The Resurgent Role of the Monarchy in Malaysia

INTRODUCTION

The unique system of monarchy in Malaysia consists of three distinct but inter-related institutions – the Conference of Rulers, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (the federal Monarch), and the Rulers of the nine Malay states. A proper understanding of the role of the monarchy requires an appreciation of the distinct but intimately connected role of all three august institutions.

For the first 60 years of independence, the monarchy at the federal level operated largely along the lines of the British Westminster system. At the state level, however, there were currents and crosscurrents between the imported and the indigenous. Constitutional conventions, which in the UK converted an absolute monarchy into a constitutional one, often worked in the opposite direction in Malaysia. Constitutional limits on power were often interpreted in the light of historical perceptions and practises. Added to this is the legal situation that in some areas like the appointment of a chief minister, the hereditary state Sultans are empowered by their state constitutions to wield greater power than the elected monarch at the federal level.

As in other countries, the Malaysian Constitution has reacted to the tides of history. After the bloody racial riots of 1969, several constitutional amendments were introduced to strengthen the role of the Malay monarchs as defenders of Islam and Malays’ special position. But during the Mahathir years (1981-2003), the monarchy suffered a serious decline of powers, privileges and immunities. The Sultans waited out the Mahathir era, which ended in 2003, after which the monarchy – especially at the state level – began to assert itself.

In the General Elections of 2008 and 2013, the once omnipotent ruling Barisan Nasional coalition could not recapture its two-thirds majority. After the 2013 election, the 1MDB scandal exploded and contributed to the decline of UMNO and the fall of the Barisan Nasional behemoth in the General Election of 2018. However, the successor Pakatan Harapan government under Mahathir did not last long due to political infighting and party-hopping in 2020. The resulting political instability was worsened by the COVID-19 crisis that crippled the economy. The nation needed, but lacked, a stable government with bold visionary leadership. At this juncture, the then Yang di-Pertuan Agong, the Sultan of Pahang, with the assistance of the Conference of Rulers, navigated the nation through unchartered waters. He played an activist role in many aspects of government.

Between 2018 and 2023, the nation witnessed the rise of four Prime Ministers, the fall of three of them and the involvement of the Conference of Rulers and the King in many areas of governance normally left in the hands of the political executive. History may record these years as a turning point in the constitutional role of the monarchy in Malaysia.

Was this royal assertiveness a short-term, passing reaction to special challenges or will it endure to reshape Malaysia’s legal and political landscape? Does it have constitutional and political legitimacy? This requires an examination of the constitutional position of the three arms of the monarchical institutions in Malaysia.

THE CONFERENCE OF RULERS

Under the Federal Constitution, the Conference is invested with several constitutional functions which can impact on the rule of law, freedom of religion, multi-culturalism, position of Islam in the legal system, good governance, and the “social contract” between the races. The main functions of the Conference are the following:

• Election of the King and his Deputy.
• Dismissal of the King.
• Consenting to some types of legislation: The Conference has the power to veto federal legislation and constitutional amendments on ten critical topics regarded as “sensitive issues” of Malay politics.
• Right to be consulted on some critical constitutional appointments.
• Extension of any Islamic acts, observances or ceremonies to the Federation as a whole.
• Right to be consulted on policies relating to the special position of the Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak.
• Appointment of two judges to the Special Court to try brother Sultans.
• Granting pardons to brother Rulers and their consorts.

The Conference has the power to deliberate on questions of national policy and any other matter it thinks fit.

THE YANG DI-PERTUAN AGONG

One hundred and seventy provisions in the Federal Constitution confer on the federal King wide-ranging powers in relation to all three branches of state – the executive, the legislature and the judiciary.

• The Yang di-Pertuan Agong is the supreme head of the Federation. The executive authority of the Federation is vested in him.
• He is the head of Islam in five states and three federal territories.
• He constitutes the third wing of Parliament. He has the power to address Parliament. His assent is needed for a Bill to become law. He shall from time to time summon, prorogue or dissolve Parliament.
• He has the power to proclaim an emergency.
• He may promulgate Emergency Ordinances having the force of law.
• He is the Supreme Commander of the armed forces of the Federation.
• He has the power to make many critical constitutional appointments. Among the prominent ones are the appointment of the PM and the Cabinet, the Attorney-General, the 44 appointed Senators, the judges of the superior courts, the Auditor-General, the Election Commission, the Armed Forces Council, the Judicial and Legal Services Commission, the Public Services Commission, the Police Force Commission, and the Education Services Commission.
• He reserves quotas in respect of services, permits, etc. for Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak.
• He has a role in the drawing up of national development plans.

