The Rise of Iran’s Third Rahbar, Mojtaba Khamenei, and Implications for Malaysia’s Shia Community

A significant segment of the Shia communities in Malaysia and Indonesia recognised the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as a principal authority in Islamic jurisprudence, in his dual roles of political leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Rahbar) and transnational spiritual guide for Twelver Shia (marja). The succession to the position of Iran’s Supreme Leader – not a dynastic one – by his second son Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei following his assassination raises questions regarding the implications for patterns of religious authority and communal orientation in Southeast Asia.  

While many Malaysian Shia followers of the late Khamenei have responded positively to Mojtaba Khamenei’s accession, the government of Malaysia has adopted a cautious stance, offering condolences while refraining from formally welcoming the new leadership. During deliberations in the Dewan Rakyat, Malaysian parliamentarians nevertheless condemned the military strikes on 28 February 2026 by the US and Israel against Iran. Interestingly, there has been considerable debate among netizens in Malaysia regarding whether Ali Khamenei may be legitimately regarded as having died a martyr, particularly given that Malaysian religious authorities have long upheld fatwas declaring Shia Islam to be a deviant sect.

In the aftermath of the ‘martyrdom’ of Ali Khamenei, the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran instituted a provisional governing arrangement while the process of electing a new Rahbar was underway. An interim leadership council was formed, comprising the Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian, the head of the judiciary Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i and a representative of the Assembly of Experts, Ayatollah Alireza Arafi. During this interregnum, Alireza Arafi was entrusted with the responsibilities of acting Rahbar.

Notably, Alireza Arafi had travelled to Malaysia to participate in the Second International Summit of Religious Leaders 2025, where he met Malaysia’s Minister for Religious Affairs, Mohd Na’im Mokhtar. In a statement disseminated through social media, Na’im characterised the meeting as one that “opened avenues to strengthen scholarly cooperation, expand networks in Islamic education, and deepen bonds of fraternity between Malaysia and the Islamic Republic of Iran”. Arafi’s brief sojourn afforded him the opportunity to engage with several prominent figures within the local Shia community.

Although Ali Khamenei did not publicly designate a successor prior to his death, reports suggested that he intimated a preference for someone whom the US and Israel would most vehemently oppose. On 8 March 2026, an official proclamation circulated throughout Iran confirming that Mojtaba Khamenei had been appointed as the third Rahbar of the Islamic Republic. The announcement reportedly elicited consternation from the US president.

Born in 1969, Mojtaba Khamenei participated in the Iran–Iraq War at the age of seventeen years, when his late father was president of Iran. In the post-war years, Mojtaba relocated to the clerical centre of Qom for advanced studies in Islamic jurisprudence. He steadily consolidated his reputation within Iran’s clerical milieu in subsequent decades, drawing substantial audiences to his lectures and seminars. Observers interpret the magnitude of his following as indicative of his status as a mujtahid, or jurist capable of independent legal reasoning. Therefore, Mojtaba was an eligible candidate for the office of Rahbar.

While many Malaysian Shia followers of the late Khamenei have responded positively to Mojtaba Khamenei’s accession, the government of Malaysia has adopted a cautious stance…

During the 28 February 2026 assault on Tehran, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei reportedly lost several immediate family members, which heightened his symbolic stature amid discussions of succession for the supreme leadership. He is known for his close ties with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and long-standing relations with regional figures such as the late general Qasem Soleimani and Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah.

Within the doctrinal parameters of Twelver Shia jurisprudence, the demise of a marja (the scholar whose legal opinions Shia believers emulate in matters of Islamic law) typically signifies the termination of the binding authority of his juridical rulings. A well-known precedent was set in 1988, however, when Ruhollah Khomeini issued a fatwa against Salman Rushdie, author of The Satanic Verses, a controversial novel which many Muslims perceived or alleged as having blasphemous representations of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. The fatwa threatened Rushdie’s life and even extended to individuals involved in the book’s translation and publication. Despite repeated international appeals urging its revocation, Ali Khamenei (as second Rahbar) maintained that the ruling was still valid because it had been promulgated by a marja whose authority transcended his physical death.

A more significant implication of this doctrinal principle concerns Ali Khamenei’s well-known fatwa prohibiting the development of nuclear weapons. With his passing, the normative binding force of that ruling may theoretically lapse. The third Rahbar – Mojtaba Khamenei – retains the prerogative to promulgate new juridical determinations that could potentially allow a broader Iranian engagement with nuclear technological capabilities.

The late Ali Khamenei maintained close ties with Shia communities in Southeast Asia during his lifetime; his conciliatory posture toward Sunni constituencies contributed to the resilience of Shia communities in the region, enabling the latter to persist despite facing considerable repression in recent years. Interestingly, many commentators portrayed him as relatively moderate only after his death. By contrast, Mojtaba Khamenei is often described as more austere and uncompromising, with limited exposure to the West, including its educational institutions. The new Rahbar’s intellectual orientation and prospective juridical rulings may significantly influence emerging generations of Shia in Southeast Asia. The broader implications of his leadership, however, are likely to emerge more gradually.

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