“Youth Retirement Homes”: A Temporary Fad or an Emerging Industry?
Published
A number of ‘youth retirement homes’ in China and, more recently, Malaysia provide insights into the predicaments faced by youth in the two countries.
Retirement and nursing homes are typically associated with the elderly and long-term care patients. However, post-pandemic, a new type of facility — “youth retirement homes” — has emerged in China and, most recently, in Malaysia. Their emergence provides some insight into what drives demand and the predicaments faced by youth in both countries.
Youth retirement homes offer affordable short-term stays (ranging from weeks to months) for young people in their twenties to mid-forties. Located in sub-urban or rural areas, including in scenic and natural surroundings, they provide communal living with activities such as meditation, painting, farming, and shared meals. Despite the “retirement” label, they are more analogous to retreats and wellness centres. The term is used loosely — a literal translation from Mandarin: 青年养老院 (youth retirement/nursing home) and 青年疗养院 (youth recuperation facility). They offer a social space for young residents to pause, slow down, and recalibrate.
In China, these facilities were initially established in late-2022 in Jiangmen, Guangdong and Xishuangbanna (西双版纳), Yunnan before spreading to other locations. By the end of 2024, there were over 2,000 such facilities in 20 provinces. On RedNote (小红书), a popular Chinese social media app, the hashtag #青年养老院 has gained almost 10 million views.
In December 2025, Malaysia’s first youth retirement home was reported to have opened in Gopeng, Perak by a 25-year-old whose family runs a nursing home. Social media reactions then were mixed: critics dismissed participating youths as “snowflakes” while others sympathised with them, stating that they were “stressed out”, “tired, overwhelmed, and burned out”.
The emergence of such facilities in China and Malaysia shares some common drivers. The interaction of these drivers contributes towards the phenomenon.
First, following the quiet quitting trend, youths globally are shifting away from the belief that work defines personal success; instead, they are prioritising work-life balance. It has been noted that Gen-Zers (born 1997-2012) value meaningful work and flexibility while millennials (born 1981-1996) value self-employment and new types of work. Sabbaticals and career breaks are normalised and prioritised as maintaining personal wellbeing.
Second, remote work, freelancing and digital nomadism have sustained the demand and viability of youth retirement homes. A facility in China reported that about 30 per cent of its residents are digital nomads. Affordable rentals and a communal lifestyle appeal to this group.
The operators, most of whom are youths themselves, treat these facilities as entrepreneurial ventures within the passion economy. In effect, they seek to monetise individuality and creativity.
Third, social media platforms amplified the promotion of the phenomenon, fuelling the growth of what has been called “a commercial project” aimed at alleviating youth anxieties. The operators, most of whom are youths themselves, treat these facilities as entrepreneurial ventures within the passion economy. In effect, they seek to monetise individuality and creativity. In sum, social media magnifies these facilities’ attractiveness as idealist retreats which meet youths’ lifestyle and psychosocial needs.
In China’s case, there are further context-specific drivers. These facilities are said to have emerged in response to rising youth unemployment and intensifying competition in urban life, which have worsened since the Covid-19 pandemic. Faced with a defeatist sense of involution (内卷), Chinese youths are said to be experiencing economic disillusionment. This led to trends of “lying flat” (躺平, or adopting a chill-out attitude instead of hustling) and “let it rot” (摆烂, voluntarily retreating in the face of a losing battle). In this context, youth retirement homes offer Chinese youths a coping mechanism to pause momentarily and seek psychological respite. Indeed, some youth residents found solidarity, emotional support and “valuable experience” during their stays.
In Malaysia’s case, the Gopeng operator shared that his motivation was to offer an escape for burnt-out youths like himself. Despite previously saying that bookings will be open till March 2026, the facility later announced a hiatus till further notice. While conclusions cannot be drawn from a single case, it does suggest that the drivers and scalar demand for such facilities in Malaysia are not directly comparable to those in China. In Malaysia, such facilities are perhaps closer to short-term holiday stays. In other words, the Malaysian case is more closely related to lifestyle tourism than to the systemic youth crisis in China’s case.
Nevertheless, the fact that the Malaysian operator intentionally marketed the facility as such on social media signalled the direct referencing of the Chinese phenomenon. The cultural interference could have been facilitated through the prevalence of Chinese social media use in Malaysia. For example, with more than 2.5 million users, Malaysia is the second largest market for RedNote outside China and Taiwan.
In China, observers have pointed out that the youth retirement home business model may be unsustainable. For this emerging industry to remain sustainable, attention needs to be paid to their proper governance and regulation. Professional licensing, operational standards and consumer rights protection are important, given the reliance on unregulated social media marketing. With regulatory oversight, this emergent industry could establish a niche at the intersections of tourism, wellness, housing and social care for youths.
2026/16
Koh Sin Yee is Visiting Fellow at ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, and Senior Assistant Professor at the Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam.


















