will not robustly rebut PAS’ messages because they fear that they might not be able to withstand a potential PAS counterattack on their Islamic credentials. In contrast, the “administrative” approach involves using the bureaucratic state to reshape incentives and behaviours, and tame, weaken, co-opt, or contain political opponents. Its methods include redirecting funds in ways that might be justified, including on anti-corruption grounds, while ensuring that the redirection concerned happens to disadvantage political opponents.

One commentator, Bridget Welsh, accused Madani of doing exactly that in 2023, when it scaled back MP’s local development funds from RM 3.8 million to RM 1.3 million – a cut of more than 65 per cent. The government has since tasked government departments with delivering local outcomes and improvements that MPs once used those funds to deliver. Welsh, however, argued that access to such funds promotes local engagement between MPs and citizens, and the measure is therefore a political attack on the opposition. And yet allowing too much discretionary spending is also known to blur the lines between parties and governments, candidates and outcomes, thereby enabling parties to present local cash grants as gifts from candidates, not to mention siphon funds into party structures. For this reason, other observers praise the move. One such observer is a political consultant with ties to both PAS and Madani, who suggested over teh tarik in December 2024 that “Anwar is using the system to paralyse PAS,” he said. “PAS believes in pahala (divine merit),” he continued. “But when they come into the system, they learn the money tricks.” The consultant was suggesting that PAS was indeed using local cash grants to strengthen its grassroots party work – and deliberately associate the cash with the party and its candidates – but is now unable to do so.

Other relevant tactics include using soft prosecutions for transgressing certain taboos that are politically difficult for any party to oppose, such as “insulting” a royal leader. For example, in July 2023, the Madani federal government charged Kedah’s PAS Chief Minister, Sanusi Nor, with sedition after he allegedly insulted the Selangor Sultan in a speech. Sanusi, who has a reputation for controversial and populist statements, pleaded not guilty, but nevertheless apologised to the Sultan in September 2024 and promised to be more careful in future, effectively accepting a form of soft discipline issued by the state.

Sanusi has volubly asserted he is also frequently subjected to government figures using their federal position and powers to stifle investment and revenue generation options in PAS-held states. In December 2024, for example, he accused Anwar’s government of actively sabotaging his efforts to attract investment into Kedah, including in relation to the now-failed Langkasuka development project, which had aimed to build a 1,000-acre, eagle-shaped floating city next to Langkawi Island. Sanusi is not the only Chief Minister to have made such claims, and states governed by UMNO and Anwar’s coalition Pakatan Harapan (PH) have also complained about limited revenues. In such cases, the federal centre’s use of federal-state power imbalances to manage political opponents has a long history and is a reminder of how effectively federal governments have used similar “administrative” tactics throughout Malaysian history.

Their history and popularity aside, however, there is only so much such tactics can do to manage PAS narratives today, especially when delivered by a ruling coalition purportedly committed to democratisation. Indeed, pushing too far with administrative measures runs the risk of delivering – or being accused of delivering – an unfair bureaucratic crackdown. Furthermore, PAS is not a fringe organisation, nor can it be described as “extremist,” given that it has operated in the Malaysian political mainstream since 1951. Any such unfairness, or seeming unfairness, is likely therefore to trigger a voter backlash. As a former PAS politician mentioned in his office in August 2024, “PAS is part of Malays’ political socialisation. It is embedded in Malay society. We cannot marginalise it.” He continued, “we actually have to work with PAS to keep it in the mainstream,” implying that any crackdown could push at least some of its supporters into less mainstream activities conducted outside the electoral system in which they are presently focused.

In any case, even if administrative restrictions are delivered with precision, they still leave PAS having the upper hand in the battle of narrative development now taking place as the next round of state and federal elections draws closer. As the discussion above shows, actors across the political spectrum ascribe to PAS a near-monopoly on the power to craft and control national narratives about Islam, including how Malaysia should be governed, and how its Muslim majority should treat its non-Muslim minority. This monopoly forces Madani into line.

… actors across the political spectrum ascribe to PAS a near-monopoly on the power to craft and control national narratives about Islam, including how Malaysia should be governed, and how its Muslim majority should treat its non-Muslim minority. This monopoly forces Madani into line.

THE MADANI RESPONSE II: POLITICAL HEDGING

Based on the discussions outlined above, Madani’s collective view is that PAS cannot be beaten, only managed – and softly, at that. The Madani-PAS contest is being conducted through silent bureaucratic tactics, while in public, the Malay Muslim-dominated parties maintain policy positions that minority community leaders cannot distinguish from each other, leaving them feeling cynical and disillusioned. However, there might also be another consideration at work behind Madani’s preference for administrative combat. This is that all these parties are keeping their collaborative options open; so why would they commit to public narrative contestation at this stage in the electoral cycle?

The Madani-PAS contest is being conducted through silent bureaucratic tactics, while in public, the Malay Muslim-dominated parties maintain policy positions that minority community leaders cannot distinguish from each other, leaving them feeling cynical and disillusioned.

