A Double-Edged Sword: Prabowo’s Shrinking Circle of Trust

In six weeks, Indonesia’s National Nutrition Agency (BGN) changed leaders twice. In July, Nanik Sudaryati Deyang resigned; Sudaryono, a senior Gerindra politician, former deputy agriculture minister and long-time Prabowo loyalist, replaced her. This was more than a leadership shake-up — it can be seen as an attempt by President Prabowo Subianto to regain control of his Free Nutritious Meals (Makan Bergizi Gratis, MBG) programme, which has become a liability.

Sudaryono’s appointment reveals something fundamental about the way Prabowo governs. The administration now depends heavily on the president and a small circle of loyalists, who are mostly relatively junior, with limited administrative experience.

The first BGN leader, Dadan Hindayana, was detained along with two former deputies over alleged corruption in the MBG programme’s governance. Dadan had helped to design the programme’s institutional machinery: his fall therefore exposes more than alleged individual wrongdoing. It raises questions about the system created around Prabowo’s most expensive campaign promise; the corruption allegations will be tested in court.

The BGN’s turmoil followed persistent reports of logistical failures and quality concerns. In early March 2026, the Corruption Eradication Commission had warned that the programme needed transparent budgeting, traceable fund distribution and stronger monitoring, identifying vulnerabilities in hiring and evaluation matters.

These are structural weaknesses, not isolated mistakes.

How the programme has been rolled out matters because it embodies Prabowo’s governing philosophy. The president hopes for a strong state that can deliver visible benefits directly to Indonesians on a large scale. If it works, this programme could become the social foundation of his presidency. If it fails, the same scale magnifies every weakness: occasionally unsafe food preparation and practices, opaque procurement, rent-seeking and poor accountability, especially where personal connections outweigh expertise.

Sudaryono has acknowledged that the MBG programme suffers from governance and transparency problems, promising “zero tolerance” for corruption. He has dismissed 261 employees, closed 833 kitchens and plans to open 13,000 new kitchens in remote areas.

Trusted appointees may help to impose discipline, contain factionalism and strengthen control. However, political authority alone cannot transform an organisation or ensure effective policy implementation.

In effect, he is trying to fix the BGN’s management style without changing its institutional design. Yet Sudaryono is not a nutrition specialist, but a Gerindra leader who once served as deputy agriculture minister. Like several other Prabowo loyalists, Sudaryono graduated from Taruna Nusantara High School (in 2003). After studying engineering at Japan’s National Defense Academy in 2009, he served as Prabowo’s personal assistant until 2015, then joined a group of young protégés known as Prabowo’s “Jedi”.

That background does not automatically make Sudaryono unqualified but clarifies the logic of his selection. The president chose someone whose loyalty and access could help to impose control over an agency that had become difficult to govern. This characteristic of Prabowo’s leadership style, where his government aims to project strength through large programmes, powerful new agencies and ambitious national targets, yet relies on informal trust, supported by his loyalists, subordinates Indonesia’s formal institutions to personalised command.

Prabowo acted similarly after the mass protests that culminated in riots in late August 2025 by appointing retired Lieutenant General Djamari Chaniago, a senior officer from the president’s active years in the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI), as coordinating minister for political and security affairs (Menko Polkam). Chaniago was on the officers’ honorary council that recommended Prabowo’s dismissal from military service in 1998, but later joined Gerindra and became one of Prabowo’s confidants.

Soon after that, Prabowo dismissed Cooperatives Minister Budi Arie Setiadi, a Jokowi loyalist, replacing him with Ferry Juliantono, a Gerindra deputy chairman and long-time Prabowo ally. The cooperatives ministry helps to implement Prabowo’s ‘Red and White’ Village Cooperatives (Kopdes merah-putih) programme. Meanwhile, at Garuda Indonesia, Prabowo appointed another military friend, retired Lieutenant General Glenny Kairupan, as president director.

However, in his handling of powerful institutions such as the TNI, the National Police (Polri) and the Attorney General’s Office (AGO), Prabowo has taken a different approach. The president may not wish to change the leadership of these key institutions because his programmes need their support. In late August 2025, even amid signs of rivalry between the military and police, he did not replace the heads of either entity, instead dismissing former police General Budi Gunawan as Menko Polkam. Gunawan is widely seen as being close to Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) chairwoman and former President Megawati Sukarnoputri, whose party remains outside Prabowo’s coalition.

Prabowo also refrained from removing Febrie Adriansyah, former deputy Attorney General for Special Crimes (Jampidsus), even after police found IDR476 billion (USD26.7 million) in cash and 74 kilogrammes of gold at Febrie’s home, in a raid that intensified the rivalry between the AGO and Polri. (Febrie has since resigned as Jampidsus.) Febrie also headed the Forest Area Enforcement Task Force (Satgas PKH), whose personnel are mostly military. By June 2026, Satgas PKH had seized 5.9 million hectares worth IDR379 trillion (USD21.3 billion). The largest share of this seizure were transferred to PT Agrinas Palma Nusantara, a state-owned company that sovereign wealth fund Danantara manages. This case exposed a broader confrontation between the police and the AGO-TNI link. Since May 2025, Prabowo has authorised military protection for prosecutors, which arguably strengthens the AGO’s ties with the TNI.

Policy Implications

The president’s reliance on loyalists and confidants to implement his policies cuts both ways. Trusted appointees may help to impose discipline, contain factionalism and strengthen control. However, political authority alone cannot transform an organisation or ensure effective policy implementation. As his exercise of power becomes increasingly personalised, Prabowo risks eroding the trust and initiative of those outside his inner circle. Officials may remain within the administration, but may be less willing to advance the president’s agenda or propose new ideas.

For instance, Sudaryono may be consolidating control, but food poisoning incidents have continued in Semarang (Central Java), Jayapura (Papua), Berastagi (North Sumatra) and elsewhere. The closure of hundreds of kitchens angered operators who invested in the programme; many of them have ties to the governing coalition. Ironically, the measures intended to restore order could create a new constituency opposed to the administration, if these new problems are not fixed.

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