With Malaysia’s Opposition Weakened, Anwar Faces More Secure Future

Since forming his unity government in the aftermath of Malaysia’s 15th general election (GE15) in November 2022, pundits have expressed a near-consistent pessimism about the long-term survival of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. They have pointed to his weak support among the majority Malay-Muslims and the solid gains made by the opposition Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition among Malay voters in GE15 and the August 2023 state elections. It has also been observed that many non-Malays have also increasingly begun to sour on him given the slow progress in implementing promised institutional reforms.

Twenty months in, however, it seems more and more likely that Anwar’s government will survive its full term. While acknowledging Anwar’s unpopularity among Malays and increasingly his own voters, one should also consider the failure of PN to provide effective opposition to Anwar’s government. Indeed, PN’s inability to attract non-Malay support alongside tensions between the coalition’s component parties — Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) and Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu) — suggests an opposition with uncertain long-term prospects. One could also argue that Anwar’s control over the vast resources of the federal government is also starting to pay dividends for him.    

The weakening of PN could be seen in their recent performance in the Kuala Kubu Baharu (KKB) by-election held on 11 May. A Selangor state constituency previously held by Lee Kee Hiong of the Democratic Action Party (DAP), one of the component parties of Anwar’s unity government, a by-election had been called after Ms Lee’s death on 21 March. Despite predictions of a reduced majority or even a loss for Anwar, the DAP candidate Pang Sock Tao secured a larger majority than her predecessor (57.2 per cent of total votes compared to Ms Lee’s 54 in the August 2023 state elections). The PN candidate, Bersatu member Khairul Azhari Saut, secured 41.4 per cent of the vote.

One by-election should not be seen as indicative of the future direction of Malaysian politics. The dynamics of state elections generally differ from that of national elections. Nevertheless, certain aspects of PN’s overall performance in KKB point to larger factors at play which have increasingly plagued the coalition in recent months.

Predictably, PN’s loss was primarily blamed on its inability to attract non-Malay support, with PN ultimately gaining most of the Malay votes and PH most of the non-Malays (Malays make up 49.3 per cent of total KKB voters, while the Chinese comprise 30.6 per cent and the Indians 17.9 per cent). Since GE15, PN has struggled to reach out to non-Malays, preferring instead to double down on its exclusivist, Malay ethnonationalist agenda for Malaysia.

Ultimately, PN’s ability to provide effective opposition to Anwar is increasingly diminishing. The long-term cohesiveness of PN is questionable given the growing tensions between PAS and Bersatu over the unequal distribution of power within the coalition and Bersatu’s own fragility

Previous attempts by PN to reach out to non-Malays have largely flopped. When it comes to Indian voters, PN initially made gains during the August 2023 state elections, securing an estimated 29 per cent of the Indian vote in Penang, followed by 19 per cent in Negeri Sembilan and 14 per cent in Selangor. However, attempts to repeat this in KKB, or to urge the community to boycott the polls altogether, were unsuccessful, with Anwar’s government ultimately making gains in KKB’s Indian votes. PN has had even less success in attracting Chinese votes. Their campaign in KKB almost immediately ran into trouble. The coalition’s apparent attacks on Chinese vernacular schools alienated the Chinese.

In the aftermath of GE15, PN sought to position itself as the new champion of Malay rights, espousing a new, more chauvinistic form of Malay nationalism and Islamist politics. While this has proved useful in mobilising Malay support, analysts have warned that this support has reached a saturation point and that PN will ultimately struggle to form a government without non-Malay support. PN will find itself particularly handicapped in the crucial region of East Malaysia, where political parties remain wary of the hardline Islamist politics of their Western counterparts.   

PN’s loss in KKB was also blamed on lacklustre campaigning by PAS on behalf of the Bersatu candidate. This may well be due to growing tensions between PAS and Bersatu. While Bersatu holds fewer parliamentary seats than PAS, it officially leads PN due to the influence of Bersatu President and former premier Muhyiddin Yassin. He is also PN’s primary candidate for Prime Minister.

This dynamic has raised tensions between both parties, with PAS unhappy about serving as a junior partner to a party increasingly seen as deadweight. Indeed, Bersatu has recently been beset by the defections of its MPs to Anwar’s unity government. Since October 2023, six Bersatu MPs have declared their support for Anwar. Their primary motivation was to secure federal funds, which under Malaysia’s current system is not afforded to opposition-held constituencies.  While Bersatu seeks to stem the bleeding, many in PAS have started to question the value they bring as a partner. Already, analysts are discussing the possibility of PN breaking up.

In comparison, Anwar has managed to shore up his position through control of the levers of power. A shift in support from the predominantly-Malay police and military personnel in KKB towards the unity government has been attributed to a recently announced 13 per cent salary hike for public sector workers. The promise of development has also proved enticing to the less-developed opposition-held states. In May, the normally outspoken and divisive Kedah Chief Minister and PAS member Muhammad Sanusi Md Nor publicly apologised to Anwar for his previous remarks attacking the government, adding that he hoped ‘the Federal Government would always give attention to and not sideline the state [i.e. Kedah]’. Anwar has also managed to ensure the support of the crucial Bornean states by giving in to the demands from Sarawak and Sabah for more state autonomy.

Ultimately, PN’s ability to provide effective opposition to Anwar is increasingly diminishing. The long-term cohesiveness of PN is questionable given the growing tensions between PAS and Bersatu over the unequal distribution of power within the coalition and Bersatu’s own fragility. Concurrently, Anwar’s control over the levels of power and the resources it brings has allowed him to bolster his own position vis-a-vis the opposition. Looking ahead, one could well argue that the pessimism that Anwar has faced since day one may ultimately prove unwarranted.

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