Most of these provisions are subjectively worded, and, if read literally (as is done by many loyalists), the words appear to confer subjective and discretionary powers on the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in the whole range of government functions. It is as if the country is ruled by an absolute monarch. Actually, the constitutional position is that most of the King’s powers are not personal prerogatives but exercisable under Article 40(1) and 40(1A) on the advice of the Prime Minister or other constitutional agencies. Unless the discretion is conferred explicitly or exists by necessary implication, the generic provisions of Articles 40(1) and 40(1A) must be grafted onto every constitutional or legislative provision that confers on His Majesty any power or function.

The overall constitutional position is that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong performs two categories of functions: (i) non-discretionary, where he has to act on advice, and (ii) discretionary which is subject to freedom of choice.

The overall constitutional position is that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong performs two categories of functions: (i) non-discretionary, where he has to act on advice, and (ii) discretionary which is subject to freedom of choice.

Non-discretionary functions

These are obligatory, non-elective, non-voluntary and requisite functions where the King must ultimately act on advice. These functions are of three types:

1. Functions exercisable on the advice of the Prime Minister under Article 40(1) and 40(1A). Most of the functions of the King under the Constitution and other laws fall under this non-discretionary category.

• Functions exercisable on the advice of the PM but after ‘consultation’ with the Conference of Rulers. ‘Consultation’ is not the same thing as consent. Nevertheless, the Conference is not a rubber stamp. It is known that its royal wishes often make, break or delay a decision. Despite Article 40(1), the King is unlikely to go against the wishes of his brother Rulers.
• Functions exercisable on the advice of other constitutional bodies: Among these are the Islamic Religious Affairs Council under Article 3(5), the Chief Justice of the Federal Court under Article 122(1A), and the Pardons Board under Article 42. Although the PM and the cabinet are not required to play any role in the exercise of these royal functions, the King is bound to the advice of these institutions on constitutionally specified matters.

Discretionary functions

The discretionary functions are those where there is freedom of choice. These are non-mandatory and non-obligatory functions divisible into two categories.

Where there is explicit conferral of discretion

The most important functions in this category are the following:

• The appointment of the Prime Minister. This is the most important, complex and controversial function. Though it is undoubtedly discretionary, the discretion is not absolute. The PM must come from the elected House. He/she must, in the King’s judgment, be likely to command the confidence of the majority of the elected House. He/she must not be a citizen by registration or naturalisation. Most scholars believe that at the federal level, the King’s discretion comes alive only if there is a “hung Parliament” or a loss of majority due to the death, defection, resignation or disqualification of MPs.
• The premature dissolution of the House of Representatives.
• The requisitioning of a meeting of the Conference of Rulers concerned solely with the privileges, etc, of Their Royal Highnesses.
• “Any other case mentioned in the Constitution”. This category is not defined or precisely explicated. One must scan the entire Constitution to determine “any other case mentioned in the Constitution”. A partial list would be: (i) the royal power to ask for any information from the government; (ii) the right to delay consent to legislation by 30 days;[54] (iii) the convening of the Malay Sultans for consultation and deliberation on any matter that the Sultans and the King think fit and necessary; (iv) constitutional appointments in the King’s discretion to the Public Service Commission, the Education Service Commission, the Election Commission, and the Governorship of the four States without Sultans.

Residual powers

In addition to the discretionary powers mentioned in Article 40(2), there are probably other instances in which residual, reserve, prerogative and inherent powers of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may come into play. Life is larger than the law and no Constitution is exhaustive or can anticipate every contingency. The residual power situations may be the following:

• Appointment of a caretaker government: The Constitution is silent on who manages the affairs of state during the dissolution of Parliament. Up to now, the British convention has applied that the incumbent PM will continue to lead the caretaker government. However, the appointment of a neutral, caretaker government during the dissolution of the elected House, though never done, is within the realm of possibility under Article 43(2).
• Dismissal of PM: This could occur if the PM refuses to resign even though he ceases to command the confidence of the House and his request for dissolution is refused.
• Grant of honours: The Federal Constitution, unlike State Constitutions, is silent on the matter of honours.
• Refusing consent to unconstitutional legislation passed in disregard of constitutional procedures. Constitutional amendments under Articles 1(2), 159(3), 159(5) and 161E require special procedures. If the government of the day submits a Bill for royal assent without compliance with constitutional procedures, it is conceivable that the Monarch may decline to follow the PM’s advice.
• Other unconstitutional conduct by the executive: In other situations of blatantly unconstitutional conduct by the political executive, the King may exercise his reserve power to safeguard the Constitution.