At present, there are two options for potential political realignment before the election in 2027. UMNO (or, conceivably, Keadilan) could split from Madani to join PAS in PN; or PAS could leave PN to join Madani’s forces, with or without UMNO. “Everyone hates UMNO,” the consultant pointed out. “But if everyone joined together,” he continued, “the problem of the Malay majority would be solved.” “And if PAS joins Anwar,” he elaborated, “we will also be able to solve the Sarawak problem.” This “problem,” as the consultant called it, consists of Sarawak politicians and NGOs demanding a better position for their state in relation to the federal centre and the peninsular states within the Malaysian federation, as a condition of their support for Anwar and Madani. Sabah has also recently adopted this approach, arguing, as Sarawak has, that the 1963 Malaysia Agreement should have guaranteed it a more powerful position all along. UMNO’s decline, and Malaysia’s new political fluidity and competition, have put these states in a powerful position to demand rights they claim were always theirs.

There is, at this point, no formal statement of intent that PAS, Anwar, or UMNO desires a new political realignment. Nevertheless, parties are beginning to informally signal their positions ahead of the next round of state elections beginning with Sabah in late 2025, and the next federal election, most likely in 2027. Whatever happens next, given the types of conversations that politicians and their staffers are conducting as they calculate their political options, Malaysia’s political environment is now such that everyone knows everyone, all competitors had previously been collaborators, and alliances may easily switch again.

In this climate, Madani’s administrative tactics keep PAS hungry for public money, and ambitious for power, leaving its leaders tempted to join Anwar’s forces as their only route to Putrajaya. Yet, they also keep PAS viable and competitive in the narrative domain, also leaving UMNO, in particular, with a permanent competitor. This way of thinking leaves both parties suitably weakened, and Anwar remains in control.

THE RESULT: NARRATIVE ADVANTAGE IS PAS’ ASSET TO SQUANDER

Whether Madani’s tactics stem from concern about repercussions, deliberate hedging, or indeed from Machiavellian design, PAS has the narrative momentum at present. It remains in a strong position to produce new messages about Islam, Malay Muslims, the nation’s minorities, and the respective place and prominence each of these elements should occupy in the nation.

From its vantage point in the four northern states, PAS is tapping into a broad public sense of unease after the 2018 election – when Pakatan Harapan, with former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, won power in a historic election upset, only for their coalition to collapse in 2022. That government, just like today’s Madani government, features the largely Chinese-supported Democratic Action Party, and this allows for PAS to portray both as proof that Islam and Malays face powerful domestic enemies that they must confront together. According to a PAS media communications professional, whose tea and snacks we both neglected to consume, while some debate is reasonable, Malay Muslims should unite to show these enemies that they are the nation’s “tunjang,” or mainstay.

In this spirit, PAS has surged into the domain of culture, heritage, history, and historiography. After identifying TikTok as a key battleground in 2022, PAS’ force of cybertroopers pounced on a surge of interest in Malay history after intellectual fellow travellers, Studio Kembara, released the blockbuster hit film Mat Kilau that same year. This intervention was essential to PAS’ Green Wave success. “Previously, we were boring,” the communicator explained, “and seen as anti-hiburan (entertainment).” When PAS realised, however, that it could artfully work the history surge to its advantage, the result was “boom, kita meletup (we exploded).” Granted, they are not in government, but “kerajaan goyang (the government shook).”

Indeed, now PAS has such a strong advantage as cultural defenders that it has a chance of displacing mainstream national history narratives about Malaysia’s decolonisation, including by deploying and developing Kedah’s claim to re-absorb Penang. Kedah’s PAS Chief Minister, Sanusi Nor, has stated he will soon release a report drawing on colonial sources to show that Kedah is entitled to a greater share of revenues from neighbouring Penang. He even argues that Penang Island, which the Kedah Sultan first made available to the East India Company in 1786, beginning its process of evolution into a separate Malaysian state today, should return to Kedah’s control.

It is not clear whether PAS will continue only working this ground to its advantage or aim to break its geographical constraints in the north, including by seeking to appeal to voters outside its existing political base. Should PAS aim for more than simply strengthening the north against the rest of the country, indeed if it aims to win federal power outside a coalition with Madani, then it must find ways to develop new audiences. The PAS communicator clearly perceives the tension between these two positions.

“I’m not an ustad (religious teacher), he said. “It’s good for us to have people who aren’t so preachy, I understand that” he continued. At the same time, he outlined, he has PAS members asking him why they are not more steadfast in their responses to the Madani government. “Because we can’t just shout our angriness,” he answered, suggesting an awareness that PAS can frighten observers, especially non-Malay, non-Muslim observers. “We must better handle some people on our own side. The ustads and the scholars must have some discipline… PAS has to manage that,” he concluded.

CONTINUING THE NARRATIVE BATTLES

PAS has turned its mind to attracting minorities in the past, developing slogans such as “PAS For All,” and deemphasising its desire for an “Islamic state” while highlighting its interest in developing a “welfare state” for all the nation’s citizens instead. It is, however, difficult at this point to imagine how these slogans could connect with national minorities.

The political incentives remain strong for PAS to cross-market, and even produce, new narrative products that retell Malaysia’s historical stories to its political advantage. As a result, it is near impossible for it to simultaneously develop convincing arguments that it will protect national minorities and their rights as citizens.

In these conditions, it is no wonder that minority community leaders remain suspicious that PAS’ chances of combining with Madani forces remain stronger than its chances of winning Putrajaya without that collaboration. While these leaders’ reactions might irritate Madani, their fears and suspicions are not without foundation.

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This is an adapted version of ISEAS Perspective 2025/20 published on 12 March 2025. The paper and its references can be accessed at this link.