Towards a Robust Philippines-Canada Security Partnership in the Indo-Pacific

On 2 November, Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro and Canadian Minister of National Defense David McGuinty signed the Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) in Manila. This was the first SOVFA Ottawa has signed with any Indo-Pacific nation. This crucial development in Philippines-Canada relations can be attributed to the evolving geopolitical dynamics in the region. For Canada, the Indo-Pacific has gained more relevance due to the supply chain disruptions brought by the Russia-Ukraine war, China’s increasingly coercive behaviour, and the reciprocal tariffs imposed by US President Donald Trump.

Since 2023, Philippine foreign policy has reflected ongoing efforts to secure its waters against China’s maritime assertiveness. This has required the Philippines to geographically expand its security partnership network with countries that share a common intent to preserve the rules-based maritime order of the Indo-Pacific and bolster its territorial defence capabilities. This includes countries such as Australia, India and Japan. Along with these factors, the Philippines and Canada are also US allies, albeit in different formats — the Philippine-US alliance is defined by the bilateral 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, while Canada and the US are bound by a broader collective defence alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Nevertheless, this familiarity with alliance politics and the shared adherence to democratic principles are additional motivations for the enhancement of their strategic relations. 

In September 2023, the Philippine and Canadian navies conducted a joint sail activity in the West Philippine Sea. The following month, Ottawa and Manila signed an agreement that granted the Philippines free access to Canada’s dark vessel detection (DVD) program. This is vital for Philippine maritime law enforcement agencies, especially since China Coast Guard (CCG) ships are well known for their practice of switching off their automatic identification system (AIS) when undertaking intrusive and disruptive activities in Philippine waters. 

Manila and Ottawa signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Defense Cooperation in January 2024, providing a roadmap for collaborative operations, including in the maritime domain. Since June 2024, Canada has participated in four multilateral maritime cooperative activities (MMCA) with the Philippines and other Indo-Pacific partners. The most recent MMCA was conducted on 4 September between the navies of Australia, Canada, the Philippines and the US. When the SOVFA becomes operational, it will reinforce the MoU of January 2024 and streamline military-to-military cooperation between the two countries. This would improve efficiency in relation to information sharing, joint-preparedness, and disaster-response operations.

The partnership must be institutionalised with regular Track 1.5 and 2 dialogues to increase the number of public and private stakeholders on both sides. These actors would eventually play a key role in maintaining the frequency of bilateral interactions.

However, there remain some challenges. First, Canada would need to operationalise its Indo-Pacific strategy prudently, given its limited resources and geographical constraints. While joint presence operations at sea are important, they should not be the sole focus of Canada’s security cooperation with the Philippines. Canada should selectively target key issue areas based on its existing strengths, such as cybersecurity and shipbuilding.

Given Canada’s robust cyber defence capabilities, it would be practical for Ottawa to take the lead in forging a comprehensive cybersecurity capacity-building framework with Manila, especially with the surge in cyber-related threats the Philippines continues to face. Additionally, Canada’s experience in building ships with reinforced hulls can significantly benefit the Philippines’ ambitions to become more self-reliant in its shipbuilding. This is particularly so in the face of the CCG’s aggressive manoeuvres at sea. While the US and South Korea are exploring ways to modernise the Philippines’ shipyard in Subic, Canada can contribute to improving the technical capabilities of Filipino shipbuilders through technology, skills, and training assistance.

Second, the Philippines and Canada should explore ways to broaden their bilateral partnership to the economic realm. There can be no holistic strategic cooperation without incorporating trade and investment. Canada has traditionally preferred working within multilateral institutions such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). With its commitment to multilateralism, the Philippines has renewed its interest in joining the CPTPP. If successful, both countries can use this trade mechanism to enhance their economic resilience.

Therefore, it would be practical for the Philippines and Canada to initiate negotiations for a potential preferential free trade area encompassing critical sectors where both nations can benefit. However, along with Canada’s efforts, the Philippines must also continue to improve its investment climate and make it more competitive vis-à-vis its other Southeast Asian neighbours, given how friendshoring has clear limitations.

Third, the alignment in security perceptions of state leaders has been one of the most important catalysts for contemporary improvement in bilateral ties. The problem, however, is that if perceptions fluctuate due to changes in governments or shifts in structural conditions, bilateral relations may take a step back. This was evident under the Duterte administration, which, because of its personal biases, undermined the Philippines’ longstanding relations with its Western partners and pivoted the Philippines closer to Beijing. Similarly, it is also a matter of concern whether the leadership in Ottawa would be willing to deal with such an administration in Manila (if it re-emerges). Additionally, if Canada eventually improves relations with the US and reaches a positive agreement with China, would there be a change in the momentum behind Ottawa’s strategy towards the Philippines and the Indo-Pacific?

Given all this uncertainty, it is vital to ensure sustainability amid potential long-term political shocks. The partnership must be institutionalised with regular Track 1.5 and 2 dialogues to increase the number of public and private stakeholders on both sides. While foreign and defence policy decisions remain in the hands of high-level state leaders, the proliferation of such mechanisms can still make significant contributions towards continued confidence-building.

Ultimately, the Philippines and Canada stand at an important juncture in their bilateral partnership. While present conditions have allowed their relations to deepen, the relationship still has quite some way to go before attaining the status of a strategic partnership similar to what the Philippines has with Japan, Australia, and South Korea. Therefore, a long-term roadmap should include regular defence collaboration, more integrated minilateral cooperation, improved commercial ties, and more frequent public-private exchanges.

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