The Puzzle of Rodrigo Duterte’s Popularity during the Covid-19 Pandemic 

Rodrigo Duterte stands out as one of the most popular presidents in the history of the Philippines, but some initial studies show that all that glitters might not be political gold. If this is indeed true, it may have a bearing on other populist politicians, particularly his daughter Sara Duterte, who is said to be eyeing the country’s top job.

The straight-talking leader has a mixed record. Despite winning the 2016 election with only 34 per cent of the votes, his approval ratings skyrocketed to hover around 80 per cent throughout his tenure (2016-2022). This occurred amid a presidency marked by numerous controversies, including a brutal “war on illegal drugs” and attacks on democratic institutions like the judiciary and the media. During the Covid-19 pandemic, Duterte imposed one of the longest and most militarised lockdowns in the world. 

Various explanations for Duterte’s popularity have been put forward to make sense of this puzzle, including his charismatic personality, straightforward leadership style, non-Tagalog-speaking ethnic ties, and a sense of disillusionment with traditional elites. However, our recent research proposes an alternative explanation that hinges on the possibility of survey respondents “pretending to support” Duterte when confronted by canvassers.

In reality, many voters may be sophisticated strategists. Rather than being delusional, they may be intentionally deceiving the interviewers.

This alternative perspective was hinted at by several analysts when Duterte scored a remarkably high approval rating during the peak of the Covid-19 pandemic. Despite a lacklustre performance in controlling the virus’s spread, his approval rating soared to 91 per cent in the survey conducted in September 2020. Political commentators suggested that respondents might have provided “safe answers” to canvassers, hinting at the potential for preference falsification or social desirability bias (SDB). Preference falsification refers to the act of concealing one’s true preferences due to fear or shame, and SDB is an equivalent term specifically used in survey research.

To investigate this, we conducted a survey experiment employing the list experiment (also known as an item count experiment), a methodology often used to probe politically or socially sensitive topics. We conducted face-to-face surveys with 1,200 respondents and an online survey with 4,000 respondents between 22 February and 3 March 2021.

Our primary finding indicates that Duterte’s high approval rating was significantly inflated due to preference falsification. Specifically, SDB-induced over-reporting amounted to about 39.5 percentage points in face-to-face surveys and 28.3 percentage points in online surveys. To put it differently, in face-to-face surveys, when respondents were directly asked if they approved of President Duterte’s performance, approximately 89.7 per cent expressed support, but the list experiment revealed that respondents who genuinely supported him were about 50.2 per cent. In the case of online surveys, the figures were 80.8 per cent and 52.5 per cent, respectively. While some may perceive our SDB detection as unusually high, it is worth noting that a comparable list experiment conducted in late 2021 among Metro Manila respondents (N = 300) yielded a similar level of SDB.

Our analysis also identified several conditions or subgroups associated with a higher degree of SDB. One such condition is “social conformity pressure”: respondents who believed Duterte was popular in their community (barangay) were more likely to feign support. The estimated overreporting was 45.0 percentage points in the face-to-face survey and 39.7 percentage points in the online survey. Our result corroborates with an existing study that focused on Metro Manila respondents.

Another notable finding was that respondents from lower socio-economic backgrounds exhibited higher SDB levels than those from more affluent strata. A sizable amount of SDB — 42.8 percentage points — was attributed to lower-class respondents, while SDB was nearly zero among upper-class respondents. We surmise that the fear of losing government subsidies or “ayudas” may explain higher SDB among the poor.

Surprisingly, our data revealed that respondents from Mindanao exhibited the highest degree of SDB compared to those in Luzon and Visayas. When asked, 95.2 per cent answered that they supported Duterte. But the genuine level of support was 22.8 per cent. This indicated that the SDB in the province was 72.5 percentage points. In Luzon and Visayas, expressed levels of support were 88.3 per cent and 86.9 per cent respectively, with genuine levels of support at 56.7 per cent in Luzon and 64.6 per cent in Visayas. This meant that SBDs in the two regions were lower, at 31.5 and 22.2 percentage points respectively.  This regional discrepancy may be attributed to the stronger pressure to conform to Duterte-imposed form of morality. Before being elected as president, Duterte served as the mayor of Davao City, the largest city in Mindanao, for more than two decades and was allegedly involved with the local vigilante group Davao Death Squad. 

These results challenge the conventional understanding of Duterte’s popularity and should be interpreted with certain caveats. They provide only a snapshot of voter sentiments during a specific time when the Covid-19 pandemic exerted substantial influence on society and the economy. It is plausible that Duterte was genuinely popular when he began his presidency in 2016. Further, even with a 50 per cent approval rating as of early 2021 (the time of our survey), he could still be considered a popular president. 

Overall, however, our study questions the dominant narrative that Rodrigo Duterte enjoyed unwavering popularity as suggested by polls.  This study also challenges the stereotype of Filipino voters as uninformed or unintelligent voters. In reality, many voters may be sophisticated strategists. Rather than being delusional, they may be intentionally deceiving the interviewers.

The Philippines’ once phenomenally popular president, Duterte, seems to have faltered in creating an enduring and robust support base on a national scale, as a recent face-off between the former president and Congress indicates. Perhaps more importantly, if we extrapolate from our findings, such a base may never have existed. This has significant implications for his daughter and the current vice president, Sara Duterte, who recently saw a dip in her approval ratings. More research is needed to confirm whether the father’s inflated popularity is also extended to her, especially in light of her presidential ambitions in 2028.

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