A Crisis of Trust: The SAC’s Failure in Post-Disaster Strategic Communications

The devastating earthquake that shook central Myanmar on 28 March 2025 gave the State Administration Council (SAC) military regime an opportunity to use the post-earthquake response to regain international attention. The generals have attempted to boost the SAC’s international image for their planned election but clearly failed at home. They have made no meaningful or effective post-disaster communications to communities affected by the earthquake. This breakdown is not just about poor performance; it reflects a deeper crisis of public distrust in the regime.

Up until last week, the Thai Meteorological Department’s Earthquake Observation Division data showed that Myanmar had experienced at least 1,125 aftershocks since the powerful 7.7 Richter magnitude quake in late March. Thousands of people have had to stay on the streets of Mandalay, Naypyidaw, and Sagaing cities, closest to the tremors, suffering through the aftershocks.

Yet, the SAC has paid little attention to the playbook of post-disaster communication practices. Soon after the earthquake, the junta published sanitised updates in state-run newspapers, including broadcasting staged footage of site visits by SAC members and rescue information on Myanmar Radio and Television, and sharing selective messages through Viber and state-run radio channels. Ironically, television news was inaccessible for affected communities where electricity was out for weeks. Many people were living on the streets, without shelter or access to basic amenities. A week after the quake (29 March to 4 April), more than two-thirds of Myanma Ahlin news reports on the quake response were about the authorities purportedly inspecting earthquake sites, receiving foreign donations, then organising (staged) donations to selected communities, and attending meetings.

There was little or no post-disaster awareness information. Thus, in the critical first 72 hours following the quake, rumours flourished without clear, transparent, and timely messaging on rescue priorities and aid distribution from official communication channels. Worse, AI-generated or unrelated disaster footage trended on social media, adding to the spread of confusion and panic. In response, independent media, grassroots digital networks, and local organisations filled this information gap and fact-checked controversial reports.

The regime also failed to respond and communicate against fake news and rumours, instead relying mainly on coercive power to arrest sources of misinformation, after the fact. For instance, scenes of the quake’s aftermath, unverified reports of aftershocks, exaggerated death tolls, and conspiracy theories about armed actors attacking aid efforts circulated widely on platforms like Facebook, Telegram, and TikTok. A Myanmar TikTok astrologer with more than 300,000 followers predicted another powerful earthquake, terrifying people for weeks. These falsehoods led some people to continue staying outdoors.

In a society already fractured by civil war and distrust, the earthquake in Myanmar has only amplified the SAC’s unwillingness to prioritise humanitarian emergencies over its civil war and election plans.

Furthermore, scammers used fake IDs on Facebook, Viber, and Telegram or celebrities’ names to trick people into donating to quake relief, but the regime did not coordinate any public awareness campaign to warn citizens about these surges in fraudulent posts and activity. The SAC instead scrutinised genuine charity and donation groups on the ground, which posed more challenges and delayed aid to affected communities.

With political and overly propagandistic messages and the regime ignoring massive and desperate humanitarian needs, more people turned to Facebook, one of Myanmar’s most popular social media platforms, for news. The Department of Meteorology and Hydrology Facebook page, one of just a few Myanmar public service pages left after Facebook removed SAC-affiliated pages in 2021, typically updates people on regular weather conditions and is not a two-way communication channel for crisis updates and responses. Worse, SAC’s Viber and Telegram channels have only 500 and 30,000 subscribers, respectively. Such insignificant subscriber numbers compared to the 33.4 million Internet users in Myanmar indicate low public trust in the SAC and reflect the SAC’s public communications failure.

Continued propaganda of the SAC media with little attention to the people’s information and post-disaster needs has further eroded public trust. Two weeks post-quake, the SAC’s push for elections started visibly taking up more space in state-run news. This was after the SAC’s Union Election Commission confirmed elections would be held in December 2025. Meanwhile, SAC military operations continued: at least 741 airstrikes were launched from 28 March to 13 May despite a “ceasefire announcement”. State-run media blatantly denied the military’s post-quake atrocities, especially the airstrike on O Htein Twin village school in Sagaing region, which killed some 20 students and two teachers, and injured many.

In the author’s conversations with affected communities in Mandalay, urban Sagaing, and Naypyidaw, almost all interviewees said that they did not read news or listen to state-run television and radio channels, as these were full of propaganda. For aid distribution and relief work, however, they appreciated front-line civil servants such as firefighters, relief workers, staff of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement, and international and local aid teams (as championed by the former National League for Democracy government). However, their appreciation clearly does not translate to trust that the SAC leadership is ready to lend them a hand.

Authoritarian regimes often view disasters as opportunities to consolidate power and gain legitimacy. In a society already fractured by civil war and distrust, the earthquake in Myanmar has only amplified the SAC’s unwillingness to prioritise humanitarian emergencies over its civil war and election plans. The real disaster for Myanmar was not the seismic event but public trust in the regime due to its continued acts of violence and ignoring public needs in a crisis.   

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