THE STATE RULERS

All nine Malay States have their own unique State Constitutions. However, all State Constitutions must contain some “essential provisions” prescribed by the Eighth Schedule of the Federal Constitution. These provisions require the Ruler to act on advice, appoint an Executive Council and have an elected state legislature.

Despite the requirement of conformity to some Westminster principles, the Constitutions of all nine Malay States contain features reflecting indigenous culture, history and royal traditions. All State Rulers have larger powers than the federal King over such matters as Islam, Malay custom, royal courts, and appointment of the Chief Minister. As to the appointment of a Chief Minister, we can refer to the Perak Constitution.

• The Chief Minister (CM) must belong to the Assembly.
• The CM must be a person who, in the opinion of the Sultan, is likely to command the confidence of a majority of the members of the Assembly.
• The CM must not be a citizen by registration or naturalization.
• No person shall be appointed to be the Chief Minister unless he is a Malay and professes the Muslim religion.
• These limitations can be dispensed with by a Ruler if he considers it expedient to do so. The Federal Constitution confirms this latitude. That is why there have been a few spectacular instances of royal assertiveness in this area in Terengganu and Perlis in 2008; Selangor in 2015; and Johor in 2022.

AN ENHANCED MONARCHY

The Mahathir years saw a significant decline in royal powers, position and prestige. But the spirals of history are in motion again. With the weakening of the political executive since 2020, there are power vacuums that the monarchy can and has filled significantly. Some remarkable instances of royal leadership, assertiveness and activism in the last few years are the following:

Appointment of PM: After the watershed results of GE 2018, the appointment of Tun Mahathir who was the acknowledged leader of the victorious Pakatan Harapan coalition, was delayed by the then Yang di-Pertuan Agong, the Sultan of Kelantan, because the Sultan preferred Dr Wan Azizah over Mahathir, as she was the leader of the largest faction in the victorious coalition.

After Mahathir’s resignation in 2020, the appointment of the next three federal PMs (Muhyiddin Yassin, Ismail Sabri and Anwar Ibrahim) was not inspired by electoral mandate or a vote of confidence in Parliament but was under royal discretion. In the face of a hung Parliament after GE15 in 2022, the then Yang di-Pertuan Agong (Sultan of Pahang) insisted that the government must be a unity government.

The present federal Monarch (Sultan of Johor) has declared that he wishes to keep government stability intact. This serves a notice to potential party-hoppers.

Emergency: There was an unprecedented royal refusal to declare emergency in Sept 2020. When in 2021 the Monarch did agree to proclaim an emergency, he insisted on several unprecedented provisions in the resulting Emergency Ordinance. First, that it must have a sunset clause terminating the proclamation on 1Aug 2021. Second, that there must be a Special Committee to advise him on emergency matters. The PM and the cabinet were not part of this Committee. Third, the discretion of the King in relation to the election and sittings of the State Assemblies will be with the consent of the State Rulers.

Later in 2021, when the PM advised the Monarch to revoke seven Emergency Ordinances, the Monarch refused and insisted that these must be scrutinized by Parliament first.

ICERD and the Rome Statute: These were opposed by the Conference and the King on the ground that they would undermine Islam, Malay special position and the position of the Rulers. Popular resistance backed the Rulers’ position, and the international treaties were jettisoned.

Appointments: There was refusal to appoint PM Ismail Sabri’s nominee as Ambassador to Indonesia. Recently, the PM’s advice to the King in early 2024 on the appointment of senior judges and members of the Judicial Appointments Commission was delayed by a few months. No one knows whether it was because of objections from the King or the Conference.

Legislative veto: Under Article 159(5), the Conference of Rulers has the power to veto legislation on 10 topics. An interesting view has developed that on these topics no Bill should even be introduced in Parliament without first being approved by the Conference. The legal position ought to be that the Conference has a veto power after a Bill is passed and not before it is introduced.

Press releases and public statements: During the reign of the Sultan of Pahang as King, a tradition of Press Statements by the Conference of Rulers and the King developed urging the government to undertake necessary initiatives. For example, in 2021 the King repeatedly and publicly urged PM Muhyiddin to convene Parliament.

