Why Not All Indonesian Muslims Support Iran

The US-Israeli war against Iran is highly unpopular among Indonesians. A recent poll has found that most Indonesians disapprove of the war (83.1 per cent) and that they believe the US-Israeli alliance is on the wrong side of history (68.8 per cent).

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah leaders have categorically condemned the unprovoked US-Israeli military aggression against Tehran, while Rizieq Syihab, the firebrand leader of the now-defunct Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), has called on Shi’a and Sunni Muslims to put aside their theological differences in the face of a common enemy: the US and Israel. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) shared a similar sentiment, saying that the US-Israeli attacks on Tehran could unite the global Muslim community.

However, the support for Iran in Indonesia is far from unanimous. Anti-Iran sentiment prevails among those subscribing to the ideologies of transnational Islamic movements. These Sunnis consider Shi’a Islam, the main Islamic denomination in Iran, as “heretical”. Shi’a Muslims constitute a small fraction of Muslims in Indonesia where most Muslims are Sunnis. Out of the 240 million Muslims in the country, only up to three million people are Shi’a. A late prominent Shi’a figure estimated that the number of Shi’a followers in Indonesia in 2012 was 2.5 million.

Ulamas who represent transnational Islam, such as Khalid Basalamah and Felix Siauw, are more resistant in public toward Shi’a Islam compared to ulamas and Islamic organisations that are rooted in local traditions and culture, such as NU and Muhammadiyah. PKS leaders, who are ideologically aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, are less resistant towards Shi’as because of their pragmatism. Many leaders, especially local leaders, have publicly expressed anti-Shi’a sentiment, arguing that the latter is a heretical sect, while others expressed their sympathy when Shi’a followers suffered from persecution. In some instances, PKS leaders have managed to get along with Shi’a figures.

Transnational Islam refers to Islamic ideas, networks or movements that operate beyond nation-state borders and promote textual interpretation of Islam. Khalid, who is one of the prominent Sunni Salafist figures in Indonesia, seeks to purify religious teachings as promoted and conducted by the earliest generation of Islam (mainly the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the first four caliphs). Felix, another proponent of transnational Islam, is a former activist of Hizbut Tahrir. The group seeks to promote the establishment of an Islamic caliphate.

… the support for Iran in Indonesia is far from unanimous. Anti-Iran sentiment prevails among those subscribing to the ideologies of transnational Islamic movements.

In a podcast released by the SAP Channel, Khalid argued that Muslims should not support Iran in its fight against the US and Israel. He claimed, without showing evidence, that the war between Tehran and Tel Aviv is no more than a “facade”, citing a controversial report that Shi’a Islam was founded by a Jewish Muslim named Abdullah Bin Saba, whose existence has been disputed by many Shi’a Muslim scholars. He also claimed that, unlike Gaza, Iran is not a victim of a genocidal war. Thus asserting that there was no urgency for Indonesian Muslims to stand up for the Iranians.

Popular Islamic preacher Felix acknowledged that there are differences of opinion between Sunnis and Shi’as Muslims over the question of political succession after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. He noted that such differences were understandable. However, Felix added that there are some Shi’a sects that hold the “heretical” views that the Qur’an is incomplete, or that Prophet Muhammad is not the last prophet, even though this is not the mainstream view among Shi’a followers. For this reason, he advised Indonesian Muslims to act as onlookers in the Iran war.

Khalid and Felix are influential preachers who are widely followed by young Indonesian Muslims. Khalid has 3.7 million followers on YouTube and Felix has 2 million followers on Instagram. Understandably, their views on the Iran war quickly gained traction on social media. Their statements reflect the persistent influence of ideological or sectarian perspectives among some Indonesian Muslims in their understanding of geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East.

For years, several Shi’a communities in Indonesia have suffered from discrimination from their Sunni neighbours, who have pressured local governments to issue anti-Shi’a bylaws, especially during the era of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014). Anti-Shi’a sentiment peaked during the Syrian civil war (2011-2024), which was framed primarily as a sectarian war between Sunnis and Shi’as. Iran-backed Shi’a militias are known to have propped up the government of Bashar Al-Assad, while the Gulf countries have been accused of supporting the Sunni rebels.

Several liberal Indonesian Muslim figures, such as Luthfi As-Syaukanie and Saidiman Ahmad, have also critiqued Indonesian Muslims’ broad support for Tehran, but their arguments are more political than theological. They highlighted the fact that Iran is a theocratic and illiberal regime whose foreign policies, mainly its support for militant groups in the Middle East, have made it a pariah on the global stage. That said, they are less popular than conservative preachers like Khalid and Felix.

Indonesians’ views on the issue are not much different from Singaporeans and Malaysians. More than 70 per cent of Singaporeans and Malaysians are critical of the US and Israeli attacks on Iran. In contrast to Indonesia, however, anti-Iran sentiment stemming from anti-Shi’a perspectives is not quite visible in the two countries, which also have significant Muslim populations. Indonesia and Malaysia are also a study in contrast: while the latter has anti-Shi’a laws and restrictions, the former does not. Ironically, this has led to anti-Shi’a Sunnis in Indonesia pushing back more vigorously against Shi’as.

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