Will Trump Revolutionise American Foreign Policy?

Over the past eight months, President Donald Trump has upended America’s post-Cold War foreign policy. Compared to his first term, Trump is doing much more to bend America’s foreign policy to his worldview. A critical unanswered question, though, is whether Trump’s foreign policy orientation will outlive his time in office. This author stands skeptical.

First, though, a quick recounting of what has changed. Trump has sought to clip the wings of multilateral organisations that seek to impose extraterritorial rules on countries. He has pushed back against multiculturalism and liberalism. He has centred American foreign policy around his personal involvement in making deals, whether in trade negotiations, efforts to end wars, and advocacy for like-minded figures such as Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil. He has focused on the risks for America of depending upon other countries for critical inputs, such as rare earths. Trump has also prioritised halting the inflow of immigrants into the US and instead encouraged building national identity around ancestry and shared history.

Trump applies an everyman’s approach to foreign policy decision-making. He questions why Americans should care about human rights conditions in other countries or invest in democracy promotion abroad. He challenges arguments that America gains from granting security to allies. He treats trade balances between countries like balance sheets between companies. He is skeptical of commitments by countries to contribute to collective action challenges such as global warming and global public health. Underlying these specific positions is a broader critique that America, in recent decades, has overextended itself abroad. Trump believes US officials have been quick to sacrifice American lives and wealth in the service of other people’s problems while the country’s own domestic condition has worsened. 

Some analysts, such as Stimson Center Senior Fellow Emma Ashford, have sought to cast Trump’s reorientation of American foreign policy as a return to realism. In this telling, Trump is right to reject grandiose visions of remaking the world and instead accept global order as something to be “managed, rather than transformed.”

The problem with this analysis is that by his own self-description, Trump is a dealmaker, not a strategist. He personalises international relations as an extension of his relationships with foreign counterparts. Rather, American foreign policy in the second Trump administration is largely an extension of Trump’s own personal instincts, grievances, and identification of opportunities.

Trump has at various points believed the war in Ukraine could be terminated because, he said, Putin “wants to make a deal for me.” Similarly, he thinks US-China trade deals are possible because he believes he and Xi can negotiate effectively with each other. He does not worry about conflict in the Taiwan Strait because, according to Trump, Xi assured him it would not occur under Trump’s watch.

Some of  Trump’s advisors have a consistent and holistic worldview. But they are not empowered to make decisions or speak to the world on behalf of the administration. That job is largely reserved for the president himself. Unlike any president before him, Trump has become a nearly ubiquitous presence in the media. Trump is his own spokesperson.

… this period of transition also could lead to a less securitised, less values-based, and more economic and interests-based relationship between the US and the region. Or it could usher in an era of American retrenchment. Or something in between. Nobody knows for certain.

Importantly, Trump’s signature foreign policies are not popular with the American public. Even Trump’s own political base is skeptical of key pillars of his foreign policy, but they appear willing to tolerate them so long as Trump is behind them. For example, American workers do not support Trump’s tariffs. Instead, they have indicated by a 51 per cent margin that the US should pursue free trade, according to polling by the bipartisan Economic Innovation Group. Similarly, support for American leadership on the world stage remains strong, despite Trump’s attempts to sell a vision for a more limited and transactional American role on the world stage. According to June polling by the Ronald Reagan Institute, 73 per cent of Make America Great Again (MAGA) Republicans want the US to be “more engaged and take the lead” on foreign policy; 83 per cent say “the US has a moral obligation to stand up for human rights and democracy whenever possible in international affairs.” 

When Trump exits office, it is unlikely that American foreign policy will continue on its current trajectory, but it also will not revert to pre-Trump American foreign policy either. Just as there is nobody in the MAGA wing of the Republican Party who could replicate and hold together support for Trump’s personalistic approach to international relations, there also is no chance of a restoration to traditional post-World War II American foreign policy. After Trump’s two terms of disruption to the international system, no American leader could credibly pledge to the rest of the world that America will return to its past foreign policy traditions.

Instead, as Mira Rapp-Hooper and Rebecca Lissner have argued, America will need to conduct a “zero based” review of its foreign policy after Trump departs. American strategists will use a clean slate to evaluate what interests and values to prioritise and how best to do so. America’s 2028 presidential election will be a competition of ideas for how the country will relate to the rest of the world going forward. 

Depending upon one’s point of view, this could either be unsettling or exciting for leaders in Southeast Asia. While it could create near-term uncertainty, this period of transition also could lead to a less securitised, less values-based, and more economic and interests-based relationship between the US and the region. Or it could usher in an era of American retrenchment. Or something in between. Nobody knows for certain. 

One thing is certain: Trump has opened a period of transition in American foreign policy. Benefits may accrue to countries that preserve flexibility and optionality in their foreign policy orientations. Those that limit their options by aligning with America or China during this transition period may foreclose future benefits in service of short-term predictability.

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