Earlier this year, the Sultan of Johor, who was then the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in waiting, gave a frank interview to the Singapore Straits Times about his role during the next five years. His Majesty put forward the picture of a very activist and involved Monarch.

Citizens’ Proposals: Now and then, proposals are made to repeal some of the constitutional amendments enacted during the Mahathir years or to question their constitutionality either on the ground of procedural violation or a violation of the basic structure. These calls will now grow louder.

WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

Will the resurgence of royal power last? Much depends on numerous unpredictable and variable factors, among them the following:

Leadership: The quality and popularity of political leadership in the years to come is obviously relevant. So is the manner in which the monarchs and their families conduct themselves.Political instability: Due to the deeply divided electorate, overwhelming, two-thirds electoral majorities in Parliament are probably a thing of the past. Due to the imperfections in the anti-hopping law, defections are likely to continue. Though there is much talk of the emergence of a dominant all-Malay coalition, the Malay-based political parties seem deeply divided on the issue of leadership. Sabah-Sarawak are no more “fixed deposits” for the peninsula-based Malay ruling elites. The 56 Borneo MPs can play a significant role in the formation of the federal government. Geopolitics may also play a role. The increasing economic influence of China in Malaysia’s economy may fuel racist sentiments within sections of the Malay electorate.

Unless political stability returns, the powers of the monarchy will continue to grow. At the same time, the appointment of interim, minority, unity or coalition governments is likely to continue.

Unless political stability returns, the powers of the monarchy will continue to grow. At the same time, the appointment of interim, minority, unity or coalition governments is likely to continue.

Protectors: A very large number of Malays see the Rulers as protectors and defenders of Malay special position and of Islam and therefore deserving of unquestioning loyalty. The civil service, the police and even some judges associate with this view. As a result, many non-discretionary areas of the Constitution like the promulgation of emergency, the grant of pardon, the appointment of judges and top civil servants, are being interpreted as discretionary powers even though the Constitution can be interpreted to say otherwise.

Islam: The link between Islam and royal position is a source of power and legitimacy for the monarchs. But there are inherent challenges for those monarchs who attempt to moderate the extremist tendencies of religious groups and leaders. Much will depend on whether the ruling government will side with extremist populist pressures for electoral gain or team up with the Rulers to counsel moderation, tolerance and inclusiveness. Much will also depend on how united or divided the Rulers are on some contentious issues of Islam like the Federal Territory Mufti Bill, unilateral conversions, and civil-Shariah court disputes.

Loss of trust: Due to populist pressures, the government plays to the gallery whenever racial and religious disputes break the calm. The citizenry seems to have lost trust in most of the agencies of the state, and is turning to the monarchy for enforcing check and balance and for being healers and reconcilers of Malaysia’s increasingly polarized society.

Not just the Malays but also many non-Malays hold this view. Much depends on how vigorously the monarchy is willing to curb racial and religious intolerance, and admonish corruption, environmental degradation, gender discrimination, poverty and other issues of human rights and dignity. As mentioned above, Article 38(2) provides plenty of potential for royal leadership on matters of public concern.

Federal-state tensions: Many other developments like federal-state tensions (especially between the Peninsula and Sabah and Sarawak) and Shariah and civil court disputes necessitate an activist role for the Conference of Rulers and the King.

Commercial competition: The Yang di-Pertuan Agong’s involvement in commercial enterprise is nominally discouraged by the Constitution. At the state level, constitutional caution on this matter is even weaker. This puts the royals in occasional competition and conflict with other economic elites of society.

CONCLUSION

Unlike the monarchy in Brunei or Saudi Arabia, the King and the Sultans in Malaysia are constitutional monarchs. However, the political instability since 2020 has necessitated an activist role for them. As long as this political instability lasts, the need for the monarchy to provide a moderating and stabilising hand will continue to be felt. The federal, as well as the state Constitutions permit the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the State Sultans a measure of discretion in many areas. In addition, the Constitution’s Article 38(2) allows the Conference of Rulers to “deliberate on questions of national policy … and any other matter that it thinks fit”. Scrutiny by the Conference can supply some check and balance, and promote openness and transparency in government. There is some potential for influencing the nation’s goals and policies, and for promoting unity and reducing inter-ethnic and federal-state conflicts.

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This is an adapted version of ISEAS Perspective 2025/10 published on 11 February 2025. The paper and its references can be accessed at this link.