The Rules-based Order: In Dire Straits, But Not Dead

The US has been viewed as the bulwark of the global rules-based order for decades, even though, at times, it violated its own rules. Under President Donald Trump, Washington appears to have adopted much more self-interested policies. It behoves smaller states and middle powers to step up their efforts to maintain the robustness of the order.

An important reason for establishing the present international rules-based order after the end of the World War Two was to discourage a repeat of violations of territorial sovereignty of countries by powerful states which had led to that war. The League of Nations had been established for the same purpose after the World War One, but the US soon withdrew from it and turned inward towards isolationism. This characterised much of its pre-World War Two history. The League proved to be impotent in preventing a series of aggressions against sovereign states in the 1930s by Italy, Germany and Japan.

The World War Two ended with America emerging as the world’s strongest economic and military power. It resolved to avoid disengagement from the world. The perceived threat to US security from Soviet communism helped to sustain its determination. The US helped to create the new world order based on the rule of law and multilateral institutions, the politically most important of which was the United Nations (UN) whose Charter calls for the sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all states. This was not purely an act of altruism. It was also meant to serve US interests and facilitate US pre-eminence. For example, multilateralism was used to expand US influence in its Cold War contest with the Soviet Union. The new order was also used to promote American values of human rights and democracy. However, there was also enough idealism and good in the system to promote the well-being of other countries.

The US itself has been guilty at times of violating the rules it had created. It invaded Panama in 1989 to depose and arrest Manuel Noreiga. Mr Noriega, the president of the country, had been indicted by US federal grand juries for racketeering and drug trafficking. The invasion was condemned by the UN General Assembly and the Organization of American States. The then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan deemed the US invasion of Iraq to be illegal as it was done without the sanction of the UN.

… with the second Trump Administration, the world has entered a troubling new era in which international rule of law seems to be in jeopardy.

Yet, on the whole, the international rules-based system has survived and the US has remained an anchor of it because of its heft as a global superpower. For instance, China’s violation of international law in the South China Sea has been condemned by many countries and the US has been conducting freedom of navigation operations to register its opposition to what it deems to be the excessive Chinese maritime claims (and likewise the claims by other states deemed to be over-reaching). Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was met with condemnation by the United Nations General Assembly. To uphold the rules-based order, the Biden administration and European countries armed Ukraine to resist Russian aggression.

However, with the second Trump Administration, the world has entered a troubling new era in which international rule of law seems to be in jeopardy. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of this is Trump’s reversal of American policy on the Ukraine-Russia war. Trump has opposed calling out Russia for its aggression towards Ukraine, and has refused to provide any security guarantees to Ukraine while pressing it to sign a multibillion-dollar deal to exploit the country’s mineral resources. The US did a spectacular about-turn at the UN in February 2025 by joining Russia to vote against a resolution condemning Moscow for the invasion. These actions are undermining NATO and raising questions about the reliability of America as an ally or partner — particularly when narrow self-interest and transactionalism characterise US thinking.

Under Trump, the US seems to care only about the aggrandisement of America’s own economic and strategic power, not international law. Nor does it value soft power which will handicap it in its competition with China, as Beijing meticulously seeks to advance in all dimensions of power and influence. What can one say to China about its claims in the South China Sea or its coercive actions against other states, when the supposed guardian of the rules-based order, the US, threatens to take control of the Panama Canal if necessary by force and invade Greenland? Whether countries succumb to or resist Trump’s economic warfare or territorial threats, the stability of the international system will be adversely affected. Coercion and idiosyncratic policies will, in the longer term, turn countries away from the US. Some may move into China’s orbit to preserve their well-being.

It remains to be seen to what extent such policies will be used in East Asia, where the US faces the strategic challenge from China to its pre-eminence and how they will affect the regional balance of power.

All this is troubling but it should not be a cause for despair. It is not preordained that such policies will continue unmodified beyond Trump’s present term in office. After four years, there may be a return of a relatively more benign America under a different leadership.

Until then it should be in the interest of all states to strive to uphold the international order. Small states and middle powers should step up their bilateral and multilateral efforts to build peace, understanding and economic cooperation. They should also help to sustain the various existing multilateral institutions and endeavours. ASEAN is using its diplomatic and economic architecture to step up cooperation within the grouping and with outside powers. Without US backing, these actions might not be enough to shore up the faltering rules-based order or protect states entirely from coercion by the great powers. Still, the order is worth preserving — with or without the US.

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